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In an era when there is so much interest in the revolutionary goals and 
tactics of socialist parties, the role of the Bolsheviks in the upheaval of 
1905 against the Tsar deserves notice as an example of the goals and tactics 
of a Marxist party in a revolutionary struggle. Therefore it is the aim of 
this study to explain such aspects of Bolshevik revolutionary activity in 
1905 as the objectives of the Bolsheviks in a democratic revolution, their 
revolutionary tactics and strategy, their methods of propaganda and agitation, 
their attitudes toward the proletariat and other classes in Russitbsuch as the 
peasantry and the armed forces, their relation to other revolutionary groups, 
their organization and implementation of armed uprisings against the govern-
ment, and the reasons for their failure in 1905. 
In dealing vith this topic I have consulted such primar,y sources as 
memoirs of men of various parties, leaflets, newspaper articles and tracts 
vritten by the leading revolutionaries, and army and police reports. The sec-
ondary sources consisted mostly of vorks on the Revolution of 1905 published 
within the Soviet Union and a number of Menshevik and western secondary source~: 
which I consulted to check the accuracy and interpretation of the Soviet sour-
ces. Most of the materials used in this study are located in the Harper 
Library of the University of Chicago, though many valuable sources were also 
found in the Deering Library of Northwestern University and the Cudahy Library 
of Loyola University. 
Throughout the fooimotes, the Libraey of Congress system of translitera-
tion of slavic languages has been used. All the dates in the text and the 
ii 
footnotes, unless otherwise indicated, are given in the Julian calender then 
current in Russia. The Julian calendar is thirteen days behind the Gregorian 
calendar now current in the West 1 and since 19181 in Russia. 
I would lilte to express my gratitude to Dr. Franklin A. Walker who 
suggested the topic and whose class lectures were a great aid to me in this 
study. To Dr. Silvestro for her critical analysis of the manuscript and for 
her helptul cOI!IZllents and further suggestions in the course of its writing, 
and Miss Laurel Tossing who bas been of great assistance in the typing of 
the final copy of the manuscript. 
At the turn of the century, 1n e period wen constitutional and parlia-
mentary limitations on royal power and mass participation in government were 
becaning vide spread in Europe 1 Russia vas still under the rule of an autocrat. 
The power that Tsar Nicholas II wielded O"''er his 123 million subjects was 
limited only by the inefficiency of his bureaucracy, of which the most effi· 
cient arm was neither the f1nanc:ial 1 judicial, nor military branch, but the 
police. Although ideas of self-government and social reform had already 
made their entrance into Russia, the Tsar was determined to preserve both the 
autocracy and the hierarchic structure of Russian society. Nicholas' outlook 
an life and his canception of his duty as head of the state were deeply in• 
fluenced by his adviser and former tutor 1 the procurator of the Holy Synod 
and the most articulate representative of Russian-official-conservative though 10 , 
Konstantine Petrovich Pobedonostsev. L1la!t Pobedonostsev 1 Nicholas thought of 
society as an organism in which each ma~or division had a definite fixed ftmc• 
tion to fulfill. The Church was to preach the true faith and lO)'alty to the 
state. The nobility vas to aid the Tsar in administering the state by provid• 
1ng the personnel necessary to staff the bureaucracy and the officers' corps. 
The peasants, meanwhile, were to work the soil end fight the wers. Unlike 
Peter the Great 1 Nicholas had little use for the urban middle class. He mis-
-1-
understood and mistrusted canmerce, banking and industr;r as infiltrated by 
foreigners and Jevs. Nicholas considered it his duty as head of state to 
preserve the social structure and was determined to prevent any change 1n it 
by the use of his autocratic powr. Inf'luenced by Pobedonostsev' s philosophy 
which held man to be essentially evil and unable to govern h:lmsel:t, Nicholas 
mistrusted and opposed any attempt at self•govemment 1n Russia. He grudging-
ly tolerated the zemstvoa, the elected organs ot local-self-government which 
had the duty of administering local l.otJer and middle education, hospitals, 
prisons, and asylums, mai.lta.in:tng roads and bridges, and advancing pUblic 
health., relief of the :poor, camnerce, industry, and scientific agriculture, 
but he severely restricted their f'reedan of action throughout his reign. 
As for selt•government on the national level, Nicholas was convinced that the 
Russian peoplA 1 espedially1 were incapable of governing themselves. He was 
therefore determined not to share his power with any organ of self-government. 
Shortly after his coronation in 18941 in a speech widely held to be vritten 
by Pobedonostsev 1 Nicholas crushed the hopes of the zemstvo leaders that they 
might participate :ln the general administration of the internal affairs of 
the state by enn.atmcing that he would uphold the p.rlneiple of autocracy as 
fimly as did his father, Alexander III, and by calling the notions of the 
zemstvo leaders "senseless dreams." The Tsar thought of' his subjects as his 
children and though he was deeply interested :ln their vel:tare he expected 
frau them the obedience due to a patriarchal father and was canpletel.y insen-
sitive to public opinion and the demands of his subjects for self-government. 
While the Tsar expected docile obedience tran his "chUdren" the ecano-
mic situation during his reign gave rise to an increasing restlessness through· 
out the country. Due to primitive methods of farming the Russian peasant had 
always barely managed to subsist and usually lived :tn dire poverty. Shortly 
before the turn of the century the agricultural situation~ worsened. The 
lands wh.ich the serfs had been granted with their treedan in 1861 were in 
many regions barely adequate to sustain the families that wrked them while 
payments required by the state to canpensate the nobles for these lands were 
more than most peasants could attord. At the same time the 1890's witnessed 
a rapid increase in the agricultural population. Russian industry ws still 
in its 1ni'ancy and could absorb only a 3!!Sll segment of this surplus popula-
tion. Consequently 1 the ;,."U%'81 areas of Russia which had alw:rs suffered from 
a low yield fran the soil now had the added problem of having more mouths to 
feed than could be supported by the soil and more laborers than were needed to 
actuall;y' work the soil. Nor vas there much hope of :lmprovement. The cOOillli.Ulal 
farming and frequent .~distribution of the land by the village camnunes stifle~ 
individual initiative depriving the peasants of a:ny desire to improve the land 
on which they did not have a secure and permanent hold. To aggravate tbe sit • 
uatian1 canpetition fran Prussia, Canada, and the United states considerably 
lowered the profits of Russian grain exports. Finally, the plight of' the 
Russian peasantry was worsened by foul weather which helped bring on the fam• 
ines of 1891-21 18971 18981 and 1901. Tbe undernourishment caused by these 
famines and the primitive hygiene which prevailed in the Russian countryside 
made the populatian more susceptible to upidemics such as the cholera epidemic 
which broke out in 1893 following the famines of previous years and dragged 
on for several years adding to the woes of the population. 
The econQllic strife :1n Russia produced not only physical hardship but 
social strife as well. 'l'he rapid growth of a surplus 1'1..1J."Ql population toward 
the end of the century gave rise to a large agricul.tural proletariat and the 
more numerous this class became the lowr the wages of the day laborers on 
large estates dropped. The increasing poverty and ec:ploitaticm. of the rural 
:proletariat intensified the hate which members of that class felt toward 
large landowners, especially in the Baltic region 'Where the emplo~nt of the 
rural proletariat ws especially widespread and where there was the added 
national hostility of Lithuanian, Lettish, and Estonian farm laoorers toward 
German and Russian landlords. In other regions the proportion of the land 
held by the nobles varied and ws ste'.>c1U.y decrea.s:t.ng as impoverished nobles 
sold or leased their la:tJs to more prosperous peasants. Yet in the midst of 
economic distress most peasants imagined that the acquisition of the nobles' 
estates as well as the state and church lands vou.ld solve their ecananic 
problems by i<'"l.creasing the landholding of the peasants and ridding them of 
the burden of pe.~ heavy rents. !b.eref'ore the pea.sant class viewed the 
nobles' estates in the Baltic provinces, Georgia, and southern Russia, as 
well as the large church and state lands with increasing greed. Already in 
1902 the increasing restlessness of the peasantry was manifested by the plun• 
dering of estates in the Kharkov and Poltava prcwinces and by the camnem.ce• 
ment of a guerilla war in Western Georgia. ot course, almost every region 
had a. history of peasant unrest and revolts but the disorders of 1902 boded 
ill for the twentieth century. 
While the agrarian crisis in Ruscla was making the peasant class in• 
creas:tngly restive, the developnent of Russian industry gave rise to a ne·\., 
d.issat1sf1ed class, the urban proletariat. In the last decade of the nine-
teenth century, industrial centers sprang~ with heavy concentration in the 
St. Petersburg, Moscm.r, and Don Basin regions. By 1900 more than two and a 
h.alf million workers were concentrated in these areas. Since Russian industry 
was still in its infancy the workers were exposed to a g:~.-oeat deal of. abuse. 
The average yearly' wage for a man at the turn of the century '-'US l/38 rubles 
or less than 95 dollars, while the average American worker in 1900 earned 
490 dollars or about 21000 dollars in today1 s cu.rrency. Russian women were 
paid half' as much while cllildren earned only' a third of the reg-\llar wage • 
The working day averaged eleven to fourteen hours in length not including 
the overtime work which workers were frequently canpelled to tmdertake either 
by lack of money to support tnemselvch• o.c by pressure fran the factory mana.• 
gers. Working and sanitary conditions were deplorable while 1-101.•kers "'rere 
further degraded by frequent searches for illegal literature, weapons, or 
stolen parts and tools in the factories as well as in their OV.'Il. living qutilrt• 
ers. F:tnes for inefficiency not CXIl.ly presented another form of degradation 
tor the workers but made their pitiable earnings even snaller. The workers' 
living quarters, often provided by the canp&.ny they worked for, were badly 
built, crowded 1 unsanitary, and expensive. Tbrougb.out the 1890's the govern-
ment attempted to mitigate the hardships of the wat"kers by ;passing tactor.r 
leg1sla.tic:m. regul.ating woman and child labor, lilaiting the work day to eleven 
and a half hours and setting a limit on overtime worlt along with other mea sure ~. 
However 1 these laws vere poor~ enforced and often evaded proving little 
help to the workers. Labor was not al.lowed to organize except; for the unions 
created by the government in 1900 and uupervised by the :t>..ead of the Moscow 
security police 1 SE!rgei Zubatov. The workers 1 most powerful wapan1 the 
strike, was forbidden and many unauthorized strikes occurring in Siberia, the 
Urals, and southern Russia in the earl¥ 1900's were crushed by volleys fran 
military detacbments. To make things even worse 1 the period juS"ii after the 
turn of the century was marked by a series of depressions ivhich forced oany 
workers to return to their native villages and wile the poverty of those 
who rema 1ned increased. 
All in all the harsh condition in which the workers found themselves 
made them a dissatisfied class and therefore a fertile field for revolutiona.r;y 
propaganda. Furthermore, their concentration in large industrial areas made 
agitation among them that much easier. Final~ 1 the workers themselves were 
usual~ just literate enough to absorb new ideas while at the same time they 
were ignorant and gullible enough to uncritica~ accept any utopian and rad-
ical ideas offered by the revolutionaries as solutions to the social and 
economic problems of the working class. 
Efforts to improve the econcrnic situatian in Russia further increased 
the burdens of the peasants and industria 1 workers. The efforts of Count 
Witte 1 the minister of Finance, to base Russian currency on the gold standard, 
finance the ccm.strueticm. of the Trans-8iberian Railroad, and to accelerate the 
growth of Russian industry thrOugh subsidies to industrialists increase the 
taxes of all the classes of societ,-. At the same time his maintenance of a 
high tariff raised the prices of imported articles and maintained the high 
prices of Russian manufactured goods thus placing an additional burden the 
lower class. 
While it is true that their harsh economic condition made the peasants 
and workers increasing~ restive 1 more than poverty and dissatisfaction is 
needed for a revolutian. Neither econanic hardship nor rebellion were un• 
lmow:n. in Russia. .aowe.wer 1 previous pee sent risi:DsJI '.8Mh .aa ~;···iet!"'1:t7 
1 . 
BGlatnilmv and Pugachev ~~· l,}GOrly led and orc;an1zed and had no definite 
and the begirming ot the twentieth, however, there was a class tn Russia which 
was willing and able to give the restless masses leadership and organization. 
This class was the "intelligentsia~ which included professional men such as 
doctors, law,ers, professors, engineers, journalists, and students 1n the 
urban areas sa well as teachers, agt"QD.aaists, botanists, veterinarians, 
econcaists, and statisticians empl())fed by the zematvos in the rural areas. 
Loosel.7 applied, the term "intelligentsia" included not cm.ly people of higher 
education but also those Who had a middle school education and were aware ot 
national and world eftnta and new ideas through the reading ot newspapers and 
scientific and eccmcmic jOUl'DBls. Such a class bad not anq enough education 
to know that political, ecCIIl.CBl1c, and social cOIDditions in Russia could be 
improved but also that idealistic cCDCept;ion that it is the dut7 of mtellec• 
tuals to lead the rest ot societ7 in achievirlg a better wa7 of life tor all 
its members. M8Dy' ot the "intelligentsia" strove to improve the conditions 
of Ute in Russia through scientific diacover7, eeonanic reform, and humani-
tarian efforts while others aS..d at political end social chenge. Due to the 
impetuosit7 and the powrt7 Vhich forced~ ot them to work at other oceupa-
tian.s while atucl71ng for their desrees at the uniftrsities, the students as a 
whole were prone to support revoluticmary ideas, though, at course, the7 had 
no monopoq on radicaliaa. 
1 Ivan BolotllikOT terrorized the ares arotmd Moscow in 1607 and lbilian 
Pugachev led a revolt ot the peaaants and DCIIIltls ill the Ural and VoJ.aa areas 
in l'T73·1774. Both aS..d to exteminate the gentJ7 and bureaucrac7 and dis-. 
tribute their possesaions 8IIOD8 the peasants. Howewr, neither could defeat· 
a vell•led al'Dl7 and both were eventuall7 executed. 
Some members of the "intelligentsia," and especially the students, had 
already been taking part in the Populist revolutionary movement 'Which had been 
active since 1870. The socialist ideals of this movement vere so vague that 
the members themselves rerely agreed on vh.at the structure of the ideal soci• 
ety or their mm revolutionary tactics should be. A rev resorted to ind.ivid• 
ual acts of terrorism against government officials 1n order to attain their 
ends but the ineffectiveness of this method was shmm by the fact that the 
assassination of Tsar Alexander II, contributed nothing toward the overthrow 
of the autocracy. Probably the basic cause of the failm-e of the Populists 
in the nineteenth century is that though the1 dedicated all their energy to 
the good of the people, they neglected to obtain the participation of the 
masses in their revolutionary efforts. 
The tm.on of the century, however, vitnessed the rise of organized 
opposition to the autocracy, carried out by parties with definite platforms 
and seeking the support and membership of the messes to attain their objec• 
tives. Of these parties the one vh.ieh strictly adhered to l.farxist ideas vas 
the Russian Soeial·Demoeratic labor Party. Its beginnings 't-rere modest. 
Towerd the end of the nineteenth century numerous marxist discussion circles 
sprang ~ among the "intelligentsia" in the industrial centers. Marxism 
appealed to many intellectuals because it seemed to provide a clear end 
definite blueprint toward the attainment of social justice. Eventually many 
of these circles merged into larger bodies sueh as the Unian of Struggle for 
the Liberation of the Working Class, founded by Vladimir Il1ch Ulie.nov (Lenin) 
and Julius Me.rtcnr in 1895, vhich aimed at spreading Marxist propaganda among 
the workers and rejected the use of 1ndiv1dusl terrorism as a waste of effort. 
Besides maintaining contaet with each other, these groups also kept in 'tiouch 
with exiled Russian. Marxists., concentrated nostly in Switzerl.end, ond frequent 
ly received letters and pamphlets on Marxist ideology and tactics fran such 
theoreticians as Georgi Plekhanov, Vera Zasuliclt 1 end Pavel .1\kselrod. 
The first attempt of the Marxist socialists to create an all-Russian 
:party w s for the most part a failure. Due to police harasfl!'lent, only nine 
delegates representing the st. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, and Ekaterinoslav 
Unions of Struggle, The General Jewish Workers• Union, and the editors of the 
l\iarxist Newspaper, Rabocha1a Gazs1ip. 1 met in Minsk 1n 1898. Beyond agreeing to 
tmite in a single Russian Social-Democratic IBbor Party and approving a 
manifesto draw up by Peter stru.ve declaring the proletariat to be the only 
truly revolutionary force in Russia, the congress did not accan:plish much. 
No party program or constitution was drawn up and soon after the close of 
this First Congress most of the leaders were arrested or fled into exile. 
1l'he Second Congreos of the party, held in Brussels and London during 
the S'Ur.1111er of 1903 can be said to mark the real begim'ling of the funetioni."lg 
of the Social•Democrats as a party. The objectives of the party were stated 
1."1 a clear platform. The Minimum Program outlined the party's i.."'!!!ediate aims: 
the establishment of the eig.ltt•hou:r day throughout the land, the restitution! 
to the peasants of the "cut-off'" lands that should have been given to them at 
the time of their emancipation 1n 18611 the destruction of all surviving 
traces of feudalism, such as tithes and rents to nobles, the overthrow of the 
autocracy, and the establishment of a democratic regublic. The ultimate 
goals ... ~re declared to be the socialist revolution, the destruetian of cap!• 
talism, and the establisbmen of the dictatorship of the proletariat. On. 
Q.uestions of party organization, however 1 the Social-Democrats split into 
tvo factions at the very creation of their party. When a resolution asserting 
the po'-rer of the Central Committee over loeel organizstions and thus denying 
the autonany of the Je1:rl.sh Workers' Union was passed, the delegates or the 
Union walked <nxt of the congr-ess. An argument ryver the def'i.'lition of' party 
membership brought out an even more basic split in t.b.e -party. Leni!l and h&s 
followers, known as the "hards" sought to construct a centralized eonspira-
tor:tal party. Since 1902 when Lenin had written his pamphlet, Wha;t i,s ~o 
Be. D!Jl!.?, he had been emphasizing the necessity of a secret conspirt:ttorinl 
organization since ccmditions prevailing 1:n the tssrist state did not allat,r 
the existence of an open, demoera.tically chosen party. Furthermore, accordin 
to Lenin, centralism was necessary 1n a party which was to be the vangusrd 
of the revolutionel"Y' proletariat to keep its ideology pure and free from 
"reformism" and "trade tmionism." with which the socialist parties of western 
Europe had already been tni"ected. L!nin1s opponents, Julius Martov, Pavel 
Akselrod, Vera Zftsulich, Leo Deich, and A. Potresov did not oppose party 
centralism as such, but only' Lenin's high•hended methods at the congr.-ess. 
However, due to the defection of the Jevtsh Workers' Union they lost control 
ot the Central C<Xmllittee and the party organ, Ism, (the Spark). Since 
Lenin's taction had temporarily obtained control of the party machinery and 
a me.~ority of the votes at the congress, they called themselves "Bolshevik!" 
(members of tbe majoritY') and dubbed their opponents "Mensheviki" (members of 
the minority). 
The rift in the ranks of the Social•Democrats continued long a:f'ter the 
Second Congress and videned into the practical crea.tion of two separate par-
ties. The basic objectives of the two factions were still the same: the 
creation of a democratic republic, the esta'111abment of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat, and the construction of a socialist state. The differences 
betwee.u them were rarely as absolute as Lenin made them seem in his articles 
and pamphlets. Veey often the differences between the two factions were those 
of' personality and temperament. One subject of dispute was the question of 
party organization. 1!he Bolsheviks insisted on the necessity of giving the 
Central Canm.ittee strict control over the local canmittees. 1!he Mensheviks, 
meanwhile posed as defenders of "party democracy," "f'reedan of discussion," 
and "workers participation" in the pert;r organizations and decisi~ favoring 
the right of the rank and file of the part;r and the workers themselves to 
participate 1n forming major policies. As is characteristic of many of the 
Bolshevik-Menshevik quarrels, l'Mlither side consistent:cy maintained its po• 
sition on the question of part,- organization. 
Q.uestions of revolutionaey- tactics divided the tvo factions more clearly 
1'he Mensheviks were more ree.d7 to cooperate with the middle-class liberals 
in overthrowing the autocrae,-. Not that the Mensheviks bore any love tor the 
middle class but it was good tactics to use cme's enem~es against one's other 
enemies. Lenin and the BolsbeViks reJected the ccm.cept of an alliance with 
the bourgeois liberals. Their middle-class interests did not pemi'tjthem to 
work for a real rlctaey- of' the people. The,- merely wanted to limit the auto-
crac,- to seize power tor themselves and protect their interests fran both the 
aristocrac;r and the proletariat. To the Bolsheviks an alU.ance with the 
bourgeoisie would onl.7 contuse the proletariat and sabotage the movement 
toward a true peoples' revolution. 
In other tactical questions the disagreements betwen the Bolsheviks 
and Mensheviks wre the results of mere difference 1n emphasis. Mensheviks 
such as Ma.rt~ov did not oppose violent revolution but feared the use of 
radical slogans which might frighten a.way liberal allies. The Bolsheviks, 
on the oth.er hand, constm1t!J'" emphasized that the autocracy could only be 
overthro;m by a violent UJ?heaval and devoted more energy th.o.."'l the Menshevilts 
in preparing the masses for an amed uprising. Furthermore, t:r..e Mensheviks, 
closely adhering to Marx's teachings, 'Were preoccupied in. agitating the urban 
proletariat ·while relati-vely ignoring the peaoontrJ which they considered 
to be too ignora.."'lt 1 primitive, and apathetic to constitute a truly revolution-
ary force. The Bolsheviks, on the other han.d 1 contended that the peasants• 
de sire for land made them a truly revolutionary force and that since the 
Russian proletariat vas still so mnal~., it could hope to CM!rthrow the auto• 
crru::y ~with the aid of a revolutiane.ry peasantry. Therefore, they urge.d 
the necessity of spreading propaganda in the rural areas to form an alliance 
between the pr!llctflr.i:ef.;,_;nnJl tl>..e ;pcsoa..'lt~:-· All these differences between the 
Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks provoked bitter polem:tcs on both sides. Though 
~~ party remained nan:tnally united, :tt vas practically split in two and its 
efforts were therefore weakened by producing disorganization and confusion 
among the masses the party preached to. 
The other socialist party ill. Rwasia was the Socialist-Revolutionary 
Party. This grou.p ws in ~ vays a"l. outgrowth of the populist movement and 
many of its d.deas had been derived fran the nineteenth-century populists, 
Ie:vrav and Mikhailovskii. After failures in attempts to create a party in 1897· 
l.898 the Socialist-Revolutionary Party was f'ounded at a congress of several 
revolutiona.r-,r organizations held in Kbarkov in 1900. '1'b.e party included 
several notable revolutionaries such as Victor Chemov, its leading ideologist 1 
Michael Goetz, G.A. Gershtmi, and Catherw Bresbkov-Breshkovskaia. The party 
had its Central COOJm.ittee and party newspaper, Rftot4t*firef!'!!!!Jtte, 
(Revol.utic:m.Et.ey Russia,) but was poorlJ organized and did not have a complete 
1st organization 'Which included s-<1eh famous assassains as Boris Savinkov and 
Evno Azef 1 who was at the sa.."tle time a police agent. Thou.gh most of the party 
oembership did not actually carry out acts of violence themselves, the party 
as a 'Whole recognized terroriEm as a useful weapon aga..inst the autocracy 
both as a means of reprisal against the government and as a course of action 
to sustain the revolutionaey feeling or the people. 
As far as an alliance vith the bourgeois liberals ws concerned, the 
Socialist-Revolutionaries, as socialists, sc:orned and hated the bourgeoisie. 
However, they considered the middle class in Russia too snall and weak to be 
a real obstacle to the progress of socialia:n. Consequently, t~y were pre• 
pared to accept the liberals, as well as any revolutiaoaey group which opposed 
the autocracy, as a temporary aJ.4r. 
The Soc1allst•Revolutio.n.ary Party ws never able to take full advantage 
of its position as the party with the most munerous following in Russia. It 
vas not nearly as well organized as the Soc:lal-Democrat:tc Party. It lacked 
a clear platform and much of its program was derived fran conflicting articles 
in the party news}Xiper. Ideological and. tactical disputes among the members 
were frequent but sel.d(E settled. Contact between the Central Camnittee and 
local com:nittees as well as party discipline were poor. Finally, the Social-
ist,Revoluticmaries concentrated more of their effort on agitating and organ-
izing the masses 1n the rural areas than did the Soc:tal-Democrats1 although 
they by no means neglected the urban proletariat as the Social-Democrats 
accused them of doing. 'l'h.is preoccupation. with the Russian peasant made it 
much more difficult to build effective party organizatioos due to the illi• 
tera.cy of the peasantry and the scattered state of the population. 
It took longer for liberal:Lm to becane an organized force of political 
opposition to the autocracy than it did for socialian. Liberal aet$.vity 1n. 
the nineteenth centuey took the form of petitions fran zemstvo congresses to 
the Tsar for ecananic and educational refoms. Sane, like D.E. Sb.ipov, the 
president of the executive board of the Moscow Zemstvo, went so far as to 
suggest that a national asaemb~ be elected by the zemstvos for the purpose 
of being consulted by the Tsar :ln forming his policies regarding the internal 
administration of the :&apire. 'fhe tsarist govemnent answered these petition 
and s-uggestions by limiting the power of the zem.stvos to raise local taxes, 
controlling the appointments of members to the zemstvo executive boards, and 
forbidding the discussion of matters oatside zemstvo Jurisdiction betften 
zemstvo congresses. Irritated by such stubborness o:o. the part of the tsarist 
government 1 m.any liberals became mare radical in their thought and carried 
their opposition underground. !n 1902 Peter struve began to edit 
Osvobo!jl.d~e, (Liberation) a liberal newspaper which had to be printed in 
stuttgardt and Slluggled into Russia. In 1903 the Union of Liberation was 
founded under the leadership of Ivan Petrmlkevich and the historian Pavel 
Miliukov. This first organization of the Russian liberals as a political 
force aimed at the establishment of a constitutions. government elected by 
universal suffrage. Though the Union of Idberation was an illegal group its 
activity remained non-violent rendering the liberals a relatively harmless 
group for the time being. 
While socialia and libel"tllism constituted most of the opposition to 
the autocracy in Russia, the growing natianal consciousness of many of the 
nan-Russian nationalities within the Russian ».tlpire increased the numbers of 
the opponents of the tsa.risn. Of the Pmpire' s population of 123 millions 
at the turn of the cent'U1'7 1 c:m1y about 55 million were Russians and another 
35 million were non-Russian Slavs. The rest of the population was canposed 
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of Baltic, Finn..Ugric, Caucasian, Turkic, and Mongol grou:ps. Deeply in:f'lu• 
enced by the thought of Pobedanostaev and the sl.a.vophile journalist, M. N. 
Katkov, Nicholas was convinced that the surest way of holding the :&npire 
together was to follow a policy of centralization and Russitication. Both 
national and religious minority groups were targets ot persecution. The 
printing of the Ukrainian language was forbidden. Finnish autonan)" was vio• 
lated. Conversions fran the Orthodox to the Catholic faith were £orbidden 
and the children of' Orthodox and Catholic parents wre autcna.t:tcally consid· 
ered as Orthodax. The five million Jews in the Empire made up the most per• 
secuted minority. They were forbidden to settle beyond their pale in Poland 
and we stern Russia. Only a limited quota ot them was admitted to Russian 
schools and, on top of' everything, periodic pogrCI!ls were organized against 
them. 
Around the turn of the century 1 the minority groups in the Russian 
Empire began to organize political parties in defense of their national 
existence. Most of these national paj:'ties did not stand for secession. fran 
the Russian Empire but for the establishment of cultural and territorial 
autonany for national minorities, equal personal and political rights for the 
members of national minorities, and sane of the more radical parties favored 
the e stablisbment of a federal republic in Russia. Among the most powerful 
of the national parties were tbe Armenian Dashnakatsuntiun (Federation) and 
Hncha.k (Clarion) parties, the Georgian Party of' Socialist-Federalists, end 
the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party • 
... 
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Tha national parties by no means neglected social issues. Tl.te social 
objectives of the f",.eorgian Party of Socialist~ederalists greatly resembled 
those of the Russian Sod.alist-Revolutiona.ries. The Ukrainian Revolutionary 
Party fell apart in 1903 because it vas a coalitian. of sepa:ratists, anarchists, 
Marxists, Populists, and liberals tmo could not agree on social issues. 
Other national parties such as the General Jewish Workers' Union and the 
Lettish Social-Democratic labor Party were concerned mainly with social 
issues end used the language and culture ot their respective minorities as 
vehicles ot propaganda. 
'l!b.e weaknesses of the national parties lay in that they were primarily 
movements of intellectuals having little support fran. the masses of the 
national minorities 'Which were just beginning to acquire national conscious-
ness. Also, there ws otten a great reluctance emcm.g the leaders to cooper• 
ate with other national parties. As an extreme example of this, in 1903 the 
separatists within the Ultrainian Peoples' Party declared all men to be broth-
ers to the T.Jkrainian people except Muscovites, Poles, Jews, Magyars, and 
Rumanians. Each of the natiane.l parties was by itself too emall to be a real 
threat to the tsarist government, but if they affiliated themselves to the 
main revolutionaey parties in Russia they' could add considerable power to the 
opponents of the autoeaacy. 
As if' the autocracy did not have enough enemies, it added to the nlmlber~ 
of its opponents by the creation of government labor tmions. Tb.ese unions 
vere instituted in st. Petersburg, Mosew, Kiev, Kh.arkov, and other cities 
under the supervision of Sergei Zubatov 1 the head ot the r.bscow security 
department. The purpose of this "police socialism," as it was called by 
critics, w.s to provide cooperative self-help to the workers, f'umish them 
with recreation and opportunities for cultural wprovement, and divert the 
workers' energies from strikes and other revolutionary activities by having 
them participate in :religious and patriotic demonstrations. The tmions were, 
however, easily infiltrated by agents of radical parties and the entire move-
ment only concentrated and organized the workers; making the task of the rev• 
olutionarie s that much easier. 
The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War brought on a wave of revolution-
ary activity. Ever since his tour to the Fer East in 1890•1891, the Tsar had 
been fascinated by that part of the world. Influenced by such advisers as 
A. M. Bezobrazov, tbe Minister of Foreign Affairs, Admiral Alekseev, Plehve, 
the Minister of the Interior, and Prince Ukhtcmski, a very articulate propo-
nent of Russia 1 s Asiatic mission, Nicholas II followed a policy of expansion 
1n the Far East. China was forced to concede to Russia the lease of the 
Liaotung Peninsula as well as the r1ght to extend the Trans..Siberian Railroad 
through Manchuria to shorten the route fran Chita to Vladivostok.. Tile Russian 
authorities extended their privileges in Menehuria to policing the e.rea around 
the rJu~e from Chits to Vladivostok, exploiting Manchurian mines and fur• 
bearing animals, cutting wood in the forests of Northern Korea, end excluding 
all foreigners except Russians from Manchuria. Such an eldiension of Russian 
power collided with Japan's interests on the Asian mainland and in February of 
1904 Japan attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. 
The population of Russia was for the most pert indifferent to a war 
which was so far away, did not pranise a~ clear reward or seriously threaten 
Russia's national existence. Though socialist parties condemned the war as a 
capitalist venture, liberals expressed their support of the government against 
a foreign enemy. Eventually, hovever, the Japanese siege of Port Arthur and 
other Russian defeats in Manchuria revealed the ineptitude of the tserist 
govermuent and disgusted even its liberal supporters. 
As news of Russian defeats catle frcrn the l!iist and the Russian government 
mobilized the reserves, the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Social-Democrats 
increased their propaganda and e.gitation among all classes but especially 1n 
the armed forces. Soldiers, sailors, and especially resenists became the 
special targets of socialist propaganda. Leaflets vrere throvm at pass ... ng 
soldiers and forbidden discussion circles were organized within military units 
either by agents fl'CI11 outside the army 'Who formed contacts with the soldiers 
or by D.Enrly r.:obilized reservists who were themselves members of socialist par-
ties. The soldiers wre told that the war was being fought to increase the 
profits of Russia's capitalists, 'Who 1n the meant:tme 1 saddled the Russian 
people with the burden or hardship, casualties, and taxes. The Tsar was de• 
clared to be the peoples' worst enemy and the soldiers were urgec to turn theil: 
weapons against him and join the Russian people in their str<1ggle for a demo-
cratic republic and socialism. For the most part, however, the amy remained 
loyal to the Tsar in 1904 though signs of dissatisfaction were beginning to 
show. In Georgia sane reservists deserted and Joined the peasant guerrillas 
who had been active since 1902. Near Moscow, the 7th Reserve Cavalry Regiment 
displa.yed armed resiste.nce against their officers and other units Which had 
been sent to pacify them. Most C!f the disciplinary problems for the time 
being, hov~ever, consisted of refusals to obey orders rather than active re• 
sieta.."lce to authority. 
The liberals, entirely disgusted ,-1-th the Tsar's mis:.vmegement of the 
v:ar, gradually withdrew their support fran the government. In the ee.rly 
autumn of' 1904 the leaders of the Union of Liberation, struve and Miliukov, 
attended a congress of socialist and national parties, held in Paris and 
attended by delegates frau the Socialist Revolution.ary Party and Polish, Let-
tish, and Armdian national parties. The liberals pledged their support of the 
demands of the other revolutionary parties even as far as the overthrOW of 
the autocracy, the establishment of a democratic republic, based an universal 
suffrage, the right of aelfoodeteminatian and the removal of all diser:!mina• 
tory restrictions agamst national minorities. 
Idberal unrest also increased within Russia. The new Minister of the 
Interior, Sviatopolk-M!rski, wb.o had succeeded Count Plehve, recently assassi-
nated by Socialist Revol.,utiaoaries, tried to a.ppease revolutionary f'eel:t.ng in 
Russia by pranising administrative reforms, releasing a. few political priscmers, 
and ignoring relatively harmless manifestations against the autocracy. In 
J.lovember and December of' 1904 the libera:;j took advantage of this "political 
spring" to hold meetings of zemstvos and professional unions and political 
banquets demanding a legislative assembly, freedm of speech, press, and 
reli.gian., and autona:ay for naticmal minorities. 
The end of 1904 was also marked by a growing wave of strikes. The most 
serious of these 'Strikes broke out 1n the oil-fields or Be.ku and spread to the 
other industries in the area. The revolutionary parties urged the workers to 
support the general strike and demand the eight-hOur day, a constituent assem• 
bl7 1 end a democratic republic. Though the workers ended the strike when the 
work day was shortened, socialists held the strike up as an example of what 
could be achieved through proletarian solidarity and the Baku strike did 
foreshadow the general political strikes of 1905. 
So it was that the ~ar 1905 in Russia was ushered in amid 1ncreas1:ng 
disorder. 
CHAPrER I 
THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOW'.riOif 
In contrast to the strikes and disorders 1n Baku, the situation in st. 
Petersburg toward the end of 190'+ was fairly calm. Although Zubatov' s govern-
ment-sponsored unions had been dissolved in 1903 because of their infiltration 
by radicals, "political socialism" was gi'fen another chance 1n 190ll.. The 
Assembl\Y' of st. Petersburg Factory Workers was approved by the Minister of the 
Interior, Plehve 1 and organized under the leadership of an ex-prison chaplain, 
Father Georgii Gapon. Membership was confined to vormrs of Russian natian.e.l-
ity and Christian faith. The workers vere all.owed to organize group recreation 
such as lectures, ccmcerts, and tea roans. Besides creating mutual aid f'lmds 
they could even discuss their material needs and publicly declare their real 
grievances. Political 4iscussian, howeVer, as well as the right to mike 
were not allowed by the government. The purpose of the Assembl\Y' ws to pre• 
vent the contamination of the workers fran radical socialism by providing an 
atmosphere of Russian patriotism and Orthodox piety. 
Nevertheless, infiltration by radicals could not be completely prevented. 
Furthermore 1 given the econ.cmic condition of the working class 1 docility could 
not be expected from the workers. Even Father Gapon who maintained contact 
with the police by sending reports and receiving directives and contributions 
fran the prefect 1 Ivan Fullon, sympathized with the workers and gradually came 
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to see tb.e workers' need of the right to strike and the gra.d'Wll attainment of 
self •government • 
Trouble started when four members of the Assembly were dismiseed fran 
the Putilov ironworks on December 271 1904.. When the managers of the factory 
refused to recognize the right of the Assembly as a Union, the workers' dele• 
gates demanded that the four difJllissed workers be restored to their positions, 
the work day shortened to eight hours, and the pa:s- be raised to ane ruble per 
day for men and seventy-five kopeks per day for women. While these demands 
,;ere bei:ng formulated, it was suggested that workers in other plants 1n St. 
Petersburg support the Pu:lilov strike by' sta:pping vrork throughout t..he city, 
thus creating a general strike. Though the actual membership of the St:. 
Petersburg Assembly of at. Petersburg Factory Workers was only 9 ,ooo 1 Father 
Ge.pon and his lieutenants had the sympathy end support of another 100,000. 
Withi:r.1. a week after the dismissal of the four workers the number of strikers 
had reached 25,000, including 13,000 workers of the Putilov Enterprises. By 
January 6, 1501000 of st. Petersburg's 175,000 workers wre on strike thOugh 
the operators of such utilities as steam, gas and electricity plants as well 
as the streetcar drivers remained aloof fran the movement. 
Mean,mile, Father Gapon proposed that the workers present their griev-
ances before the Tsar. The petition draw up on January 6 to be presented to 
the Tsar on the coming Stmday, iucluded not only measures which would improve 
the econanic vell•be:t.ng of the workers but demands of a political nature as 
well. Besides being asked to decree the eight hour day in Russia and recogn::l.zE 
the workers' right to organize, the Tsar vas also petitioned to convoke a con• 
stituent assembly, grant civil rights, separate Church and State, and end the 
war. It was decided to present these :petitions, signed by thousands of' worker~, 
by marching to the Winter Palace on the bank of the !~eva River in st • Peters• 
burg, in a religious processioo attended by thousands of workers and their 
families. The date set for this fateful march ws &mday, January 9.1 
Meammile, the revolutionary opposition, includhlg the Bolsheviks, did 
not approve of the spontaneous movement ot the workers of St. Petersburg. It 
is true thst the Bolsheviks saw the strike as an opporttmity to increase 
proletarian solidarity and they spread numerous leaflets throughout the city 
by the st. Petersburg Corrnittee of the Social-Democratic Party calling all 
1-10rkers to support and join the general strike. Furthermore, the workers 
were urged to demand self-government and political liberty as well as economic 
cancessicms for no benefits that the working class could obtain vould be safe 
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e.n.d permanent lmder an autocratic government. It was partly due to tll..e in• 
fluence of the Bolsheviks and other socialists who had infiltrated the Assembly 
or 8t. Petersburg Factory Workers that political demands were included in the 
petition to the Tsar. Yet there were man:y things about Father Gapon's movement 
of which the Bola.'l-t.eviks did not approve. A letter fran s. I. Gusev, a member 
of' the st. Petersburg Committee, to Lenin, who was then in exile in Switzerland 
and editing the Bolshevik paper, Vpead, (Forward) iB indicative ot the Bolshe-
vik attitude toward Father Capon's movement. Ousev saw Father Gepon as a 
bourgeois adven.turist or, at best, as a well-meaning id.ealist. He canplained 
that the priest was dre:wing the masses away fr<:ll'l the Social..,Democratic revolu• 
1 ~ history of the Gaponist movement is well presented in Sidney Har• 
eave's F~st Bl;9od: The Russ!9 &tyoJ.aY&on. ot 1905, (Nev York, McMillan Can-
paey, 19 ) pp. 39JiOO, M:73. 
? 
-Akademia Iiauk SSSR, Revoliutsiia l2Q5•19Q7 M• v. Rosgii. DokHinent:r 1 
yateria]J, Vol, I: Nacbp,lo Pepo1 Russko~ Hevol;iu;tsii. ;tanyari;l!rt 1995 gods 
Moscow, Akademia Uauk, SSEI\ 1 1955.) p. 11, 
"!':ionary :t..'lO"Ii'l~ment and requested tl'J.St rlo:re brochures a:.1.d article3 ill Vwrep, be 
t~Titten condemning bourgeois edventurian and emphasizing that such aims as 
the creation of a democratic republic could only be achieved through revolu-
tion under the leadership of an independent proletari.an party. Gu.sev admitted~ 
however, that for the sslte of the reputation of the Social-Democratic Party 
the Bolsheviks could not afford to stay aloof from a movement Which could 
reach the proportions of a general strike or sauething even more grandiose. 3 
As fer as the march itself was concerned, the BolSheviks considered all 
attempts to petition the Tsar futile. Either the masses wuld receive illusorj 
pranise s which would serve onl.y to lead them astray fran the only method by 
which the people could acquire their rights•-revolution•-or the crowds on 
their way to the TSSJ:" would be met by violence on the pe.:t of the police and 
the army. On Saturday 1 January 81 the at. Petersburg Cam:littee issued a 
leaflet warning the people that to ask the 'l'sar to grant a constituent assem-
bly based on tmiversal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage, popular control 
ot the administration, the equalitY' of all before the law, civil rights such 
as freeda:n of expression and association and the inviolability of the person 
and his hcxne, 811ID.esty to politica.l prisoners, and the ending of the war was 
to ask him to voltmtarily abolish the autocracy a.nd turn the privileged 
classes out of power. The people would receive only lies. They were told 
that they could only win liberty by their own efforts and not as a gift fran. 
the Tsar, 
!~ot to beg fran the Tsa.r1 nor even to demand of him, nor to 
lower ourselves before our swom enemy, but to cost him f'rorn. the 
throne 1 and chase out the autocratic band with him•-mly in this way 
is it :possible to win liberty. 
3 Ibidt pp. 8-10. Gusev to Lenin, January 51 1905. 
The liberation of' the workers can anly be the achievement of 
the workers themselves and you will receive your liberty neither from 
priests nor tsars. On Sunday, before the Winter Palace, if they even 
let you get that far, you will see that you can expect nothi.TJ.g fran 
the !tsar. Then you will see that no outsider will bring you help, 
but that only yoll yourselves can win liberty for yourselves.4 
Despite their efforts, the Bolsheviks could not prevent the march to 
the t![inter Palace. H~rever, they could not afford to stay aloof from a sit-
u.!ltion 'tmich offered such opporttmities for agitation. A clash with. the police 
was expected and the Bolsheviks as wll as other :revolutionaries joined the 
procession to the Winter Palace with furled. red banners which were to be dis• 
played ~rhen the police took action against the crowd and created a revolution 
mood. Orators of ell revolutionary parties participated in the march, awit-
ing their chance to be&in anti-government agitation as soon as the crowd had 
been attacked e:nd the people disillusioned in their father 1 the Tsar. Sane 
radicals such as the Socialist Revolutionaries hoped to start the revolution 
right then and pJ.anned to break into nearby gunshops as soon as the fighting 
started.5 The Bolsheviks, however, only planned to use any ensuing violence 
es an opportunity for anti-tsarist agitation, probably because they considered 
the masses still too disorganized to begin e serious revolution. 
What happened on January 9 shocked even the Bola.l:tevi.'l(s 'Who had been ex• 
pecting saneth:lng of the sort. The Tsar w.s not even in the Winter Palace that 
day. The Mi.uister of the Interior, Sviatopolk-Mirski, and the Prefect of st. 
Petersburg, Fullon, had decided Ol1 the eve of' the march to teach the crowds a 
lesson and. had not informed the Tsar of their plans. The crowd, marching in 
processicm lrlth national flags, portra.its of the Tsar, and religious icons, 
w s met on the S<ltU.U'e of' the Winter Palace by eight rifle volleys and a cav-
alry charge. About the 88me thing happened 1n other parts of the cit;r such 
as the Alexander Garden, the Neva Arch, and the Troitsld Bridge where llll8ller 
processions, also headed f'or the Winter Palace, were met by tl"O'~ps and police. 
By the end of' the da;r the authorities succeeded in dispersing most of the 
people. The only resistance was of'f'ered by a f'ew :revolutionaries, wottkers, 
and students, who fired occasional revolver shots or made isolated attacks an 
lone policemen\i.. Figures can.cerning the number o£ dead vary. The government 
admitted that 96 people were killed while sane Journalists claimed to have 
obtained the names of' 4,6000 'Who had perished that d.ay. All that is certain 
6 is that two policemen were killed. It is true that the Tsar had not been 
in st. Petersburg that day and was tminformed of' what his bureaucrals were 
planning and thus cannot be held directly responsible f'or the tragedy. But 
who would believe him or accept this as an excuse? Many now ceased to believe 
1n the benevolence of' the Tsar. Previously the tm.educated masses ha.d held 
the Bureaucracy responsible f'or all the abuses of the gowr.mnent, but after 
peaceful workers end their families had been met by gunfire in front of' the 
Tsar's palace, they now lost faith 1n him personally and lost all loyalty to 
any part of' the government. Father Gapon best expressed the disillusionment 
of the Russian people 1n the Tsar when he said 1 "We no longer have a Tsar. A 
river of blood divides the Tsar fran the people."7 
~arcave, First Blood, pp. 88-94. 
7 Q.uoted in Lenin • s article in VRS?red, Jan. J.8, 1905 • 
The bloody events of January 9 had v1n4icated the Bolshevil~ position 
that liberty could be won only by revolution and not by petitions, ao they 
took full advantage of the peo,les' anger against the Tsar to call the workers 
to arms. The day after "Bloody Sunday" the Bolshevik Bt• Petersburg Camnittee 
and its district committees 1n the city issued several stirring leaflets de• 
signed to fire up the emotions of the masses. One leaflet coodemned the wil-
full murder of workers by the government and asked for money in support of the 
8 
mot"e!llent, not specif'y1ng exactly what the movement was. Another called on. 
all to turn the present mike into a general one in order to canbat the auto-
cracy and capitalism. The workers were urged to draw nan-strikers 1nto the 
movement, especially those operating utilities such as gas and electrical 
plants, telephones, telegraphs, railroads, streetcars, stables, and mail trans• 
port. All were urged to wreck the gas and electrical plants, cut telephone 
and telegraph wires, and even tear up rails. It was hoped that the destruc-
tion of these utilities would weaken the enemies of the people by disrupting 
their com:m:m.ications and rendering them unable to shift troops to where they 
9 
wre needed. 
Other leaflets directly called the people to a:rms. They emphasized 
that revolution was the ~method by which the working class could improve 
its eondt.tion and reminded them of what had happened to petitioning workers 1n 
front of the Winter Palace. 
You wnt to the Tsar to obtain your rights and be met you with 
rifles and gmd'ire, blows by spears, and the sharp swords of his 
"Cprichniks." 
You begged for bread and work and he welcomed you with hot lead. 
8 
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Didn't we Social-Democrats tell you that you 'WOUld get not~ing fran the 
blood-sucking Tsar? Didn't we tell you that he is not a friend but an 
enemy of the people and doos not concern himself with the good of the 
people but with the good of his mistresses and attendants. 
The people were then called to action • 
• • • Now gather around our red banner. Rise. Go dawn the streets 
and see that wrk. is stopped everywhere--that all citizens, as one man 
rise with arms in their hands against the Tsar and the government, band 
leaflets to soldiers and ask that they not shoot at the pe":'ple. 
Down with the Tsar 1 
Down with the autocracy! 
long live the constituent assembly! 
Long live Social-Demoeracy!10 
T'ne ~r vms also a target of Bolshevik agitation. Officers were :remindec 
of their tiuty +o defend the people with their l:f:"-es and were urged to turn the r 
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weapons against tlte peoples' enemies. Other leaflets aimed at the ran..lt a.nd 
file reminded the soldiers that they were the brothers of the veey peoJle they 
had fired on and called on them to turn against the government. One very 
stirring leaflet read, 
Soldiers! yesterday with your guns and rifles you killed hundreds 
o:f' your brothers. They didn't send you against the Japanese, nor to 
protect Port Arthur, but to kill unarmed vanen and children. Your of• 
f'icers turned you into murderers. Soldiers! Who did you kill'l Those 
who wnt to the Tsar to demand liberty and a better life••liberty and 
a better life for themselves and f'or you, f'or your fathers and brothers, 
for your wives and mothers. Sbeme and disgrace 1 You•...a.ra our brothers. 
You need liberty and you shoot at us. Enougll Pull yourselves together 
soldiers! You•-are our brothers. Kill those officers who order you 
to shoot at us! Refuse to shoot at the people! Come over to our side 1 




Dow. with the murdering Tsar! 
Down with the executianer-of'f1cers1 
Dow. with the e.utocracyl-1 
Long live liberty! 12 
long live socialism! 
Ibid. p. 65. 
Ibid. pp. 64·65• 
Ibid. p. 19· 
Similar agitation was carried out by Bolsheviks Cormnittees in all the 
other major cities in Russia. A leaflet of the Moscow Bolsheviks declared 
the autocratic government and capitalists to be worse enemies to the people 
than the Japanese were and urged all to arm themaelvev and demand a constitu-
ent assembly, civil rights, and separation of church and state.13 Bolshevik 
organizations in Transcaucasia issued similar calls to arms in the hope of 
reviving the rioting vhich hed occurred in Baku the past month and intensify-
1n.g the peasant guerrilla war in western Georgia. 
In Geneva Lenin, his wife 1 Nad.ezhda K'rupskaia, and other Bolshevik 
exiles including V. V. Vorovskiiwept with emotion when the news of "Bloody 
Stmday" reached them. They wept not only from sorrow but from Joy for they 
expected a revolution would surely begin after such a bloody act had been 
11 
committed by the government.. · In the wek following "Blood.y Sunday" Lenin 
wrote several articles defining the tasks of the Social-Democratic Party at 
such an important time: to arm and organize the proletarian masses and to 
obtain the support of the army. On Januttry 18 he wrote in ~,a, that the 
government had put the people in a revolutionary mood, but 
••• I remains for the Social-Democrats to see to it that the news of 
the bloody days 1n St. Petersburg is spread as wide as possible 1 to 
rally and organize their forces still better. and to popularize still 
more energetically the slogan they had long since advanced: the 
general armed uprising of the people "l:;i 
13 
~. p. 237· 
14 
Nadezhda Krupskaia, Reminiscences of Lenin, (Moscow Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 1959) pp. 110-112. 
11 
15v .I. Lenin, Collected Works, (Moscow, Foreign Langt.1ages Publishing 
ouae, 1962) Vol. VIII, p. 113 • 
... ________________________ __ 
If there was to be a revolution the masses needed organization and leadership. 
According to Lenin, the January 9 gathering of workers was a mob incapable of 
revolution. A proletarian pa.rty was needed to give the masses goals and tac-
tics. It was the duty of the Social-Democratic Party as the vanguard of the 
:proletariat to provide leadership in all aspects of revolutionary preparation. 
Lenin condemned the r,1ensheviks for merely heightening the ardor of the workers 
through agitation. To give the masses the desire to arm was merely the first 
step. It was also the duty of the Social-Democrats to guide the proletariat 
1n such technical aspects of the revolution as obtaining and distributing 
arms, organizing revolutionary caubat units, and training the workers in the 
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use of weapons and. tb.e tactics of street fighting and partisan warfare. 
In the meantime 1 the Bolsheviks in Russia sought to take advantage of 
the mass discontent and disvrders which followed January 9. Large mmbers of 
vorl-.ers struck in almost every maJor center in Russia in protest f.ig&inst the 
government's action on January 9. Revolutionaries of all parties encouraged 
them to include political demands such as a constituent asr·embly and civil 
rights along with their economic dera.ands. Professors ceased lecturing and 
student£ not belonging to ~· particular party agitated workers, peasants and 
soldiers. But the Bolsheviks considered strikes ar..d a restless tnood on the 
part of the people to be only the first ate.p toward revolution. The second 
step we s to be the turning of the sympathy strikes occurring in Russia vith 
no cODrdination or clear goal into a general all-Russian political strike which 
was eventually to be a n.ationtride clash between the people and the government 
and result in revolution. To achieve this it ws necessary to urge the con-
tinuance of the sympathy strikes throughout Russia and to draw non-strikes 
16 Ibid. VIII. pp. 166·176. 
into the mo'V""emen·l; by urging them to quit work in support of the St. Petersburg 
::rtrike. :E}I'.ren if such ag1ta.t ion did not 1mmed iate ly bring on a genera 1 strike, 
it- wm:tld brinr'3 eb out separate strikes which ~rould draw the working class 
closer to revolution by providing them with political education, showing them 
the necessity of political liberty as well as economic advancement, making it 
clear to the working class that its real enemies were the government and the 
bourgeoisie with whom there could be no canpromise, and teaching the workers 
the need of organization and proletarian solidarity. Thus, the proletariat 
vould become class conscious and politically educated throu.$ experience. The 
vrorkers ,-rould learn the necessity of revolution throu.'!h the violence they wou.l.C 
meet on the part of the government and they would acquire class consciousness 
by seeing that no strike or revolution could succeed without proletarian solid· 
arity and organization.17 
The Bolsheviks were nat uniformly successful in a.ll regions of Russia. 
during the first three months of 1905. In some regions they succeeded in wide • 
ing the str:Um movement. In others they managed to incite strikes and intensi 
fy unrest and violence. In some areas they met with no success at all. 
In st. Petersburg the Bolsheviks of the St. Petersburg Committee and 
members of the Menshevik Socia.l...})ernocrat Group agreed to sign their leaflets 
1n common in order to set en exemple of' solidarity to the workers and to avoid 
confusing the masses with intra-party disputes. The agreement did not last 
beyond the middle of January but at least both f'actions were able to concentra e 
their energies on agitating the masses. Frequent demonstrations ""'re held wit 
17 S.K. Khammatov, Kazanskaia Or&a.ni_zatsi_ia Bolshevikov v Godakh Pervoi 
Ru!akoi R~oliutsii. (Kazan, Tatknigizdat, 1955) P• 33• F.P. Bystrikh, 
t;'ahevistskie C}.r&,B;aizatsii Urala v Revoliutsii 1~5·1997 gg. Sverdlovsk, 
rdlovskoe Knizhnoe Izdateistvo, 1959) pp. 75•T7. 
workers marching ml.der red bunners with socialist slogans and Bolshevik .and 
Menshevilt orators calling on workers to support the strike and demand political 
rights as well as economic concessions. At the same time, the workers already 
on strike were urged to continue their strike, to organize strike committees 
to gather funds and enforce the strike, and fi.nell.y, the 't-TOrkers "trere m-ged to 
gather arms and prepare themselves for the coming rising. 
However, to turn a series of strikes into a revolution was a difficult 
task despite the fact that Father Gapon's organiZation of the workers had 
given them a foundation for class consciousness and solidarity and that "Blood;y 
Sunday" had put the workers 1n an angry mood. There was still a laclt of rev-
olutionary discipline among the workers. By January 20 the Putilov workers 
were beck on their jobs and a total of 50 ,ooo had drifted back to work on their 
own in other plants. As far as political demands were concerned, it seems 
that most workers were not aware of their meaning. Workers shouted revolution· 
ary slogans and adopted Social-Democratic resolutions to rise 1n arms under 
the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party. Yet they also petitioned the 
government for a gradu.ated income tax, cheap loans to workers, and the gradual 
transfer of state lands to the people • It is true that many were tm.aware of 
tb.e difference between a revolutionaey resolution and a petition to the govern· 
ment but this is not the only explanation of the Social-Democrats• failure to 
instigate a general strike. It must also be remembered that both the BolshevU s 
and t-iensheviks were 1n competition with Socialist-Revolutionary, non-party, ana 
anarchist agitators and therefore many of the wrkers remained uninfluenced by 
Social-Democratic leadership and tmimpressed by the Social•Democratic program. 
Furthermore, the great majority of the workers still sought only to improve 
thetr econanic condition and ignored political issues. As lenin wrote in 
A fighting spirit prevails everywhere but it could. hardly be said to 
be in favor of the Social-Democratic line. Most of the workers stand 
for a put'ely economic struggle and against s political one. 
18 
There were also other obstacles facing the Bolshevilts in their efforts 
to L"lcite a general strike and an armed uprising. It was one thing to call 
the proletariat to arms but sanething else to actually arm. it. Rifles and 
rev·olvers which could be smuggled into the country or stolen from gun shops 
were rare. Th.e Socialist-Revolutionaries made so..-ne bombs for the vorkers but 
most were amed with cold steel such as daggers or home-made piltes and lances. 
A revolution could not succeed with such euipnent. 
Furthermore, the police was not idle. Apartments 'Which served ao .Bol-
shevik meeting-places were frequently raided and many leaflets stored there 
-were destroyed. By the end of' January many of the lead 1ng Bolsheviks in 8t. 
Petersburg wre behind bars and the Bolshevik effort was further disorganized. 
By the beginning of February the strike movement threatened to die out. 
To add to the Bolsheviks' difficulties Tsar Nicholas formed a commission headec 
by Senator Shidlovskii to investigate the causes of the disaster of January 9 
as well as exami..."l.e the grievances of Russian factory workers. In order to re-
deem some of the government's popularity among the lower class, this commissior 
was to include representatives elected by the workers as well as by members of 
the bureaucracy and factory managers. The Bolshevik st. Petersburg Committee 
would have liked to urge the workers to boycott the elections to the commissirn • 
An article appearing in Vpered in mid-February expressed the general attitude 
ot the Bolshevilts toward the commission. It reminded the lrorkers of' thtir 
..tll!'llf""' _........._ 
l.Bx.enin, Collected Works, VIII. p. 115. 
experience in dealing with the government on January 9. The Shidlovslti Com-
mission was condemned as an attempt on the part of the government to muddle 
the workers, deflecting them fram their revolutionaey purpose 1 and to appear 
as a frtend anxious to improve their condition. The remedy to the worlmrs' 
ills was declared to be not cooperation with the government but the reaort to 
arms under Social-Democratic leadersh1:p.19 
Ho'!'lever 1 the Shid.lovskii Cooamission vas so popular among the m:..jority 
of the vrorkers that the st. Petersburg Committee did not dare boycott the 
elections to the cOlllllission lest it out itself' off from the masses. Reluctant 
ly, the Bolsheviks decided to make use of the freedast of expression sllowd 
during the campaign to carry out increased ant1 ... govel'l'lll18nt agitation. Both 
Bolsheviks and Mensheviks demanded that the deputies be given immunity from 
arrest freedom of assembly and off the press be all.owed 1n discussing matters 
concerning the Shidlovskii Commission. It these demands wre not met, the 
Social-Democrats threatened to expose the commission as a fraud and scuttle it 
by quitting it. The government, of course, would not meet all of these demand 
and the Social-Democratic electors refused to choose deputies for the commis-
sion and called the workers to a general strike. Though only eighty of the 
four h\mdred electors were Social-Democrats 1 enough of the Gaponist and non-
party electors joined them in quitting the ccxmnission to make it unworkable, 
so the Tsar ordered the Sh.idlovskii C emission dissolved on February 20. The 
Social-Democrats succeeded 1n scuttling this attempt by the govel."'rrment 1n 
reconciling itself' with the working class, but even more important, the worker 
themselves gained political experience from campa1gn1ns and electing their 
re]?l>esentatives and the Shidlovskii Commission proved to be a precedent for 
20 later workers• representative bodies such as trade unions and soviets. 
The Tsar made yet another attempt to calm the revolutionary feeling in 
Russia. On Feb~ry 18 he issued a manifest promising the formation of a 
commission including popularly trusted notables which was to advise the ~sa.r 
1n matters of reform and agislation. Bolshevik orators and pamphlets were 
quick to point out that this commission in no way limited the autocrs..:y and 
was meant only to deceive the worl{Srs. The creation of the coorniasion did 
not satisfy even the liberals. Unrest increased after the nevs of the Russian 
defeat at Mukden, the revolutionaey agitetion againat the Sb.idlovski1 Commis-
sion, and the campaign against the Februaey 18 manif'est and strike activit,- 1n 
st. Petersburg increased temporarily. However, by the end of February most 
of the workers had tired of strikes and polltical agitation. Though sporadic 
strikes continued, most of the plants in St. Petersburg were back in operation 
21 by March. 
In Moscov the Bolsheviks carried on activities similar to those of the 
st. Petersburg Committee • Att.er January 9 the workers in the area were urged 
to cease work in protest of the massacre of "Bloody Stmda.,-," By January 18, 
howver, the strike was nowhere near being a general one. On.ly 1!.3,000 workers 
out of the 1701000 in the city stopped work. \fuen the strike was called the 
20 Solomon M. Schwartz, The R;y.asiap, R!]plgU.on ot l2Q5: The Wgrk!rs' 
Mo and the Formation of RnlAhevism and M.n•h•vAsm. G. Vakar, Trans. 
(Chicago, Unbersity ot Chicago Press, 1967}. pp. 75·1.28. 
2lyor Bolshevik leatlets, correspondence 1n Vemd, workers• demands, 
strike statistics, police reports, and other documents regarding the st. 
PetersbU'I!"g "Bloody &mda7" and the consequent disorder see Nachalo Pervo1 
Russkei Revoliqtsii pp. 3-225. For the Mensheviks' activities and point of 
view on this period see 5. Somov' "Iz istorii sotsialdemokra tiaheskgo Dviz-
heiia v Peterburge v 1905 godu, (Liahnie Vospomi.naniia)" Bxloe April & May 19< 7. 
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,mrkers uere taken by surprise and did not even have their demands worked out. 
v1:'1en the demands were finally formulated, they turned out to be generally of 
an econcmic nature--eight-hour day, higher pay, better vorking conditions, 
abolition of fines, and searches, half pay in case of sickness, the right of 
elected delegates to present grievances to the management, and free housing 
for tartars as well as Russians. To combat this disregard for political issue 
tbe Moscow Camnittee issued several leaflets on the necessity of political 
liberty as well as economic improvement. One leaflet explained to the workers 
You have put forward demands for the eight hour work day, a raise 
in wages, and others. But these demands cannot be satisfied by one 
factory owner or even severl. 'l'hey would have to be promulgated through 
out all Russia. at once--it means it is necessary to do this in the leg-
islative sphere. And can a law good for workers be passed if the work-
ers themselves cannot send their representatives into a legislative 
body. It means that it is necessary that the workers have the right 
to send their freely elected deputies into a popular government, celled 
a parliament, where they would pass laws for the good of the workers. 
After reminding the workers of how much they su:t.rered "Without the freedom of 
expression and association and the right to strike 1 the leaflet reiterated 
the necessity of a political struggle. 
For a free struggle against the masters, to secure for themselves 
civil and political rights, the freedom of assembly, association, the 
right to strike 1 and the freedom of speech and the press9, the workers 
must inevitably enter into a political struggle, a struggle to the death 
vith the autocratic government •22 
'1'he Bolsheviks intensified their agitation when the February 18 manifest was 
issued. street orators end leaflets warned the workers that the manifest did 
DOt in any vay limit the autocracy or grant self-government but ves only a 
deception on the part of the government to prolong the war and the misery of 
the working class. The provision in the manifest which allowed workars to 
22 
Ibid. pp. 279-281. 
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present their grievances to the Tsar ws especially ridiculed. '!.>That l'ltld hap-
pened when the people tried to petition the 'raar on January 9? If the Tsar 
really wanted to hear his people 1 why w s there euch a heavy censorship in 
the land? The Tsar would not grant the people anything. Only by taking up 
a:r::ns and establishing a democratic republic could the workers obtain w'hat 
2"" they demanded. :.> 'rhe agitation continued into t-tarch. Bolshevik agitators 
provided workers with ready printed resolutions to be adopted at meetings. The 
resolutions most frequently declared the governme:.1t to be void of' any popular 
trust 1 affirmed that the workers would refrain from petitioning the govermnent 
for anything, and proclaimed that the factories and land in the nation tlould 
fall into the hands of' the toilers onl;y through the resort to arms mder the 
leadershiP of the Social-Democratic Party and the establishment of a democratic 
24 
republic. The proletariat was not the onl;y target of Bolshevik agitation. 
All citizens were reminded that liberty could only' be won. through revolution. 
from below and not commissions appointed from above. All classes were warned 
that no one could be neutral in the present revolution and all were called 
to support the revolution under the slogan, "People to arms. "25 
'rhe Bolsheviks managed to keep the wrking class in ferment by distri-
buting leaflets, spreading runors about clashes between workers and soldiers 
1n other cities, establishing secret reading and discussion circles, and hold-
26 













However, there ws no rising. The workers were still main~ interested in 
economic questions and readily returned to work when their demands were par• 
tiall~r satisfied. From the Bolshevik point of view, the workers needed more 
political education before there could be a revolution. 
In the Transcaucasian region it did not take much effort to make the 
workers violent. In Tiflis, the capital of Georgia, crowds carrying red ben-
ners destroyed shops and houses, tore d.own telegraph wires, stopped trains, 
and fired revolvers at troops and police. Similar disorders took place in 
Poti and Sukhum in western Georgia. Such disorganized efforts, however, were 
of little use in overthrowing a government. Th e Bolsheviks attempted to pro-
vide the terrorists and the mobs that followed them with some leadership end 
tactical advice. The Tif'lis Committee 1 of 'Which Iosif Dzugashvili (Kebe or 
Stalin) was a member, called on the rebels to accept the leadership of' the 
Social-Democratic Party so that the Transcaucasian proletariat might be organ-
ized into a revolutionary force and coordinate its efforts with the proletaria 
27 in the rest of' Russia in one general attack against the throne. Leaflets 
offering t..actical advice called on all the people not to attack troops in largE 
crowds but to use every building and window as a place for ambush by small 
units. All were urged to use firearms, bombs, and even roc1ts 1 but to concen ... 
trate their efforts on disrupting comunicstions and tating the initiative 
against the troops. 28 
In Baku, the violence of the December strikes had never real~ stopped, 
but the Armenian and l.foslem oilers now turned their weapons against each other 
27 Ibid. pp. 609-611. 
28 
Ibid • pp. 6o8-609. 
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tur!1:in.g e1e city and the oilfield into a battlefield in which una:rned. Russian 
~mrlcers were killed as well as Armenians and Tartars. The Bolsheviks accused 
the poHce of igniting the latent feud between the two netionalities and urged 
botlt sides to join the Russian proletariat in their struggle against the auto-
cracy. It ws a futile attempt, however, as both the Armenians and Tartars 
29 forgot about the autocracy and the revolution and went on figh.ti.ng e·ach other. 
Throughout the rest of Russia ·the Bolsheviks similar:cy made the slogan 
of a popular armed uprising their main tactical directive. In Reval, Estonia, 
the news of January 9 brought on two clashes between troops and worl..:ers in 
which several people were killed but no reel threat of revolution developed. 
In Riga the Bolsheviks cooperated with the Lettish Social-Democra·ts in orga:~.t­
izing demonstrations with red banners and revolutionary slogans, one o±' the 
demonstrations resulting in about a hundred casualties. In Riga, however, 
Bolshevik activity was overshadowed by that of the Lettish Social Democrats. 
The Bolsheviks' biggest failure was probably in southern Russia. In Ekaterino-
slav 1 (today Dniepropetrovsk) there were instances of rock throwing at troops 
and threats against non ... strikers, but the strikes were generally of an economic 
nature and political egitators were sometimes turned in to the police by the 
workers themselves. Tn the Don area there was nat much enthusiasm for the 
strike movement. Generally, the workers would suddenly leave their work and 
gather to formulate their demands. Sanetimes they presented their demands 
vithout even bothering to stop work. Tn Saratov the news of January 9 caused 
Cl'OVds to gather and threnten public buildings, but the presence of troops 
PI'Oved to be su.fficient to quiet the situation. Both the Social-Democrats and 
1-
29 Ib,±2.. pp. 578-579 • 
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the Socialist Revolutionaries urged the workers to support the St. Petersburg 
strike by starting a general strike in Saratov but they soon found that the 
'\vorkers could not even read the demands which were drawn uP by their more 
enlightened comp!!.lnions. Clearq, the population was for the most part still 
too backward to comprehend political issues, much less revolt against the 
autocracy. 
30 
In January Poland was already in turmoil for the Poles bad long been 
demanding the use of their language 1n the schools and local administration 
along with civil equality for Cathollcs. The news of' "Bloody Sunday" brought 
ermed rebellion to Warsaw and Lodz but here the Bolsheviks had too much com-
petition fran the PoUsh Social•Democratic Party, the Social-Democratic Party 
of Poland and Lithuania 1 and the General Jewish Workers' Union to have any 
real control of the situation and their propaganda was ·therefore mainly con-
fined to the Russian garrisons in Poland. 
It had always been a basic tactical principle of the Bolsheviks that 
they could not overthrow the autocre.cy without the support of the peasantry. 
"The interests of the working class," wrote Lenin, "demand the most energetic 
support of the peasant revolution--more than that: its leading role in the 
31 peasant revolution." In lurch of 1905, he reiterated his belief in the 
necessity .of an alliance between the proletariat end the peasantry against the 
autocracy and the landowning nobility in order to establish a democratic 
republic. 32 As unrest increased in the cities, the Bolsheviks attempted to 
30 ~· P• 391-397. 31 
P.I. nimoT. ~evoliutsiomuda Deiatel'nost Rabochikh v. Derevne, 
(Moscow, I~datel'stvo SOtsio-EkonOIIicheskoi Literatury 1960) p. 46. 
32 Ibig. VIII, p. 231. 
incite a simultaneous revolution in the countryside. In Georgia the Menshevil s 
and Bolsheviks attempted to i..'ltensify the guerrilla war which was being car-
ried on by the peasants since 1902. The Georgian peasants demanded the lover~ 
ing of rents on large estates, the abolition of payments due to the state 
since 1C)61 to compensate the l.andowners for the serfs' personal freedom, loca 
self-government, and the use of the Georgian language in local schools. To 
heighten the revolutionary spirit in the eountrys:.de, the Tiflis Committee 
issued leaflets calling on the peasants to join the workers of Russia under 
the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party to win freedom for all. Aimlese 
destruction of property, however, was discouraged since these estates and 
goods would SOOleday revert to the people. Instead the peasants were urged 
and encouraged to organize their forces and maintain contact with the Tiflis 
Committee in order to provide a good founB.ation for the revolutionary move-
":l3 
ment • ..J 
The Baltic region was also a scene of peasant dissatisfaction. Here, 
about half the land was owned by German landowners who hired Lithuanian and 
Latvian day laborers at extremely low wages and extracted large rents and fee~: 
from the local peasants for the use of their pastures and wooded areas. Here 
as in th.e rest of' the l!Dpire, the Bolsheviks urged the peasants to join the 
proletariat 1n its struggle for a democratic republic and promised their sup .. 
port of the peasants• demands for tb.e abolition of feudal dues, fees for the 
uae of pastures and woods, and all existing taxes along with the restoration 
ot the lands the peasants believed the:y should have received with their free-
clam in 1861. The Baltic peasants were better educated and more orderly than 
33rlachalo Pervoi Revoliutsii, pp. 670-671. 
rtoat peasants in the rest of the :&o.pire. 'r!J.ey annotmced th.ay wul.d cut wood 
'"'ithout paying fees to the l.andO'W'.O.ers 1 ceased paying feudal dues1 and peti -
tio:.1ed the government to legalize their actions. Agricultural laborers went 
on strike and mobs gathered to threaten non-strU:ers but there v.."Bs little 
violence and no attempt at revolution. 
There 'tro s plenty of vio lance in central Russia 1 e spec 1~ lly L"l the pro .. 
vin.ces of Kursk1 Orel1 and Cllernigov, but Bolshevi: influence 'li78S vreak. Bol-
shevi...~ leaflets and worl..ers returning to their families from Odessa 1 Ekater-
inoslav, and the Donetz Basin did not succeed in spreading the Soeial-Democra-
tic ideas among the peasants but did make them more violent. Independent 
agitators fired up the peasants by- spreading rtnors that the Tsar had given 
the land to the peasants but needed their help in taking it from disobedient 
landlords. Rumors of revolts in other provinces wre spread about and it 
was even said that the army was returning from Manchuria to chase the land• 
lords off the land. As a result agricultural laborers ceased working, peasant 
mobs stole grain and livestock from the landlords, and robbed and burned sev-
eral estates. The motive for these actions was not revolution but robbery-
and revenge since peasants often returned their loot and turned agitators 
34 
'Who spoke against the Tsar in to the police. The Bolsheviks could not 
organize the violent peasantry- into a revolutionary force because they lacked 
the popularity that the Socialist-Revolutionaries bad in that aren. Further-
more, the general ignorance of the peasantry mede peasants more a.pt to be-
lieve rumors about the Tsar giving the peasants land than to study political 
issues and revolutionary tactics. Many of the peasants om1ed no land and .. 
lacked the sense of responsibility required to c:ia~ the social str.J.Cture or 
lnndowning system in Russia. T?:.tey seemed to be more conc~rned with robbing 
the landlords of a few tl&terial goods than with actually siezing tr.Le land 
themselves or organizi.."lg local sel:r-e;ove:rnment. T:"le lack of troops in the 
area beeau.se of the war in l\ianchuria served only to an.courage the peasants to 
greater violence rather than to utake them see their opportunity to organize 
tl1eir own local govern.rnent. 35 
Looking at the general situation in the begi:rming of April, the Bolshe-
viks could see that in th.e first three months of 1905 there had been much 
uarest and even violJ.mce, but not revolution. The autocrac;r was still stand-
i:ng. All the revolutionary parties together did not provide the people 'rl.th 
a clear revolutionary strategy which would unite all in a struggle against 
the autocracy. The Social-Democrats themselves were split by a factional 
strife 'Which served only to confuse their adherents and dampen the revolution-
ary ardor of the proletariat. 'lh.ere was also much violence in the country· 
side but no real revolutionary movement. Finally, the a:my was still loyal 
to the Tsar. If some remedy were nat found for each of these problems, the 
revolution could not succeed. 
35Ib1d. pp. 61J.6-650. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE "THmDtt PARTY CONGRESS: THE ORGA.."'iiZATIOH OF THE 
BOLSHEVIKS AS A Plffirri A!1D THE DEF:DJr:fiON 
OF THE:m REVOLUTIONARY TACTICS 
T:'le fsilure to bring about a general armed u;prising duri.."lg the first 
three nont:u1 of 1905 ;ros a bitter disapp:>intment to the Bolsheviks. The 
dissatisfaction and unrest necessary for a revolution were present but the 
proletariat as well as the peasantry "Yms still more of a mob rather than an 
organized revolutionary army and the Social .. Democratic Party ws now'h.ere near 
being 1..."1 the positio..'"l of leadership as "vanguard of the proletariat." The 
party itself was split into two camps resulting in the disorganization of 
party effort and the confusion of the masses it preached to. Furthermore, 
tactical questions had to be cleared up before any more progress towrd revol-
ution could be made. Wh.o were the allies of the Social-Democrats and the 
proletariat in the cooing struggle? What 'rould. be the nature of a future 
Provisional governmer.t end l1hat part were the Social-Democrats to play in it? 
How were the Social-Democrats to organize the masses and :L1crease their rev-
olutionary ardor and political consciousness. Finally, there ~"fls also the 
Deed for the technical preparation of the armed uprising. t.Tithout a solu:t1.on 
\o these problems there could be no democratic revolution, muc:1 less a social-




The first proble!!!. ws the disunity of the Social-Democratic Party it-
self. Since the Second Party Co:r.1.gress in 1903 the !-i!nsheviks obtained control 
of' the Centra 1 Comittee. Durin.g the same period Georgii Plek.~anov 1 the 
fol.Itliier of the Social-Democratic Party 1 tended to side "t-rith Julius Martov, the 
Menshevik spokes:nan on the editorial staff of Iskra, thus undermining Lenin's 
position in the party organ. ~lith the Central COOlmittee and the party news-
paper under Menshevik control, the Social-Democratic Party did not. live u;p 
to Lenin's expectations of what the "vanguard of tbe Proletariat" shou.ld be. 
He feared the !~nsheviks' willingness to cooperate l-Tith the Liberals t-Tould 
turn the party from a revolutionar;y proletarian organization into a trade-
unionist and reformist socialist party of the western European type. To carry 
on a theoretical dispute in the party paper would not furnish the proletariat 
with the leadership it needed but would only confuse and demoralize the masses 
who did not understand the f:lYJe points of the disputes within the party. 
Rather, it \rould be better to break with the Mensheviks and the Central Com-
mittee altogether. A completely separate party organization and newspaper 
would enable Lenin end his followers to carry out their revolutionary program 
without t·Senshevik interference and would enable them to clearly present the 
Bolshevik message without having to confuse their readers with the opposite 
message on the same page. Lenin, therefore, was determined to make a clean 
break with his I!lOst intransigent opponents even if they composed the majority 
ot the partyo By manipulating local committee elections he cou.ld arrange s 
third Party congress dominated by the Bolsheviks. Those wo supported the 
decisions of his congress he would accept as party members while those who 
'bo7eotted the congress or refused to sul:rnit to its rulings would be clearly 
•PBrated from his organization. Lenin did not mind being in the minority if 
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the follmrers he did have: "trere devoted to his ow.a plan of revolutionary action 
It was extremely important to act quicldy i."l order to grab control of 
the Social-Democratic organizations which vlE're then being fomed in the var-
ious parts of Russia • In the urte summer of 1904 Leni."l convoked the famous 
council of the "twenty two" somewhere in Switzerland. The "twenty-two" who 
are said to have attended included Lenin's wife 1 ii. KrupskB.ia 1 s. I. Gusev 1 
A.A. Bogdanov, A.v. Lunacharskjj, lo1. Essen, v.v. Vorovsldj, I-4. Liadov, P.A. 
r,ra si.kov 1 and R.s. Zemliachka. T'.uis gathering called for a new party congress 
to give a Bolshevik interpretation to the decrees of the Second P a'ty Congress 
As the meetings of this body continued, Lenin was granted funds for establish-
ing a Bolshevik paper, VJ2Sred 1 as a rival to Iek:ra. The editorial board was 
I 
to include Lenin, A.V. Ll.mscharski). v.v. Vorovskti, and D. Olminsk1j. Soon 
after, the Bureau of' the Committees of tr£~ Majority, including Gusev, Zem-
liachka, Bogdanov, Liadov1 ant '-1.J.1. Litvinov, was set up ass Bols."l.evik sub-
stitute for the Central Committee and entrusted with the task of convoking 
a third party congress. The creation and membership of' the Bureau were 
approved by the Southern Conference 1 which was supposed to represent three 
of the Social-Democratic organizations in the Ukra:J.ne, the Caucasian Union, 
which supposedly represented the Baku, Tifl1s 1 Batu:n, and Inmeretii•}.fingrelia 
COUIIlittees, and the Northern Conference representing the st. Petersburg, 
Moscov and Riga committees and other organizations in the north and industrial 
l 
center of Russia o As will be seen, it is extremely doubtful whether these 
~. Liadov Iz Zhi i Pa ii Nalmnunie i v Godi Pervoi Revol u:tsii. 
(Vosponimannia) ( Sverdlovsk, Kommissia Universiteta I.M. Sverdlova, 192 
PP. 54-po. Anna Pank:ratova, Pemta Rgsskaia Revoliu:lisiia, (Moscow, ~atelstvo Po1iticheskoi Literatury, 1951) pp. 85-90. Liadov claims that 
vas present at the conference and names sane of the "twenty-two." Yet 1 
!:alomon Schvmrz in his The Russian Rev.2l~Jon of 1905 1 pp. 257·260 1 doubts 
t there was any such conference. The exact location and time of the 
conferences actually represented the conmittees they claimed to represent 
and even more doubtful whether the mentioned committees themselves represented 
the majority of the Social-Democrats in their respective areas. The Caucasian 
Union, for example 1 represented an area in which Menshevik influence was very 
strong. By fair means or foul, Lenin practically had his own party rlth its 
o~m paper and central committee in the form of the Bureau of the Committees 
of t..lJ.e f.-i!!()ority by the end of 1904. 
One can imagine what etf'ect the creation of the Bureau of tbe Committees 
of the Majority bad on the organization and activity of the local party organ-
izations in Russia. The intra-party feud had been diSl;'Upting the party work 
of the local committees during much of 1904. As the split widened, the peak 
of the confusion was reached during the critical period following January 9 
when the Social-Democrats should have been devoting all their efforts to form 
and organize a revolution. A few examples should serve to illustrate one of 
the reasons wb:'y they failed to fulfill their task at the time. 
One area 1n which the intra-party feud deeply affected the local com-
mittees was the Ukraine. In Ekaterinosl.av a Menshevik group had been carrying 
on its own agitation and organization of the workers separately from the 
Bolshevik-dominated local committee. The Central Con:mittee of the party 
continual:cy- urged the Bolsheviks to include the Menshevik grotq> in the local 
conteeence are unknown. Furthermore, it is known that Vorovski, Lunacharski, 
and Essen perhaps a few others could not have been in Switzerland at the 
time. Perhaps Lenin alone wrote the "Declaration of the Twenty-Two" after 
consulting Bogdanov and Ol'minski 1n order to present it as a demand of party 
1101"kers 1n Russia, so that he would have a declaration formulated by a for-
aal conference wich would be a.pproved by committees 1n Russia. Or perhaps, 
there really was a conference which was attended by only a few of the people 
llentioned by Liadov. In any case, the beginning of the Bo lshevik party re-
•1ns shrouded i.'"l. mystery. 
party organization. Though the Bolsheviks at :t'irS't refused 1 they soon fomtd 
themselves short of propaganda literature fran the Central Committee and 
-vrere forced to accept the Mensheviks as co-workers. The r<~enshevik group 1 
meanwhile, continued to slander the local committee 1 as 't.ras customary for 
both factions 1 and eventually built up a large following among the workers 1 
created or took over the great majority of the Marxist reading and discussion 
circles in the city, and even managed to gain control of the local party press 
thus canpletely throwing the Bolsheviks out of contact with the masses. 
After Janua.ry 9 the Mensheviks became even more popular among the workers 
when they proposed that a strike commission formed by the workers be headed 
by an elected leadership wile the Bolsheviks had some presunably less demo-
cratic plan of o;rganization in mind. The Bolsheviks were too few and too 
inept to counter the popularity of the l~nsheviks and were eventually cut off 
from all support from the workers. Finding they could no longer operate under 
such conditions, four of the five Bolshevik canmittee members dissolved the 
camnittee and le:rt while the fifth member vas ou:t of town. An agent of the 
Central Committee soon came and. finding no cam:nittee in Ekaterinoslav, formed 
a new one composed entirely of I~nsheviks. When the fifth Bolshevik member 
returned he clamed his right to form the new committee as he was the last 
member of the old one. Instead 1 he was excluded from all cormnittee work for 
being absent fran his party work and not returning within fifteen days after 
be was called back to Ekaterinoslav. The BolsheYik protested to the Central 
Qaam1ttee but received no answer. In the meantime, he organized his ow 
group of Bolsheviks and undertook a campaign against the mrw connittee. ·.:. 
'rhus, the workers in Ekaterinoslav were again faced ~.rith ttro bickering 
.. ______ _ 
factions of the Social-Democratic Party.2 
A similar situation arose in Nikolaev, near the mouth of the Bug, when 
a police raid around the middle of February, scattered the local oommittee. 
A week later, an agent of the Central Committee n:rived and formed a new 
connuittee composed of Mens.YJ.eviks. As in Elalterinoslav1 a Bolshevik member 
of the scattered con111ittee returned claiming his right to co-opt the new 
members necessary for a new canmittee. The agent fran the Central Committee 
'tVSS willing to arrive at some sort of canpranise but was not willing to al 
both himself and the Bolshevik to form a new committee together. So, the 
Bolshevik went on to form his ow organization and Uiltolaev 1 like Ekater-
inoslav found itself nth tw feuding Social-Democratic organizations. Here 1 
again, the Menst.1viks enjoyed f'ar greater popula.rity among the workers be-
cause their orga.nization and program. seemed more democratic to the workers) 
In Sarato•t 1 the M:mshevik-dominated committee sinned in a manner the 
Bolsheviks considered abominable. Tvro Mensheviks Joined a "united Camnittee" 
·which was created by liberals in 19011. to carry on an anti-government prope-
ganda campaign. When the Bureau of the Committees of' the Majority called on 
all local committees to elect delegates to the coming party congress, the 
Saratov Mensheviks refused to comply. In !·~rch 1905 1 M. Liadov 1 who had been 
sent to Saratov b7 the Bureau, held a general party meeting wbich elected a 
representative to the party ccmgress. That this irregular move ws made a-
gainst the will of the local committee is proved by the fact that even after 
the lhird Congress the Menshevik committee refused to recognize the legality 
2 
'l'retii S'ezd RSOJ.Y:!f Apref-MaA 1292 ~a 1 Pjretokog, (Moscow, 
i•iarksisma•Leninisma, 1959 pp. 30-6§3, 69094. 




of the congress or to accept its decisions. 
In Voronezh a group of Bolsheviks had obta i.."led the support of a member 
of the Central Canmittee and declared the rival ~nsh.evik committee dissolved 
in September of 1904. The r-tensheviks 1 however, can-ied the dispute to the 
Party Council and finally' won back their status as a cormnittee 1n the spring 
of 1905. In the meantime 1 during the critical period of revolutionary un-
rest, party agitation and organization was severely disrupted. In an area 
where the Socialist Revolutionaries had a strong influence 1 the rivalry be• 
tween the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks caused the Social-Democratic Party 
to lose much of its respect and trust among the workers and made it unable to 
take advantage of the strike movement and peasant unrest.5 
Even the December strike in Baku was hampered by the dispute in the 
party. As far back as the summer of 1904 sane of the Mensheviks broke off 
from the local committee and formed their own "Bal.akban and Bibi•Eibat Work• 
ers' Group." While the strike movement ws reaching a peak in late 1904, 
the quarrel between the two factions over the proper timing of the strike, 
reduced its effectiveness. The Bolsheviks' su;pport of the strike was reluc• 
tent for they wanted to delay the strike till a general all..Caucasian or all• 
Russian strike movement got under way. 0 nDecember 27 the Bolsheviks further 
weakened the strike movement by issuing leaflets calling on the Baku workers 
to return to work and save their strength for a greater struggle against 
615-620. 
6 
capitalism in th.e near future. 
The Kazan Committee composed of Bolsheviks and Mensl'"Leviks split over 
the issue of' a party congress and even Lenin doubted the legality of counting 
tile Kazan Bolsheviks' vote in favor of convoking a congress.7 
The Riga Ccmmittee was a very small Social-Democratic organization and 
had always had enough trouble coobatting Iettiah and Jewish nationalist 
propaganda even without internal dissention. T'.ae clashes between t>1orkers and 
troops after January 9 brought about such a. degree of revolutionary ardor in 
Riga that there might have been serious trouble in Riga had there been sur-
ficient arms for an uprising. The best the Social-Democrats could do, hO\T• 
ever, l.1llS to urge the workers to strike and organize a strike committee to 
collect fands and enforce the strike. Just at this crucial moment, an argu-
ment over the appointment of a Menshevik to the Riga Contuittee caused a split 
1n the organization. The Bolshevik-dominated camnittee dissolved the Menshe-
viks' organizations, which were carrying on agitation among the 11 intelligent-
sia," on the grounds that a separate organization for more highly educated 
people was not needed. The Mensheviks, however, continued their work, and, 
:In the meantime, contacted the Central Canmittee. As the strike movement 
reached its pealt. between January 20 and 30, the local Bolshevik comrlittee 
worked along with the Mensheviks rather than disrupt the entire movement. 
But feuding seemed unavoidable. The strike caumittee became divided and 
workers were puzzled and scandalized by the frequent arguments bet-ween the 
6
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Social-Democrats. The Mensheviks captured the support of most of the workers 
in the city, though, arter much exertion, the Bolsheviks managed to keep the 
loyalty of the railroad vcm.kers. After e little while 1 the Mensheviks com• 
pletel;y disassociated themselves from the Bolsheviks. The letter remained 
faced with the task of creating new organizations among factory workers, 
renewing previous connections among the workers, organizing new discussions 
end reading circles and creatin8 sub-committees to train new psrty workers 
in the various districts of the city. In other words 1 the Mensheviks had 
completely wrecked the Bolshevik organization in Riga. Not receiving party 
literature from the Central Committee and being unable to communicate with 
most of the proletariat in the city because of the lack of leaflets written 
in Lettish, the Riga COI!Illittee remained a shadow organization supported by 
some of the railroad workers and a few soldiers belonging to the local Russian 
8 garrison. 
Even the st. Petersburg Caamittee was not spared the strife between the 
two factions. After the formation of the Bureau of the Committees of the 
Majority the Mensheviki~ 1n the capital struck back by campaigning among the 
workers against the Bolsheviks. Apparently, the Mensheviks succeeded in 
making their rivalr: very u.npopular. Bolshevik prestige fell to such an extent 
that workers frequently beat Bolshevik agitators and destroyed their leaflets. 
TI1e Bolsheviks' prestige rose after January 9 because their views con-
cerning the march had been vindicated. For a few days even the Mensheviks 
cooperated with them in a United Committee which carried on agitation and 
issued leaflets jointly si(pled by Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The friendship 
8 Tret!i S"ezd, pp. 58l-6oo. 
did not last long, however. Although Bolsheviks and Mensheviks occa$ionally 
Inet and discussed party work, their loyalties remained with their own organ-
izations. Workers often demanded that both factions unite and stop their 
arguing but it ws no use. Even the Social-Democratic student Organization, 
which h.ad been organized yea.rs before to recruit party members from among the 
students, obtain funds for the party, and support the revolutionary movement 
among students of' all parties, was also split b:y the party squabble. When 
the Bolsheviks supporting party centralism demanded that the student Organize-
tion, which included many non-party members, be headed by a member of the 
Bolshevik-dominated committee, those sympathizing with the Mensheviks quit 
and formed another organization. Despite the efforts of conciliators to 
unite the two factions in a "Executive Committee," the Menshevik -orientated 
students declared that two thirds of' the original organization had quit and 
demanded the treasury 1 press 1 and large library of' Marxist literature be 
given to the new Menshevik student orga.nization. Thus, even in the imperial 
capital the feud between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks weakened and disorganized 
the party' s vork. 9 
So, it is easy to see hov the deplorable condition of the Social-Demo-
cratic Party rendered it too weak to carry on its task of' organizing the 
proletariat into a revolutionary army. The Bolshevik Bureau's campaign to 
obtain the necessary approvals of local committees for a third party congress 
only worsened the situation by resulting in the formation of many pseudo-
CCIIIIIlittees and shadow organizations. Yet Lenin thought it well "t-TOrth the 
'temporary confusion to obtain freedom of action for himself and his followers. 
!bat he was determined to be completely disassociated f'rom his opponents is 
9 
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s11ovn in a letter Lenin wrote to Gusev late in January of 1905 urging, "For 
10 
God • s sake ••• put through an unconditional split, a split 1 a split!" Nor 
did Leni:l let the possibility thnt he v."'u.ld end up L'"l c mL."1.ority deter hi:n 
from creating his ow party. In February he wrote to Gusev and Bogdanov, 
But now 1 after the Bureau, after V:e,t!red 1 the split is a fact t 
And when the split had become a fact that materially we were very much 
-r;-reaker ••• The Mensheviks have more money, more literature, more 
transportation facilities, more agents, more 11names 1 " and a. larger 
staff of contributors ••• only after e long 'battle, and only vith 
the aid of an excellent organization, can we tut"J:l o\n" moral strength 
in.to materia 1 strength ••• 11 
As the year 1905 cO!Ilmenced 1 ~nin was already dee~ in his canrpeign to 
obtain enough support to make his congress at least seemingly legitimate. 
The ~.tensheviks' domination of the Party Council and the Central Committee 
was the main obstacle to his :plans. Lenin's article 1 "Time to End It 1" 
which a-ppeared in V!!!!red 1n early January, is a good summary of his position 
regarding the upper circles of the pa.rty. Since the Party Council and the 
Central Committee ~re obstructing the convocation of a congress against the 
will of the majority of the committees, the Bureau of the Committees of the 
Majority would take upon itself' the duty of' organizing the congress Which 
would be held with or without the approvsl of the Centra 1 Committee. Lenin 
went on to declare that Iskra had lost the confidence of the party because 
ot the lies it printed, and therefore 1 V;e.t!red w s now the major party organ. 12 
'l'hroughou:t the first third of 1905 Lenin continued his abusive campaign 
8 sa1nst the Mensheviks, blaming them for the split in the part;r and condemning 
10 
Lenin, Polnoe Sobrannie Sochinenuii, XI, p. ll. 
11 
Lenin, Collected Works, VIII, p. 145. 
12 
Lenin, Collected Wox:ks 1 VIIIa pp. 35•39· 
•----
the Central CO!t'Jmittee and Party Council for their opposition to a party 
congress. In February of 1905, Fortune, in the form of the Russian police, 
sniled upon Iellin. Nine of the eleven members of the Central Com.'nittee were 
arrested in Russia, while the remaining two, L.B. Y..rassin und A.L. Liubimov, 
,;ere "conciliators" an...v.ious to repair the split 1...11 the party even if it meant 
s'3tisfying Lenin's O.entands.13 \iiith the opposition of the Centra 1 Committee 
re::noved 1 it became a lllUCh simpler matter for the Burel<u to obtain tm~ r...ecessar 
majority of votes by local committees calling for a party congress. By April 
4, Lenin could triumphantly announce that with the consent of the Central 
committee the support of tventy-four local camnittees, he had more than the 
14 
necessary majority of committee votes to convoke a congress. To dispel any 
doubts concerning the legality of the congress, the Mandate Cet.mnission which 
had the duty of checking the delegates' credentials at the congress, obtained 
a three-fourths majority of the votes by accepting the affirmative votes of 
a few committees which were so recently formed that their full privileges 
l) 
had not yet been confirmed. It must be remembered, however 1 that many of 
these organizations were mere splinter committees. For example, the Kazan 
end Nikolaev Committees were obviousl-Y not regularly formed committees, while 
the real approval of the Sarstov Committee had never really been obtained. 
At the same t:l!ne, some of the legitimate committees tr:.lch as those of st. 
> 
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Petersburg, Riga 1 Kharkov and some of the Caucasian committees did not enjoy 
16 
the support of the majority of the Social·Democrats in their respective areas. 
The congress opened 1n London on April 12 (April 25 in Icndon) with 
Lenin presiding. The Central Committee and Party Council were represented 
along with twnty of the local canmittees1 all of 'Which had full deciding 
votes. A few committees commissioned men already in exile to represent them 
in order to save the expense and risk of' traveling from Russia to .England and 
so it turned ou:t that Lenin represented the Odessa Committee while Vorovskii 
represented the Nikolaev Committee •17 
The first question to be considered was the declaration of the party's 
attitude tow.rd an armed uprising. Lenin submitted a resolution declaring 
the proletariat to be the leading revolutionary force 1n the democratic rev-
olution in Russia and that it could play its role in the revolution only if 
tmited under the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party. Therefore, it 
was the task of the Social-Democratic Party to set up an apparatus 1n order 
to provide the masses with information and leadership for a direct struggle 
with the autocracy by means of' mass political strikes and general armed up• 
risings. All party organizations, therefore, had the duty not only to pro• 
vide the proletariat with class consciousness and a political ideology but 
also to organize special groups to provide and distribute arms, devise a 
detailed plan for the struggle against the autocracy, and to actually lead 
the armed uprising. 18 
l6 See Above 1 pp. 49-55. 
17For a full list of' the delegates and the organizations they represen-
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After so.-·ne discussion on the exact timing of the uprising and the readiness 
of the proletariat to rise, Lenin asserted that the events of the past fevr 
months had shom1 the proletariat to t.~.S.ve a sufficient degree of class and 
political consciousness to be a revolutionarJ force though he admitted that 
more ini'ormation from local party workers was needed on the readiness of the 
proletariat. There bei.."'lg no serious objections, Lenin's resolution ws adop-
19 
ted unanimously. 
Regarding participation 1n government elections to such bodies as the 
Shidlovskii Co::mnission or to the council Which w s to advise the Tsar in 
matters of legislation, Lenin argued that there was no need to be so rigid in 
political tactics. By participating in such election campaigns, the Bolshe-
viks could take advantage of the freedom of expression offered by the govern• 
ment on such occasions to consolidate the peoples' gains of new liberties 
end expose the government's effort to disunite 1 deceive 1 and draw the workers 
away fror.t their true interests. Lenin emphasised that the party must act in 
the open as \Jell as in the lm.dergrotmd, and therefore, should use every legal 
means to develop class cansc iousne ss among the masses. Should the field of 
legal political action be left to the liberals, the bourgeois class would 
strengthen its econanic and political dominetion over the masses and make the 
working class an appendage of bourgeois democracy. However 1 some Bolsheviks 
found it hard to adjust to &$epping into open politics. I<rasin, the repre-
19 Tretii S"ezd 1 P• 450-1J.51. N.V. Romanov, the delegate of the Northern 
CCIIIIaittee 1 vanted an additional resolution on the timing of the uprising 
Iince he considered the ~revolutionary enthusiasm in Russia at that time to 
have fallen considerably since January and feared a premature uprising. 
pP. 154-157. z,iost of the delegates supported L enin in his belief that the 
Pl"'letariat <ms ready for an uprising at the time and Romenov' s resolution 
•a ignored. Did anyone remember Romanov's warning in December? 
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::>en.tative of' the Central CoiTmlittee, proposed c: clause i'orbidding the party 
to participate in government cor:nnissions and in actual elections, thus allow-
ing Bolshevik :partici:fXltion only in the campeigns preceding the elections.20 
PL'I'ltllly, H resolution embodying Lenin's position, calling on the Scx:ial-
Democrats to ta.~ advantage of every legal means of carrying on their agita-
21 
tion., was passed. 
One of the most noteworthy contributions of the Third Congress to the 
Bolshevik tactical plan of revolution was the nev agrarian program. This 
program was not entirely new. T'.o.e Bolsheviks had already realized for a long 
time that in Russia, where the great majority of the population consisted of' 
peasants, the relatively srtl8ll urban proletariat could hardly hope to over-
throw the autocracy without help from the countryside. Bolshevik leaflets had 
long been declaring that the Social-Democratic party supported the peasa.nts 
in their efforts to a .olish all feudal dues and rents, all existing taxes 
and payments to the government ns compensation to the landlords for the loss 
of their serfs, along W'ith the transfer of all Church, State 1 and "out off" 
lands to the peasants. This policy, as far as it went, was found to be unsat-
isfactory. L"'l the first place 1 the acquisition of' merely the "cut off'tt lands 
did not attract most peasants. They wanted to sieze all the nobles' estates 
22 
ae well as the state, church and non.astery lands. Another problem lied in 
the Social-Dem.ocrata analysis of the social structure of rural Russia. To the 
Social-Democrats the peasantry did not represent a single class, but an exten-
20 
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sion of urban class differentiation into the rural areas. Just as there was 
<'l proletariat opposed to a bourgeoisie vhich owed the means of production 
in the cities, there l-786 a rural proletariat composed of agricultural day 
laborers who owned no land opposed to a rural bourgeoisie which owned the 
means of' production 1n the rural areas••laJW and livestock. Ccnsequently, 
there was a fear among most Social-Democrats thnt by su;pporting the entire 
revolutionary peasantry the;y would be surrendering the rural proletariat 
tmder the tutelage of the peasant bourgeoisie. Finall;y1 a concrete tactical 
directive uas needed to enable the peasants to overthrow the autocrac;r and 
landed nobility. 
During March and April of 1905 1 Lenin gave much thought to devising a 
clear resolu:tion which would provide the congress vith a solution to these 
problems. 23 Regarding the siezure of estates, Lenin quickly realized that the 
old Social-Democrat:i.': slogans calling for the seizure of the "cut ott" lands 
had failed to give the peaaantry a common atm to unity it as a revolutionary 
force. Overhearing a conversation of Father Gapon, who had arrived in Switzer 
land soon atter "Bloody Stmday 1" with another emigre and became convinced 
that the peasants wanted something f'ar more than the seizure of the state 1 
church, and "cut off" lands. They wanted all the land, includ.ing the nobles' 
24 
estates. He realized that only by supporting the most radical peasant 
demands could the proletar:tat hope to obtain the su;pport of the peasantry in 
a struggle for a democratic republic. The peasantey might be backward and 
politically tmeonscious, but if their main interest--the seizure of all the 
23Lenin, Collested Works, VIn. pp. 231-236, 246-2511 315-322. 
24wolte, Bertram, , Three Wh9 ~faS}e a R!!volution. B .Y., Dial Press, 
1964., P• 186. 
land--were at stake, they would be the most determined opponents of the 
autocracy and feudal order.. Th.e:refore, Lenin ss·u· no objection in supporting 
the peasant revolution in its most extreme form. In April he wrote in Vpered, 
We are in full sympathy with the peasant movement. We would 
consider !t n trenen.dous gi'in both for t!w genercl socirll developuent 
of Russia and for the Russian proletariat if the peasantry, with our 
help 1 succeeded in. 'rreuti.'c.B fror;: the lnndlords ill tbeir lBnd.c by 
revolutionary means.25 
Though the seizure of all the nobles' estates would mean the destruction 
of the old feudal order and the advance of political democracy, the increase 
of economic freedom would only enlarge the problem of capitalist oppression. 
Though it was the duty of the Social-Democratic Party to support all revolu-
tionary actions of the peasantry, lenin added that the rural proletariat must 
be organized by the party in order to make it conscious of itself as a class 
with interests antagonistic to those of the peasant bourgeoisie. Once demo• 
cracy had been wan, the urban and rural proletariat were to unite in a canmon 
struggle against bourgeois societ;r. Although for the time being the rural 
proletariat was to participate in the democratic revolution in the cotmtry• 
side, it was also to prepare itself to act together with the urban proletariat 
26 1n the great social struggle in the near future. 
Finally, as a tactical directive for a successful agrarian revolution 
against the state and the nobility, Lenin insisted that the peasants create 
tbeir own village committees which were to democratize rural society by 
Hizing and distributing the land, grain, and livestock, and setting up 
l"nolutionary self-administration. In his draft of' the resolution to the 
!hird Congress, I.en5.:n further recommended that the peasantry disrupt the 
-
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autocratic government refusing to recognize its aathority, non-performance of 
27 
military service, and reilu.sal to pay all taxes. 
Lenin's reoolution at the congress on the Social-Democratic attitude 
to-ward the peasant revolutionary movement expressed these ideas on Social-
Democratic support of the peasant seizure of all state, church, and nobles' 
estates, the organization of the rural proletariat 1 and the formation of 
28 
revolutionaey peasant camnittees. 
Krasin did not like the idea of actually supporting the peasant bour• 
geoisie and submitted a resolution stating that the party would not oppose 
29 
the peasant movement which went so far as to seize all the nobles' lands, 
but Lenin's resolution was adopted without alteration. 
Another tactical question facing the congress concerned the relation of 
the Social-Democrats to other parties participating in the revolution. Tl1.e 
Mensheviks were the first group to be dealt with as Lenin already considered 
them outside the party for all practical purposes. In a short resolution of 
one paragraph Ienin condemned the Mensheviks for putting mass spontaneity 
above consciousness of the proletarian struggle a.nd thus relinquishing the 
role of the Social-Democrats as the vanguard of the proletariat, disrupting 
party discipline and organization, endangering the independence of the party 
b7 close coopera.tion vith the liberal bourgeoisie 1 and den.yin.g the possibility 
and desirability of the party playing the organizing role in an armed uprising 
8!ld participating in a future democratic provisional government. The resolu• 
tton further called on all party me!!lbers to combat and expose the fa.lsity of 
27Ibid. pp. 2361 406. 
28 
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:,1en&:1ev:tk doctrines and decreed that only those 1-rho subu.itted to party disci-
pli.."le and recognized all the party congresses were party members. Since 
determined l4ens.heviks would never ~recognize the legality of the Third Cvne;ress 
this would a·tttomatically exclude them and their organizations from Lenin's 
30 party. 
liot all Bolshevilts vere prepared to write off the Mensheviks so quickly. 
M.G. Tslt.b . akaia 1 o:J.e of th.e representatives of the Caucasian Union, denied 
that the Mensheviks had become a separate party and declared that they were 
still the Bolsheviks' comrades and that the party split could still be healed. 
He further declared the Bolsheviks to be partially responsible for tl'l..e split 
and condemned the formation of 6 personal cult around Lenin. The Boisheviks 
-were devoted to a revolutionary method and ideology and not to "Leninism." 
Len:L'l might be one of the party's most able ~heoreticians but he '-ISs not 
infallible and would make mistakes. 31 Krasin, who was devoted to restoring 
tmity 1n the Social-Democratic party, objected that the present period of 
revolution was not a time to further divide the party but to Wlite it. If 
ever the Me::J.sheviks' energies were needed, it was nmr. Besides, there were 
so many different shades of belief among the Mensheviks themselves that it 
32 
was hard enough to define the group much less condemn it. Romanov reminded 
the delegates that Menshevik cooperation was necessary at the local level 
and proposed a resolution condemning individuals rather than entire organiza-
33 tions vth.ose cooperation was needed. B.V. Avilov denied that the party split 
31 ~. pp. 339-3~1. 
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,.,as very "tr.tde and pointed out that L'l his mr..t to\1'.!1; Kharkov, 1:!: the !Jkraine, 
both factions distributed Islcr""a B:>.d Vpered and recognized the Central Cozar1it-
tee. Therefm.~ 1 other co1:mittee s ohould be 'tvilling to nerge 'ltr.f.t::1 the H""nshe-
34 
vilcs and guarantee them freedom of expression. This idea 1 !J.cnrever 1 vre s too 
much for even the "conciliators" and provoked an outburst of laughter. But 
though there '~s much opposition to Lenin's proposal to make a complete break 
with tlte Iilensheviks, his opponents could not agree on a plan that would remedy 
the r.~nsheviks' disruption of Bolshevik propaganda and organization. Conse-
35 quently1 L:!nin's resolution vms finally :passed 't~ithout a dissenting vote. 
The Bolsheviits' attitude toward other Social-Democratic :partias i.."l the 
Russian ~pire -was far more friendly. Parties such as the U!ttish Social• 
Democratic Labor Party, the Social-Democratic Illbor Party of Poland and 
Lithusnia 1 the Armenian Social-Democratic labor Organization, end the General 
Jewish Workers' Union were Marxist ]?Elrties which differed from the Russian 
Social-Democratic U!lbor Party mainly in that they carried on. their propaganda 
1n the la!lot"""!.Wge of the minorities among 'Which they worked and in that they 
usually de:nanded autono."!lY within the Russian Empire for these national r1inor-
ities. For instance 1 the Lettish Social-Democrats resembled the Bolsheviks 
1n belief and action even more than the Henshevil~s did and proved this by 
temporarily fusing with the Bolsheviks in 1906. Believing that the interests 
of the common struggle of a 11 the proletariat against the autocracy demanded 
the eventusl unification of all :proletarian parties, the Bolsheviks looked 
forward to t!J.ei:r a'bGOr:ption of the other parties. Many, ~mrever 1 still 
Z'emembered their disagreements with the Jewish \-lorkers' Union over autonomy 
-
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i'or national groups within the Ru ssian Social-Democratic Party. G.L. 
S.hklovskii1 representing the Minsk Group, warned that it would be wise to 
readmit the Jewish Workers• Union into the party, not as an organizativn, but 
as individual members. As a further precaution to keep the principles of the 
Bolsheviks free from the influence of possible erroneous beliefs of other 
Social-Democratic Parties, all agreed that the Central Committee should cere-
fu.lly' oversee all forms of cooperation between such parties on 'bhe local level 
Therefore, a resolution introduced by Vorovskii 1 proclaiming the necessity of 
the eventual w.ity of' all proletarian parties, reaffirming the principle of 
eentralian against federalism within the party as established by the Second 
Party Congress, and instructing the Central Committee to supervise all forms 
of cooperation between Social-Democratic parties on the local level was 
quickly adopted. 36 
The Socialist Revolutionary Party received special consideration be· 
cause the Bolsheviks considered it not a socialist party but a radical liber• 
al one. Its program promising the distribution of all land in Russia so that 
each family would have as much land as it could work without the use of hired 
labor was condemned by the Bolsheviks as bourgeois vhile its non-Marxist hope 
that democracy would immediately replace capitalism with socialie was de-
rided by the Bolsheviks as utopian. At the congress, many delegates saw 
great difficulty in vork.ing out a plan of cooperation with the Socialist 
Revolutionaries. V.M. Obukhov, representing the Saratov COOJitittee, and 
P.A. Dzha.paridze, a representatift of' the Caucasian Union, both came f'rom 
regions where there was ample opportunity to observe the activities of' the 
Socialist•Revol.ul#ionaries and cautioned the other delegates at the congress 
36Ibid. pp. 368-371. 
-
that the Socialist-Revol\Itionary Party was overrated and far less active 
than w s commonly thought. Therefore 1 cooperation with it might actually 
hinder the Social-Democrats' revolutionary effort rather than help it. 
G.I. K:ramolnikov of the Saratov Committee added that there was such diveriity 
of belief and tactics a.mong the Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves that 
they did not really constitute a party. Further complaints were raised that 
since there 'Wfls no real Socialist-Revolutionary program or pat:ty discipline, 
many of the Socialist-Revolutionaries were monarchists and reformists rather 
than revolutionaries, thus making it impossible for the Social-Democrats to 
cooperate with them. 37 Finally, the congress accepted a resol\Ition intro-
duced by Lunacharskii and supported by Lenin. Militant agreements betveen 
Socialist Revolutionary and Social-Democratic organizations for the purpose 
of combatting the autocracy were approved of provided that they did not 
restrict the independence of the Social-Democratic Party or affect the purity 
of its proletarian principles. As in relations with all other parties, the 
Central Committee was to supervise all forms of cooperation between the lo-
cal Social-Democrat and Socialist-Revolutionary organizations.38 
It was also considered necessary to peas a resolution on revol\Itionary 
cooperation with the liberals. Lenin's mistrust and hatred of the liberals, 
however, was well-know. Since the class interests of the bourgeoi£ demo-
crats were essentially anti-proletarian, Lenin believed they would eventually 
turn against the proletariat as 'b.h.ey bad in other countries. In the meantime 
they were willing to ally themselves with the Social-Democrats 1n order to 
-
~~-~--------------~ 
obtain the support of the ~rorking class in. a com:.non struggle against the 
autocracy--to use the wrlmrs to 'tt!n freedom for themselves. Lenin did not 
object to strildng against the t::utocracy <trl.th any group that opposed it 1 but 
he did object to entering into a formal agreement with any party. T"ne Social• 
Democratic Party could hope to attain victory only if it preoerved its bde-
pendence and purity of ideology. A formal alliance 'lrlth even radical bour-
geois democrats such as the Socialist Revolutionaries vould lead to a fusion 
of trends and ideas which would result 1n chaos in the Social-Democratic 
revolutiona,ry program and the confusion of the proletariat. I!mr much more 
then w s an alliance with the liberals to be feared. 39 One had only to look 
at the Menshevik wing of the party to behold the inconsistency and waveri..11g 
which resulted from dealing with the liberals. Accusi.."!.g the l.fensheviks of' 
clouding the class consciousness of the proletariat by cooperating with the 
-
liberals 1 he wrote, 
••• Considering themselves to be Social-Democrats and the true spokemaen 
of the working class aspiration, these gentlemen do not understand, or 
do not want to understand, that the \TOrk~-class movement will achieve 
substantial results only if it is led by a vorking-class party, if the 
proletariat is conscious of its class distinctions and realizes that 
its true emancipation lies in its own hands and not in the hands of 
the bourgeois democrats who are discrediting the actions of the worlt~~rs' 
party. These 'strictly speaking' Scx:ial-Democrats, alleged r-mrxists, 
ought to realize the demoralization they are bringing amo~ the working• 
class masses by seeking to prove that certain 'democrats' (but not 
Social-Democrats) 1 consisting exclusively of bourgeois intellectuals,40 
are called upon to show the workers the way to freedom and socialism. 
le.in was determined that the Bolsheviks would not follow the Menshevik course 
ot cooperation with the liberals. 
-
Most of the other delegates felt that a resolution on the question of 
39Lenin, Collecj;ed Works. VIII, pp. 159-166, 221•223. 
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cooperation 'tdth the liberals ,;ras necessary. A resolution submitted by 
Voroovskii declared that the Social-Democrats sr.~.ould support the bourgeoisie 
::L."l its opposition to the autocracy but also warned that tr.t.e Social-Democrats 
must also show the workers the limited quality of the bourgeois movement and 
the anti-revolutionary and anti-proletarian character of all liberals, espec• 
ially those of t..lte Union of Liberation, and must struggle to prevent the 
bourgeois democrats from taking the leadership of the workers • moV\'!Illent or 
any parrt of it i..TLto their hands. V.I. Fridolin1 a representative of the 
Ural Union, supported the resolution by claiming there were various shades 
of liberalisn besides the most radical, the Socialist Revolutionaries, and 
that these lass radical liberals could joi.11 the struggle against the au:to-
41 
crecy. Lenin had his doubts, 
To 'Wldertake the question of cooperation with the liberals is 
u:u~.doo. Our cause in. Russia has cane to a.n uprising, and under these 
conditions such agreements are tmreliable. Even if some groups of the 
"Liberation" or liberal leaning students, which do not refuse to step 
forward vihh weapons in their hands can be folmd, that does not con-
clude an agreement with Struve -~2 
However, since the resolution contained the warning that the Social-Democrats 
were obliged to expose the anti-proletarian nature of the liberal movement 1 
Lenin disco11tinued h:ts opposition to it and it was passed u.naniraously. 
T"ne reletion of the Social-Democrats to other parties in the revolution 
wes an important tactical question, but it was necessary to look further ehea • 
What would be the role of the Social-Democratic Party once the autocracy had 
been overthrmm and the revolution accomplished? Could the Social-Democratic 
Party take part in a revolutionary provisional government l.-ri.th non-proleta.ria 
~~etii s"eza, 375-377. 
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elements? rJ!ost 31enslleviks lfOu..lil say not. Tl1ough they 'l:rere villin.g enough to 
enter into agreements ldth the bourgeoisie in order to strike together against 
the autocracy, they were war.y of entering into a bourgeois government and 
thus ceasing to be a revolutionary oppositional party, lapsing instead into 
"reformismtl and "opportunisn" as head many socialist parties in western 
Europe. In a pamphlet entitled Two Dictatorships, A.s. I'-1artynov "rarned that 
the Social-Democrats' participation in a democratic government and their con-
sequent effort to establish oocialisra. would frighten all the anti-proletarian 
elements into restoring the monarchy and expelling tr...e Social .. Democrats from 
:povrer. On the other hand, if the Social-Democrats participated in the 
gove:rn.!llent 'trl.thout attempting to establish socialism, they would be guilty of' 
"Jau:..--e sisn" i.e. "reformism." Therefore, Martyn.ov advocated the boycott 
and opposition to a :future provisional government. 
Lenil1. 68'\r the problem in another light. lie retaliated by issuing a 
pamphlet entitled §.oc,1,!31-Democracy a.nd the Revolutio.nary Provisional Govern-
43 ~· and an article, "the Revolutionary-Democratic Dictatorship of the 
44 
Proletariat and the Peasantry," in which he set forth his vie'tvS on the 
desirability of seizing power. In the first pl.ece, under Russian conditions, 
there could be no truly democratic go,rernment with universal suffrage 1 the 
arming of' the people 1 separation of church and state, economic reforms, civil 
rights, and so on, without the participation of' the proleta.rist 1 the peasan-
tey, and the petty bourgeoisie in the provisional government. According to 
Lenin, Martynov v78s confusing the democratic revolution with the socialist 
~'eVolution. Tb.e present revolution was a democratic one and Social-Democrati 
43 
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participation in the destruction of' the last remnants of the auto.-:::racjl' and 
feudnlim, the defence of the republic against !~onarchist reaction, the dis-
tribution of the land among the peasants, and the implenentation of such 
economic reforms as the eatebl.ish!:1ent of the eight-hour day rlid not constitute 
a soc:teliot revolution. Lenin '-r.ls vague on ~-Then and hmr socialism uould be 
i.•!rglemented in Russia and expressed the hope thnt the irestern European prole-
tariat would rise and come to the aid of the Social-Democrats. Until t'.1en 
it v-C~s best for the Social-Democrats t? concern themselves <t.rith the establish-
r.tent and preserro.tior.~. of a democratic republic. In the Russian situation, 
Socbl-Der.locratic participation in a. democratic government did not constitute 
"Juaresiw." or a betrayal of the proletariat but the defence and consolidation 
of political liberty which was the first step toward socialism. The proletar-
ian party trould not sanction the abuses of power by the bourgeoisie but use 
its ovn1 political power to eli.mi..'l'}.8te the bourgeoisie. As for the possible 
reaction C[1linst the proletarian party and democracy in general, it was prob-
able that there ~rould be one, but then e revolution cannot be won without 
risks and struggles. The possibility of' a reaction made it all tr..e more nee-
essary for the proletariat to unite vith the :peasantry and petty bourgeoisie 
to defend the political liberty they had gained. The main thing to rementber 
vas that if the proletariat ws participating in a revolution, and even lead-
ing it, it must hope and expect to vin power or there l.<ras not much purpose in 
the struggle. 
In his speeches at the congress lenin restated his views on the partici-
pation of the Social-Democrats in a. pr0Visional goV"ernment. He especially 
ftreased the neeci of seizing power to combat reaction; "Even if' ~re did seize 
St. Petersbtl:'g r.nd go..dllotine racholas, we would still have several Vendees to 
...... 
deal with. "~5 Hov were the people to force the bourgeoisie to cons~te the 
revolution or rise against it if they renot.m.ced the state treasury and govern-
ment power? The Social-De!:tocrats would alwys keep the interests of tr..e pro .. 
letariat 1n mind and remain a party of opposition to the bourgeoisie elements 
in the government 1 but to Lenin the Iskra principle of "only from be lov and 
never from above" ws an anarchist principle. 46 In the midst of revolution, 
the proletariat could not afford to fear or shun victory and the power it 
would bring. The Martynovist fear of seizing power only sapped proletarian 
energy: 
At such a time Martynovism is not mere folly but a downright crime 1 
tor it saps the revolutionary enerQ ot the proJArtariat and clips 
the vings of revolutionaey enthusiaan.47 
Most of the delegates agreed with Lenin. Krasin, however, warned that 
though participation in a revolutionary provisional government was as a gen-
eral principle desirable, the question of whether or not the Social .. Democrats 
should participate 1n a revolutionary provisional government vould have to be 
decided on the basis of such concrete conditions as the relative strength of 
the bourgeoisie and proletariat in the government for certainl.3' the Social• 
Democrats could not participate in a predominantly anti-proletarian govern• 
ment. Furthermore 1 the party would have to exercise close supervision over 
its representatives in the government to enSUl"e that they did not betray the 
interests of' the proletariat or compromise the party' a independence. Lenin 
agreed with Kras:ln on these points and his resolution with Krasin.'s additions 
~5l!?J4. vm,. P• 393. 
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vas adopted as a statement of the party's objectives in the democratic revolu 
1 42. t on. 
The resolution declared that the interests of the proletariat 1 namely 
the final implementation of socialism, required the greatest possible amount 
of political freedom which could be achieved only by tr.te replacement of the 
autocracy by a democratic republic. The creation of a democratic republic 
ll'8S possible only as a result of a victorious popular uprising, whose instru-
nent, the provisional revolutionary government could establish full liberty 
of pre-election agitation and convoke the constituent assembly on the basis 
of general, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. However, the resolution also 
wrned t..lJ.at the democratic revolution would not weal".en but rather strengthen 
the hegemony of the bourgeoisie which 1 at a favorable moment 1 would attempt 
to seize most of the gains of the revolution from the proletariat. Therefore 
the Third Congress provided a blueprint for Social-Democratic participation 
in a revolutionary government: 
a) It is necessary to spread among the working class a concrete 
representation of the most probable progress of the revolution and the 
necessity of the appearance 1 at the right moment 1 of the provisional 
revolutionary government of which the proletariat demands the realiza-
tion of all the illlnediate political and economic demands of our program 
(Minimum program); 
b) Depending on the relation between forces and other factors 
which cannot be determined ahead of time 1 participation in the provi-
sional revolutionary party by plenipotentiaries of our party is permit-
ted with the aim of ruthlessly struggling against all cotm.terrevolu-
tionary attempts and all attempts to set aside the independent inter-
ests of the working class; 
c) 'l'he strict control of the party over its plenipotentiaries 
and unceasing protection of the independence of social-democracy 
striving for the full socialist revolution and an irreconcileable emnit 
to all bourgeois parties stand as the necessary conditions for such 
participation; 
48 
Tretii s"ezd, pp. 196-202. 
~----------
d) Regardless of whether t2le participation of the social-
democracy will be possible or not 1 it is necessary to propagate among 
the lvidest strata of the proletariat, the idea of the necessity of 
constant pressure on the provisional government by the armed prole· 
tariat, led by the Social-Democrats, with the intention of protecting, 
strengthening, and videning the gains of the revolution.49 
'E1is, then, was the goal of the Bolsheviks in 1905--the establishment of a 
democratic republic as a first swp toward socialisn. 
Besides outlining the tactics to be used in the coming upheaval, the 
Bolsheviks also organized themselves as a party though they still kept the 
name oi' Social-Democrats to make the r.fens."levU:s appear as the secessionists. 
Canmittees not recognizing the Third Congress were declared dissolved and a 
50 
new Bolshevik Central Committee was elected. The organization of the party 
contained elements of centralism as well as of local autonomy. The defi.r."li· 
tion of party membership which Lenin had failed to attin at the Second Congre~ s 
was adopted. A party member was defined as one who allhered to the party 
program, contributed to the party's support 1 and what 't.m s very important to 
the Bolsheviks, worked in one of the party's organizations. The Central 
Committee ws made the su:prer.te organ of authority having control of the party 
paper so that the Pa.rty Council, Which used to be composed of members of the 
Central Ccxm:1ittee and the party organ, was now needless. The Central Com-
mittee also had the power of organizing new committees and co-opting members 
for theo with the consent of the majority of the remaining members of the 
committee. A two thirds vote in the Central Conmtittee could a lao dissolve a 
49 
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local committee if two thirds of the lccal party ::nembers consented. ~"'i..?W.lly, 
to end the wrangling which had plagued the previous central COTif!littee, the 
unanimous vote of the remaining committee members was required to co-opt e 
new member into the Centre 1 Camnittee. 
Yet there were also signs of decentralizatio...'1. Local committees were 
granted considerable freedom i>'l printing their own literature as long as they 
did not take it upon themsel-res to decide general party questions in their 
publications. All organizations were guaranteed the inviolability of the 
autonomy that was giwn to them when they were organized. Subordinate organ-
izations were giwn the right to influence the local committees and receive 
51 information regarding party business from them. It was hoped by the Bol-
seevil'>:s that such decentralization would increase local initiative and that 
some freedon within the party would appeal to the masses as had the Menshe-
viks seemingly more democratic organization. Lenin wanted to go even f't.tl:"ther 
and admit enough workers to ensble thea to outnmber the party intellectt¥lls 
four to one. He urged the creation of more party organizations and less 
stringency in admitting workers. Finally, he ewn suggested the admission of 
workers from the lower party circles into the local camnittees as a means of 
political education. Lenin saw the recent disorders in Russia as having 
ahaken the foundations of the autocracy and believed that an exclusively 
aecret and conspiratorial organization was no longer necessary, though he 
bJ no means discarded the undergromd aspect of the party. In such a revolu-
ttanary situation, l1.e considered it necessary to increase the memberahip of 
the Pfirty both to give it more of the bulk it needed to carry out its task of 
51 !Pid. pp. 46o-466. contains the party constitution. 
organizing the proletariat to lead the revolution and to increaoo the revol-
utionary mood among '\vorkers by r.1akil1.g their membership in. · :w pvrty e means 
of political education. Though in this case Lenin may have been approachL"'lg 
the ~fensllevik position on mass participation in the party, !1e "tms not adopt-
ing their tendency to,rord party spontaneity for he probably still counted on 
t:-,.e structure of tb.e party to keep the worlters tmder the tutelage of the 
professional revolutionaries. However, many agreed -o;rl.th rr.v. ROl.'llanov and 
V .A. Desnitsldi when they warned that the autocracy ws still standing and 
tr..at s:L'l'lCe the situation had not really changed, the party had better remain 
pril'"aarily an underground organization for tb.e tiD::: being. After considerable 
debate, the project was shelved and the question of tlw number of \-lorkers and 
52 
the conditions under 't¥hich they could be admitted was left open. 
On. April Z7 (May 10 in London) the Third Party Congress closed. Most 
o:f' the delegetes departed for Russia ~rhile Lenin, Vorovskii, and a f~v others 
returned to Stvitzerl.and wi1.ere L nin continued to edit Vnsred, the na."":le of whic ll 
was changed to Prolejta£Y in May. Uith the conclusion of the Third Party Con-
gress, tlle ::-:>olsheviks vrere left organiZed as a separate party end in possess .. 
ion of a clear plan. of action. for the caning revolution. 
5'' 
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BOLSHEVIK EFFmTS TO mGANlZE THE MASSES 
During the spring and Sl.lrltiler of 1905, most of the Bolsheviks' efforts 
-were directed toward inciting a gensral strike throughout the 12np1re. Though 
by April revolutionary ardor and unrest had sanewhat decreased, no one had 
forgotten January 9 and the situation vas far from peaceful. To revive the 
revolutionAry spirit, all revolutionary parties, including the Bolsheviks, 
took advantage of every occasion to incite political demonstrations and 
strikes, hoping that these might grow into an all-Russian general strike. 
The best occasions for creating tmrest were May Day, which in some Russian 
cities was celebrated on April 18 to coincide with the first of May in western 
Europe, July 91 which commemorated the passing of six months since "Bloody 
Sunday," and any day on which news of defeat from the Far East or clashes 
between workers and troops in other cities served to stir u;p the people. 
Whether the agitation by revolutionary parties resulted in mere political 
meetings or 1n actual violence depended on local conditions such as the amount 
of tmrest among the workers and the measures taken by the police. 
In st. Petersburg the situation was relativecy quiet. The May Day 
celebrations consisted of political meetings with revolutionary speeches but 
not violence. This does not mean, however 1 that the local Bolsheviks were 
idle. A police raid on one of the party presses tm.covered a small store of 
....... 
rifles, revolvers, and daggers as well as a pamphlet, "on the Eve of the 
struggle" calling on all vorkcrs to sieze such strategic points as adminis-
trative buildings, especial:cy the Ministry of Interior, police stations, and 
banks as well as surrounding buildings by a surprise attack and urging them 
to prepare themselves for the upris:f.rl..g by gathering bombs, dynamite, and 
flammable materials. Along with this store of equip:1ent which was apparently 
Lntended for use on May Day about a hundred members--most:cy 1miversity stu-
dents--of' the "Armed Uprising" group were arrested, thus disrupting acy plans 
1 
the Bolsheviks might have had for creating a major disturbance on May Day. 
For the next t-wo months Bolshevik activity in St. Petersburg consisted 
mainly in gathering crowds '\dth red flags around railroad stations and threa-
tening officers embarking recruits to Manchuria. IBte in Jime, the Putilov 
workers ceased work and were followed by the wag:on-'W'Orks and port workers. 
However, the strike failed to achieve anything because workers in many plants, 
especially those in the Sestroretskii armaments factory refused to join the 
strike. '.ro the Bolsheviks this provided another example of Why political 
freedom was necessary to improve the workers• economic condition. A leaflet 
issued by the lieva District Bolsheviks told the workers, 
••• our enemies 1mderstood very well that as lang as the autocracy 
exists '\<Te cannot organize ourselves into such a powrful and mighty 
trade unions as our comrades abroad, and as long as we are not organized 
we cannot successful:cy struggle against capitalisn for the betterment 
of our economic condition and even if we do strike w will be unsuccess-
ful. So that w can successful:cy struggle against capitalism we need 
wide political liberty, i.e. the freedom to strike, associate, gather, 
freedom of' speech and press, so that we may freely gather, discuss and 
print our demands. But all these liberties, as it is well known, can 
be guaranteed to us only by popular representatives chosen from all 
l ftH Ak.ademia Uau1{1 SSat 1 Revoliutsii 1905·1997 v Rossii, Dok.umenty i 
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classes of the people by general, equal, direct, and secret voting, 
and passL.""Lg laws protecting t:1.e interests of the people as vrell as 
seeing to it that they are protected.2 
Follovring this arguoent up in otber leaflets, the Bolsheviks, as well 
as the Socialist Revolutiozwri.es and Gaponists, called on all workers to join 
in a general strike on Ju.l.y 9 to commemorate the ISSsing of half a year since 
"Bloody Sunday." Much of the Bolshevik agitation was aimed at the Putilov 
workers, both because the motor works were such a large and important part of 
the economy of the city and the nation and because they had already had ex-
perience in organizing themselves tmder Father Gapon. The !<lsnsr.t.eviks expected 
tlle Tsar to grant a constitutio.tl and vronted to ,.;sit till July 16 but they 
finally gave in to the perstW sion of the Bolsheviks and the Socialist Revolu-
tionaries and 'With their support about 6o 1000 wrkers struck on July 9. The 
strike, of course, was nmfuere near being a general one, but as the stElmer 
progressed the workers began to show their political a'\-rereness by increasingly 
including demands for a constituent assembly, a peoples militia, labor reformsl 
and free education for all among their economic demands. 3 
In Russia • s other great industrial center. MoscovT, the Bolsheviks had 
great difficulty 1n implanting a proletarian self-consciousness among the 
workers who maintained their patriarchal relations and whose primary allegi-
&nee was still to their clans. Bolsh.evilt leaflets and orators constantly re-
lltnded the YOrkers trJBt 'trl.thout a general strike and a final uprisine against 
'tbe autocracy, the socialist goal, the ownership of all factories and rail• 
I'Oade by all the people could never be reached. Only a frection of the workers 
ltruck at any one time and these quickly returned to vrorlt when granted higher 
-
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wages. In July the Moscow Cor.rnittee despaired of ac:i1ieving a general strike 
in the near future and saw no point in one at the present time anyvay. In a 
letter to Lenin a member of the Committee pointed out that a general strike 
by itself would not overthrow the autocracy but only partially paralyze it. 
Only an armed u,prising could destroy the autocracy end due to the lack of 
arms and the disorganization of the proleta,..iat, it would be unsuccessful at 
present. Therefore, the ~foscow Committee held that it ws better to save th4 
workers' strength for the time when all Russia would rise against the Tsar 
than to prematurely and uselessly waste the strength of the working class in 
4 
the central city of the Empire. 
In most other industrial centers the Bolsheviks similarly failed to 
organize a general strike but the increase in gatherings and.,demonstrations 
did serve to make the workers more concerned with political affairs. The 
firing of the troops on a May Dey demonstration in Warsaw stimulated sympathy 
strikes as far fiWSY as Baku. In June, violence broke out in Revel, in Estonia 
and Odessabut nothing substantial was achieved. There vas heavy fighting a 
Lodz and Warsaw, reaching the stage of pitched oattles among barricades but 
the Bolsheviks pla;yed a very snall part in these uprisings which were mainly 
the wo:t:k of the Polish Socialist parties. 
Though there was no general all-Russian strike in the summer of 1905 1 
the Bolshevik strongholds of the north-central industrial regions and the 
Urals produced something much more significant--the seeds of revolutionary 
•lf sovermnent. Up until May, revolutionary agitation urging the workers to 
Ol'PJ1ize and the workers' own tendency to organize during the strikes in early 
- 4 
Ibid. I, pp. 351·352. 
' 
190) had resulted, at best, in the creation of strike cozamittees which kept 
a strike ftmd, formulated demands, and exerted pressure on the workero to ad• 
here to the strike. 'r'ne f01'11lation of' a workers' council or sO"riet 1 however, 
marked a departure from the regular strike committee in that a soviet signi• 
fied the seizure of certain govel"'ll1lental po-wers by the 'trorkers. 
Tbe newly-instituted soviets arose ~m previously existing strike com-
mittees and developed greduelly so that it is hard to determine just 'tidlEm a 
striJ:..e committee actually became a soviet. In the second l"J.Slf of May, the 
wrkers in Nadezhdino, a small town on the western side of the Urals, went on 
strike and elected a cotmcil of ten deputies to formulate their demands. Once 
bhe co'Wl.cil or soviet was formed 1 the workers and the deputies expelled the 
politce from the plant where the workers held their I!leetings. Admittedly, 
this w-as a modest beginning, but the exclusion of the police from tr.e plant 
did mean taking a part of the area out of' the jurisdiction of the local town 
5 
authority. ~"le news of the soviet quickly spread to some of th.e nearby mines 
and railroad stations and the institution was copied in these isolated places 
on a small scale. At about the same ttme 1 ~rorkers in Nizlmi Tagil1 in the 
Ural range seized control of the local theater, end elected deputies to a 




The Comradely Court, or Soviet, consists of workers' deP'..rties 
and has the atm of protecting the legal and material interests of 
the comrades, by maintaining a mo!"H influence and tmdertaking 6 
to raise the class consciousness and initiative of fellow comrades. J 
5 Bystrif'~h, Bolshevistkie 0 rmn1zetsi1 Ural.a 1 pp. 119-120. 
6Ibid 
-· p. 121. 
In Ivanovo-Voznesensk, a textile factory center in the north-centra.l 
industrial region, the Bolsheviks spent most of the spring urging the workers 
oo go on a general political strike. Several economic strikes occurred in the 
first half of May and the Bolsheviks continued to urge togetherness, class 
solidarity, and organization among the vorkers. By the middle of May over 
50,000 textile, river-port, shoe-factory, and railroad workers had struck. 
At a meeting held in the town square on May 14 about one hundred and fitty 
deputies were elected to carry on negotiations with the government and to con-
duct the strike. This "Assembly of Deputies" maintained unity and discipline 
among the vorkers by forbidding individuals to return to work and by asslJlling 
the authority to bargain for all the workers coll.eetively. To give the new 
"Assembly of deputies" more proteetion and authority the organiZation of a 
workers militia was begun. Due to the l.Bck of ams, this militia could not 
even protect workers' meetings from Cossack attacks, much less undertake an 
armed uprising, but it did give the wrkers a sense of unity and. power. 
As the summer progressed, the institution of soviets or "assemblies" 
spread to a few other towns. In J~, an "Assembly of Deputies" was fotmded 
1n Kostroma. It organized a workers' militia of 110 men 'Which occssional:cy 
clashed lrith the police 1 organized a financial commission, and in general \laS 
recognized by the workers as an autonomous democratic authority.7 T'nere ws 
l.lao a s1milar organization in Odessa at about the same time but for the most 
»art, the soviets remained isolated phenomena in the Ural and notth Russian II 
1Ddustr1a 1 centers for the remainder of the S\Jlmler of 1905 • IIowever 1 these 
urq soviets did provide precedents for the larger soviets in the autumn and 
1 ' 
A'-.. A.V • Piaskovskii, Rsvoliutsiia 19Q5-1901 gg, v Rossii 1 (Moscow, 
-.v.811lia Uauk., SSSR. 1966) p. 91. 
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winter months of 1905.5 
Besides directly appealing for an armed uprising, the BolshevU:s also 
sought to unite all classes against the government in common opposition to 
the wr being fought in Manchuria against Japan. Leaflets and orators of all 
socialist parties told the workers that the war was being fought by the lower 
classes in the interests of the greedy Tsar, nobles, bureaucrats, and capital"" 
8 Since the soviet or "Assemb:cy- of Deputies" was such a new institution 
many Bolsheviks failed to see its significance or usefulness as an organ of 
revolutionary government, thus leaving the initiative of creating the soviets 
in late 1905 to the Mensheviks. For example 1 the tbscow Bolsheviks urged the 
workers to elect deputies in August of 1905 to combine the demands of the 
working class and for 1111tt181 support but as the workers in Ivanevo•Voznesensk, 
but it seems they did not look upon the Ivanovo-Voznesensk organization as 
the beginning of a revolutionary govemment. s. Schwartz, 'I'he Russian Revolu-
tion of l9Q5, p. 351. And little wonder! Sane of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk 
Bolsheviks themselves did not think of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk "Assembly of 
deputies" as much more than an oversized strike committee. Some of the local 
party workers did express pride in what their agitation accomplished. An 
unnamed correspondent wrote to lenin that the "Assembly of Deputies" enjoyed 
immense authority among the workers as a provisional government and proudly 
cla:L"lled that every detail of the recent events was due to the role of the 
local Bolshevik organization. Revplipts1c?n,n.oe Dvizhennie v Rossii I, p. 468. 
Miha 11 V. Frunze, a member of the Northem Cam:;tittee and later leader of the 
red forces against Kolchak's forces in Siberia in 1919, took great pride in 
the part the Bolsheviks had played in Ivanovo-Voznesensk in those days. 
While it is true that Bolshevik party workers guided the election of deputies 
and :printed leaflets for the "Assembly of Deputies," some Bolsheviks -were 
remarkably indifferent to the "Assembly." Some Bolsheviks themselves became 
deputies only because to refuse vroulii injure the reputation of the party and 
because as deputies they could broaden their contacts and influence among the 
workers. Hikhail Frunze himself expressed concerned that those Bolsheviks who 
were elected deputies might not be able to fulfill their duties to the party. 
~t the same time no Bolshevik was ever a chairman or a secretary of the 
lasembly," this role being left to non-party individuals. Schwrz, ~ 
Bys1an Revolution of 1905, p. 136. Many of the workers do not seem to have 
considered the "Assembly of Deputies" as much more tl'lt:ln a strike committee. 
Ia letters concerning the Assembly, printed in Krasni Arkhiv 1935, #4, p.l)l-137. ~not indicate that the correspondents thought of the "Assembly" as a rev-
0 ~ry gmrer:nment. Finally, when the strike was broken l.Bte in June 1 
the lssembly of Deputies" dissolved and was not revived late in 1905 when 
IOviets vere becoming widespread throughout Russia. Apparently both the 
11Qrkers and the Bolshniks considered the need for the "Assembly of Deputies" 
::. ~nded with the strilte. The case of Ivanovo-Voznesensk indicates that 
._ 
8 of wrkers' assemblies being organs of revolutioru:lry government had 





ists. Peasants were urged to evade militar.f service by refusing to report 
to mobilization centers, vrorlrers in the munition plants and railroads were 
urged to go on strike 1 end soldiers were urged to tur-.a. their weapons against 
their worst enemy the Tsar. Like the other socialists, the Bolsheviks wel-
cOOled the defeats at Port Arthur 1 l-fukden1 and Tsusl1.ima because they ser~.ried to 
show bhe corruption and inefficiency of the Tsarist bureaucracy and disgust 
the people 'ldth the entire governnent. After th.e fall of Port Arthur, in the 
last days of 19041 Lenin rejoiced in Vpered 1 
T".ae war is not ended yet by f'ar 1 but every step towrds its continuation, 
increases immeasurably the unrest and discontent of the Russian people, 
brings nearer the hour of the new great 'mr 1 ·the var of the people 
against the autocracy 1 the 't-tar of' the proletariat for liberty •0 
·' 
Ai'ter the destruction of the Russian fleet in the Straits of Tsushima, in llay 
of' 1905 1 Lenin expected that all classes would be up in arms against the gov-
ernment. He wrote in Vpered 1 
E•rerythi.ng is up in arms against the government: the 't.ro1mded. nat ::tonal 
pride of the great and petty bourgeoisie 1 the outraged pride of the 
army, the bitter feeling over the loss of hundreds of thousands of 
lbres in a senseless r:tilitary venture: the resentment against the 
embezzlement of hundreds of' millions from the public funds, the fears 
of financial collapse and a protracted economic crisis as o result of 
the usr 1 the d,read of' a formidable people • s rising, whicr~ (in the opiniOl 
of the bourgeoisie) the Tsar S:1ould have avoided by means of ti.JJ.tely 
and "reason.able" concessions ••• Now the autocracy is facing the end it 
deserves. The war h.e.s laid bare all its sores, revealed its rotteness 
to the core, its complete alienation from the people, and destr,oyed its 
sole pillars of cesae:rian rule. The people have already passed sentence 
on this government of brigands. The revolution vill execute the sen-
tence.10 
!bel'efore, it is easy to see <til:J.Y the Bolsheviks did not desire peace at any 
Price as many socialists were demanding. The longer the 'tmr continued, the 
-
9 
Lenin, Collected Works, VIII, p. 53. 
10 
Ibid. VIII. pp .. 483 1 485. 
closer the revolution came. They encouraged desertion and rebellion 1n the 
army to bring on more defeats and increase the disgust of the people with 
the government. However, the last thing the Bolsheviks wanted was a peace 
concluded by the '.rear which would leave the a.utocracy in power and release 
the troops in the Far East for the suppression of domestic uprisings. It 
was essential that the people first overtbrov the Tsar and then conclude 
peace through a constituent assembly. A leaflet of the Moscow Camttittee re-
minded readers of the ma.ny war deaths and the increase in the national debt 
and taxes and eVtm. accused the government of prepartng another war in India 
against Ch-eat Britain, Japan's ally. ~by overthrowing the Tsarist gov-
ernment could the people avoid further bloodshed. 
Onl.7 the Canstt.tuent Assembly will end the war and conclude peace with 
Japan. On.l.y it will save us from excessive toil, only it: will declare 
a democratic republic and give us liberty and rights, necessary to us 
so that we can struggle against capitalian for our happiness 1 for 
SOCia Usn •12 
In this "-~Y' the Bolsheviks held peace out as a bait for revolution. 
In attempting to unite all the people, and especiall7 the prolstariat 1 
against the autocracy, the Bolsheviks also sought to obtain the s~rt of 
all the nationalities which had so long been oppressed by the tsarist policy 
of Russif'ication. On the local level ths Bolsheviks frequently cooperated 
with proletarian national parties such as the Lettish Social-Democrats or 
the Social-Democrats of Lithuania and Poland. The Baku. strike in December of 
1904 -was marked by cooperation between the Bolshevik Baku Camn1ttee, and the 
Armenian Droslwk and Hnchak grou.pa participating in a tmited camn1ttee which 
12asvoliuts1o:r:moe Dv1zhenn1e I, p. 311. 
was to organize and sustain the strike •13 When the Armenian-Tartar canf'Uct 
broke out in the same town in early 1905, the Bolsheviks frantically strove 
to prevent the tw sect ions of the proletariat from wiping each ather out. 
However, violence spread throughout the Transcaueasian region and involved 
not only Armenians and Tartars but also Georgians and Russians. The Titlis 
Conmittee accused the police of inciting these riots 1n order to maintain 
its authority by the tactic of "divide and rule." One of the Committee's 
pamphlets, ln"itten by Stalin, called on all nationalities to unite aga1nst 
the Tsar. 
These miserable slaft a of the miserable Tsar are trying to 
foment a f'ratricidal war among us here 1n TUlia! They are demanding 
your blood, they want to divide and rula over you! But be vtgilant 
you Armenians, Tartars, Georgians, and Russians! Stretch out your 
hands to one another 1 unite more closely 1 and to attempts by the 
govermnent to divide 3f'OU1 answer u.nan1mousl.y: Long live the frater-
nity of the peoplesl14 
I!owever, nationalistic riots spread not onl.7 to Tiflis end Erivan but even 
to Kazan, were bed feeling arose between Russian and Tartar wrkers. A 
leaflet of the Bolshevik Kazan Camnittee, written in the Tartar l.an.gt.tage 1 
pleaded with the workers. 
Victory vill only' be obtained by the workers when the workers of all 
nationalities--Tartars, Russians, Jevs, Armenians, and others--
stretch the 1r hands out to one another, as brothers, all fusing 
into one close family •• .Always remember comrades Tartars your enen:cy' 
is not the Russien people but the autocratic government •15 
Throughout 1905, the Bolsheviks strove to influence the non-Russian 
masses. stalin wrote leaflets for the TUlia Committee in Georgian. other 
1~ti .s"ezd, p. 612. 
14 J.V. Stalin, Wgrks 1 (Foreign Isnguages Publlshing House, Moscow, 1954) 
I, P• 83. 
15 KhatmlL&tov~zgskai,! Orp.ap.izatsU.a Bols¥vikov1 p. 39. 
3olsllevik Cau.easian committees 1rrote party literatl.l.1"e in Tartar and Armenian 
as well as Russian. In Kazan, :.Iussein Iamash.ev "harangued Tartar workers and 
16 
organized 1ilrxist discussion circles in the Tartar language. Attempts were 
E'ven made to spread revolutionary propaganda among the Mongolian Buriats in 
oouth-central Siberia. Leaflets were also written in Yiddish and Lettish, 
though for the most part, Bolshevik influence in Poland and the Baltic area 
"tas overshadcnred by the national Social-Democratic parties such as the General 
Jewish Workers' Union, the Lettish Social-Democratic Party, the Social-Demo-
cratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, and the Polis.."l Socialist Party. In 
the Ukraine 1 the Bolsheviks neglected to produce party literature in the 
Ukrainian language 1 leaving the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Union, which was 
an autonomous organization of Ukrainian Leninists, without canpetition in 
this field while the Bolsheviks themselves concentrated on the urban prole-
tariat 1n the Ukraine which was mostly Russian. 
There we s not, however 1 any agreement between th.e Bolsheviks and other 
revolutionary parties on a national scale. The only attempt to reach some 
sort of tactical agreement between most of the revolutionary organizations in 
the &lpire turned out to be a failure. After "Bloody Sunday" Father Gapon 
fled from Russia to Switzerland where the emigre revolutionaries hailed him 
as a hero. Lenin himself' tried to convert the priest to Marxian and encou.rage 
him to read the works of Plekhanov. Soon, however, Lenin observed that thougL 
Father Gepon 'tres indeed a revolutionary, he still lacked the materialistic 
Tievpoint necessary to be a Marxist. Nevertheless, Father Ge:pan proceeded to 
arrange a. conference of revolutionary parties which -was to include the 
16!bid 4 
-· p. 7. 
Socialist Revolutionaries, both factions of the Russian Social-Democratic 
Party 1 and fifteen national sod.al-democretic and socialist revolutionary 
organizations. The conference was doomed even before it began. The :Marxist 
socialists objected to the seating of the Fin.."1.is.l). Activists while no real 
attempt had been made to even invite the Workers' Party of Finland. The 
Lettish Social-Democratic Party strongly objected to the participation of 
the Lettish Social-Democratic League which it considered to be a ficticious 
organization. The Mensheviks declined the invitation outright. When it 
became obvious that the Marxist parties would be outnunbered by the Socialist 
Revolutionary groups, the Bolsheviks, Lettish Social-Democrats, the Jewish 
~1orkers' Union, and Armenian Social-Democratic labor Organization withdrew 
from the conference. With the Marxist parties absent 1 the conference adopted 
the Socialist Revolutionary program, including the seizure of land wose cul· 
tiwtion ws based on the use of hired labor, independence for Poland and 
Finland, Autonomy for the Caucasus, and a federalist government for the rest 
of the 12llpire. With the announcement of the conference's decisions, the 
Bolsheviks and other Marxist organiza.tions disassociated themselves from the 
17 
conference and its program. Hereafter 1 the Bolsheviks vorlmd with other 
parties onl\v in local situations, usually in organizing strikes and combat 
detachments. 
The Bolsheviks' relations with the l.te!lsheviks and liberals were even 
less cordial. Soon after the Bolsheviks' Third Party Congress, the !>Jenshevikf 
closed a conference of their own at Geneva and, except for a resolution de ... 
claring they would boycott a provisional government which contained bourgeois 
l7Len1n1 Collected Works, VIII, PP• 416-420. 
e lenents m'ld a more democrdtic party organization, they largely agreed with 
18 
tl;.e llolshevik revolutionary program. 
1'he Menshevik conference goaded Ieni.."'l. into writing a11 entire pamphlet 1 
:l:'m' Tactics of the Social-pemocracy in the Democratic Revolutioll, devoted 
entirely to the condemnation of the Mensheviks. Le:n:tn•s main objection to 
the Mens.l-teviks' Revolutionary program was their refusal to participate in a 
revolutionary provisional government with the bourgeoisie. In the psmphl.et 
Lenin restated the decision of the Third Party Congress which affirmed tl.~e 
necessity of proletarian participation in the future provisional government 
19 
as wll as the arguments he himself presented to the congress on that point. 
Lenin cl.a'bned that the establishment of a democratic government was not 1n 
itself socialism but a first step toward socialim. The full consur.nnntion. of 
the democratic revolution, that is, the redistribution of land to the peasants 
the establishment of a :fully democratic republic, a.nd the spark.ing of a revol-
ution throughout the rest of Europe 1 could not be achieved by boycotting the 
provisional government and thus renoun,~ing governmental po;<Ter1 but only througl 
20 
the armed dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. 
Toward the end of the pamphlet Lenin re-emphasized that the :first step 
toward soc:t.altam could not be taken without th.e armed dictatorship of the 
proletariat and the peasantry. 
T'.he actualiza.tion of the demands of the contemporary peasantry, the 
complete defeat of the reaction, and the winning of the democratic 
republic will be the full end of the revolutionary leanings of the 
1.8 Schapiro, Communist Party of the §ov~t yP.ion1 pp. 62-63. s. Schwarz, 
T!J.e Rgasian R~rvylution of 1905 1 pp. 11-14, 22:229. 
l9See above, pp. 68•70. 
20 
Lenin, Pol.noe Sobrannie Sochirunmt, XI, pp. 44-45. 
bourgeoisie 1 even the l'Jetty 'bourgeoisie. It 'tfill be the begL11...'11ng 
of the present struggle of the l):roletariat for socialism. The oore 
complete the democratic upl:..eOV'al1 the soone:r, wider, !:lore clearly, 
and more decisively 'Will this new struggle develop. The slogan, 
"democratic dictatorship" designates ti.1e historically li.VJ:ited c::wr-
acter of the present revolution and the necessity of a ne11 struggle 1 
on the basis of a new order 1 for the ftull liberation of the working 
class fran all oppression and all exploitation.21 
Bath the pa.'n.:phlet and lenin's speeches at tll.e Third Party Congress re-
gar:'.! in.g t:1e provisional revolation.aey govenr'll<!llt s...~ov that he w s not dabbling 
in. the "si:nultanious re"rolution" of the democratic and social kinds but held 
tl:u! full consummation of the democratic revolution to be necessar.f before the 'i: 
socialist re""rolution could be begun. To Lenin the establishment of a , fully 
denocratic republic did not constitute socialism, which is the ar.flwrsh1p of 
all the means of' production--factories, ccmmunications, and land--by all the 
people. The former had to come before the latter, perhaps "rith the aid of a 
revolutionary western European proletariat. Therefore, the claims by sor1e 
historia!ls vThich hold that at this time Leni..."1 formulated tr.Le tactics of si.11ul· 
Besides condemning the t%:!nshevilta for their refusal to rmrticipate i..'1 
a democratic provisional government, Leni..Yl. denounced them for emphaoizing the 
possibility of revolutionary cooperation with the liberals rather ·than empha-
sizing the necessity of exposing the liberals' anti-revolutionary c].,gss inter-
eats to the proletariat. Lenin feared that Menshevik cooperation ~rith the 
Uberals would only lead them astray from the path of revolution, cause them 
to dampen the revolutionary ardor of the people 1 and lead the !-fensheviks 
tbeiaselves i..11to betraying the L11terests of the proletariat through the loss 
21 
Ibid. XI, pp. J20•l21. 
-
of their independence of action ~1.d tl1ei.r absor:;.rtion in liberal :parlczncntor-
Fi..Yl.ally ~ Ienin condem."'l.cd the 1~nshevil: revolutionary p:t•ogra::-:1 as vague 1 
o;;spccinlly bccauoo it diu :u<Yt exglicitl,y call i'or the cstablish'lent, of a re-
public and adnitted the possibility of participati.ng in an assembly \rlthin 
a monarchist governr:Ient as a party of extreme opposition. !Ie ridiculed this 
vagueness i."l the f,ienshevil~ progra;n calline it "te.ctics as process" and accus-
i110 the Mensheviks of conf'using the wrkers by not givL."'lg them a clear goal 
of a democratic republic. As for participation in a tSZ:lrist re:presentative 
as::a.nbly1 lenin pointed out that an.,y promises the UenshevH:s could extroct 
from tlle autocracy by parliamentary opposition 't-TOuld be only lies since the 
autocracy 'trould never consent to enlli..11g its mm existence. Therc;for€, the 
only 'W8.Y :L"l 'tlhich truly representative government could be oc~lieved only by 
means of an amed uprising and the Mensheviks ·were only hindering the rev·.Jlu-
22 
tionar'iJ r:J.oVErt.'lent by not maldng this clear. 
Lenin's condemnation of' the Liberals '\'SS even stronger. Trrrou.z;:1out the 
Stl!mler 1 his articles in Vp!!red and P:roletw attac!red the Libcraln as hypo-
crite s uho were willing to use the people to gain liberty for the:naelves but 
not to establish a truly popular govern.nent. The liberals were 'rilling enough 
to end the outocra.cy but their class interests did not permit t"::em to destroy 
the monarchy and ~"l.e bureaucracy for fear that a people' a government would 
deprive the bour~oisie of' its property. To back this a:rgunent, Lenin 
811alyzed the constitutional projects proposed by the Union of Liberation group 
ot Uberals a.'Yld compared them vrith the goals of the Social-De1:1ocrats. The 
-
22 
!Pi£.. xr, PP• 121-125. 
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liberals vislwd to retain the Tsar as a constitutional monarch vh.ile ·the So-
cial-Democrats stood for a democratic republic. The liberals proposed a bi-
cameral legislature of which one house would be elected by indirect and w.equa 
suffrage 'While the Social-Democrats demanded a unicameral legislature elected 
on the basis of general, equal, direct, and. secret suffrage. The liberal plan 
provided :f'or a division and separation of powers which, by leaving only one 
bouse to popular control, would leave only' one third of the power of the gov-
el"'!.lll1ent to the masses, 'While the Social-Democrats demanded that aU power pass 
into the hands of the people with no checks, divisions of power, or privileges 
tor capitalists and landowners. '!'he liberals feared Jacob in centre.llan as a 
threat to their property and desired not a populer revolution. but one of the 
1848 variety. All the liberals wanted was to balance the monarchy vith the 
power of the people. They did not wish to destroy the monarchy but to use it 
as a brake on the popular will by retaining the pollee and army for the pro-
tection of the bourgeoisie. 'l'b.ey tailed to giw the power of the state 1 
undivided, into the hands of the people for they dared nat; give the prole-
tariat the freedom to struggle for socialian and thus abolish all class privil 
23 
eges and put all the means of production in the hands of the people. This 
argunent was put in outline form and widely' circulated as a leaflet entitled 
Tbt'!! £CJl.!Jiit~J.pp.s, gr ±ht'!9 !'!l§t&s of qove;ngez, comparing the monarchist, 
24 liberal and Social-Democratic plans for a future constitution for Russia. 
Of' all he said about the bourgeoisie, Lenin most wanted the people to 
remember was that : 
23 Len1n1 Collected Worl"..s, VIII, PP• 425-4321 486-494 • 
...... 
c:<+Ibid. VIII. PP• 557•559. 
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••• The bourgeoisie does not 1 and because of its class position cannot 
want, revolution. It merely wants to strike a bargain vith the mon-
archy- agai:ast the revolutionary- people: It merely- wants to steal the 
pm10r behind the people's back. 25 
While lenin and ot..'her emic;:res conti:u.ued their polemics in Sw-itzerland, 
the Bolsheviks in Russia had their r .... 'UJ.ds full combatting the political back-
;.r.:.rdness of the people a.'l'l.d the i.."lfluence of other parties. Due to its con-
spiratorial nature, it is impossible to accurately state th.e size of the Bol· 
sllevik organization in Russia and very difficult to determi:o.e the strength of 
tile Bolsheviks' influence relative to other parties. In mid 1905 the member• 
ship of all Social-Democrats nl%!lbered in the thousands but it is very doubtful 
26 
,,•hether it reached the ten thousands. In gene1-al, it can be said. tn.at the 
Bolsheviks' main strength lied in tlle central and northern industrial region., 
25~. rx:, pp .. 244-245 .. 
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.u. M:artov, P. Maslov, and A. Potresov, eds. Obshchestve;moe 
Dvizheff:i& v Rossii v !iachale XX-go Veka, (Petersburg 1909) Vol. III, pp. 
572·57 • J:.fartov gives figures Bh~vine the size of many Social-Democratic 
organizations but these mt~st be understood as only approximate. For one thing 
the conspiratorial natu:re of the party did not allow the kee:ping of an accur-
ate roll. Furthermore 1 in those days there was no formal admission of an in-
dividual into the party. An individual who regularly S1l'J?ported and wrlted 
fol' the party was considered a member. Consequently, Martov•s desi(;lation of 
"organized workers" might vary from place to place depending on how a local 
co."llllittee defined an "organizec wor kar s." IIowever 1 aartov' s report is accurat 
in U.~signating the areas in which either the Bolal-J.eviks or the Ii:?nshevi?..s pre ... 
dominated. According to ~rtov, some of the largest BolshevU:: organizations 
~rere in r<bscow and St. Petersburg with several hundred organized workers each. 
The Ivanovo-Voznesenak Committee '\-tas Gtt.PPOsed to have about 6oo 1 Uizhni Nov-
gorod about 400, and Iaroslavl and Kbstroma 1 ea.ch with about 200 workers and 
students. The largest Bolshevik cormnittee in the south seems to llave betm the 
Odessa Committee with about 300 organized workers but 1n this region the Bol-
sheviks \-~ere in canpetition with such Mana'levik organizations as the Odessa 
Group of about 700 wor1mrs1 the Kiev 8anmittee with 500, the Poltava Conmit 
with 4001 the Kremenchug and Kharkov COlllllittees with 300 workers each, the 
Elmterinoslav Con:rnittee 'tTith perhaps 1000 worlrers 1 and the Crimean Union which 
in addition to worlmrs coun::ted several hund.red sailors in. its membership. At 
the same time 1 the membership of the Mensheviks in the Caucasus numbered in 
tlle several thousands. It appears, therefore, that the Bolsheviks• :name is in 
itself' misleading and that they were actually the party minority in the Socia} 
stretching fron the area surrounding Moscovr to tl't...e tfuite Sea in the north, and 
t~1e Ural region. In Sl;. Petersburg, the Mensheviks' organization of t"ttelve m·, 
thirteen htmdred irorkers and several htmdred students heavily outnumbered the 
Bolshevik organization. The same was true in most of industrial centers of 
the Ukraine, southern Russia, and the Caucasus which were centers of r~1enshevik 
power. In the Baltic area the Mensheviks were more powerful than the Bolshe-
viks but both organizations were much smaller than those of the Lettish Social 
Democrats, the Jewish Workers' Union, and the Social-Democrats of Poland and 
Lithuania • In the Volga region the Bolsheviks might have been r:1ore powrful 
than the Mensheviks but both groups were insignificant compared to the Social-
ist Revolutionaries' organizations in nlDbers if not in organization. In 
Siberia the division between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks ws not yet clear. 
The local cozmnittee vas the unit of organization arotmd which all the 
party's activities in a given area were centered. Most of the local committee~ 
consisted of five men, approved by the Central COlll'llittee. Usually a cha:irman 
was elected from among the five and vas given the power of acting for the 
entire committee if for sane reason it was impossible for the committee to 
meet as a vhole. Each committee bad the responsibility of carrying on propa-
ganda and agitation among the masses by means of speeches at gatherings and 
Democratic Party if one considers the nl.lllber of members. Even Bolshevik 
IOUrees corraberate Martov. The Protocols of the Third Party Congress reveal 
the weakness of the Bolshevik organization in St. Petersburg. In the begin• 
Bing of 1905, the St. Petersburg District which contained some 10 ,ooo workers 
bad only 128 workers belonging to Bolshevik organizations. The Vyborg Dis .. 
trict with 20,000 workers had onl:;y 129 in Bolshevik organizations. The City 
district had only 325 workers organized in various Bolshevik propaganda cir-
cles. The Neva District Bolsheviks were even worse off with 150 or~ized 
rkers and outnumbered by the Mensheviks by about three to one. 
tzd, pp. 538-556. The Bolsheviks were somewhat stronger in l-k>scow where 
;; of their districts had as many as 300 organized workers. Kliueva 1 
Go kovlk!e Bolshevik! vo Glave Vooruzhenom Vosstaniia v 1905 &rode 1 (Moscow 1 
- audarstvennoe Izdate:rstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1955) p. 20. 
demonstrations, the distribution of party literature, and the organization of 
reading and discussion circles. Also, it was considered no less important :for 
each committee to print its ow literature, maintain contact with the Central 
Co:nmittee 1 and prepare for an armed insurrection against the government by 
organizing and arming canbat tmits. To carry out these tasks, each committee 
had special departments a :tached to it. Almost every committee had an attachec 
technical department which handled the printing storing, and distribution of 
local party literature. Almost invariably propaganda and agitation depart-
ment s were also attached to the committee. It was the business of the props-
gandists to hold lectures and preside over discussion circles while agitators 
had the duty of serving as orators at msss meetings and demonstrations, ex-
plaining the party program to the crowds, exorting them to take some revolu-
tionary action, and condemning rival parties. Ccmmittee members themselves 
took on the duties of organizers. This involved the organization of' new cir· 
cles and the recruiting of new party members. Often a financial department 
vas also attached Wlder the authority of the eOIIll!littee to collect contribu-
tions and distribute the money for such party needs as printing, equipnent, 
paper, the renting of apartments for printing and storing literature, and the 
acquisition of weapons. Special attention was given to spreading propaganda 
among the youth because the young were potentially the most revolutionary 
•ction of the population and could therefore be the soln"Ce of devoted and 
a.rgetic party recruits. The St. Petersburg Bolsheviks had a student society 
M4e up mostly of students fran the university 1 while the Kazan and Saratov 
lolab.eviks organized youth departments to spread Lenin's writings among the 
JOung, especially the middle school students. In regions 't-rhere the committee 
•• too .... u to have a special student organization, individual porty members ~ 
~ 
•rould frequently hold discussions and spread literature among the youth on a 
r:1ore L"1.forma l basis. Ia•M• Sverdlov 1 one of the Bolshevik organizers who 
operated in !Costroma 1 Iaroslavl, and Perm spent much of his time with students, 
discussing l'·tlrxism and especially those vrorks of Lenin ~vhich he gave them 
27 
to read. Such informal gatherings often grew into large stu:lents organize .. 
l 
tiono. 
In addition to the student organizations, the "periphery" consisted of ',1\ 
district committees and factory committees vhich were subordL"1.ated to the lo-
cal committee. The organization of the "periphery" depended on the size and 
social structure of the industrial population in the surrounding area. The 
st. Petersburg Bolsheviks organized six district committees, each of which was 
pased on e geographical section of the city and headed by a MllbEr ./1 the St. 
Petersburg Committee. The main City District ws even subdivided into four 
subdistricts, each with its own committee. Finally each district committee 
administered and supervised numerous plant and factory committees made up of 
the employees 1n these enterprises, various reading and discussion circles, 
and apartments full of leaflets, pamphlets, and books, which served as illegal 
28 11brarie s of Marxist literature. The r4::>scow Bolsheviks had a similar organ-
1zation of ten districts and a large suburban organization which eventually 
bad to be converted into a committee in its ow. right. other Bolshevil~ organ-
izations were subidivded on an occupational rather than a geographical basis. 
betimes a mixture of both types was used. Sevastopol had a :Bolshevik city 
collective and a port collective. 
Gatherings and demonstrations vere an important part of the Party's 
-
27 
K.T. Sverdlova, Vospom1Daai1! I.M. Sverdlova. (Sverdlovsk, 1960), 86-~ • 
28 
~etii s"ezd, pp. 538-556. 
~ 
---------------------------------------------, 
activity. Bolshevik agents would often appear at factory workers• meetings to 
persuade them to adopt political demands as well as econanic demands in their 
ultimatums to the management. At various times 1 when the revolutionary feel~ 
among the masses provided an opportl.mity, Bolshevik agitators gathered crowds 
arol.md themselves and ba.rangued them on the necessity of political freedom, 
a constituent assembly, ·.-he creation of workers' organizations, the need of a 
general strike and amed uprising against the autocracy, and so on. Besides 
treating with these general topics. Bolshevik agitators were careful to deal 
'With more immediate and local issues such as "Bloody Sundayfl and the Shidlov-
skii Camnission 1n st. Petersburg, the necessity of a railroad strike in Siber· 
ia to end the war against Japan, the necessity of supporting the general strilo:! 
in Ivanovo•Voznesensk1 protests against police brutality, and so on. Atter 
the Third Congress, much time was spent by the agitators explaining the resol-
utions of the Congress to the masses and condemning the Mensheviks. Invariabl.J 
the meetings included the handing or sca.ttering of leaflets among the crowds. 
For special occasions such as the first of May or July 9, large demonstrations 
were planned ahead of time and special literature was prepared. All the social~ 
ist parties would organize processions and meetings at which orators i'rom other 
parties would appear to counteract each other's influence, otten resorting to 
heckling and other forms of abuse. Then the demonstrations would end with the 
distribution of leaflets and the adoption of resolutions promising to work for 
the overthrow of the autocaracy l.mder the leadership of the Social-Democratic 
Party. All this would be done amid red barmers and the singing of revolution• 
ary songs--or violence if the police and Cossacks attacked the meeting. Due 
to police surveilence, meetings in many centers had to be held outside of town. 
The Riga and Odessa Bolsheviks often held meetings 1n the nearby forests. 
r4.F. Fru:nze, the future marshal of the Red Arm.y, held mass meetings ill thE 
wods outside of Ivanovo-Voznesensk 29 so that the first large soviet carried 
on muc~.,_ of itc activities in a forest. I.M. Sverdlov v.a.o usually operated in 
the upper and middle volga region, often held mass meetings in the fields near 
the river and had boats and barges ready to support the agitators and the 
crow to the opposite barJt of the Volga in case the police or the C..:>ssacks 
showed up. Not all agitators were as fortunate as Sveltdlov, however. In 
Jcme the C:6ssack.s made a severe attack on a forest meeting outside Ivanovo-
Voznesensk. Gatherings in other towns liks Kazan were frequently threatened 
by the police or by the "Black Hundreds" which were bands of super-patriots 
who organized relig!lous and patriotic manifestat1ons honoring the Tsar which 
freqtf4ntly resulted 1n the beating and even murder of Jews, Armenians, revol-
utionaries and even stude:lts. Few local committees had the money to procure 
arms to protect themselves. Some 1 like the Kazan Committee 1 built u;p a snall 
reserve of rifles and har&emade ba:nbs which served as a deterrent against 1n-
discrim1nate attac:.ts but did not make the Bolshevik organizations revolution• 
30 
ary threats. By the end of the 01.lmller of 1905 only the st. Petersburg and 
Moscow Committees had made any progress toward organizing strong combat organ-
izations. 'J!be st. Petersburg COOIIlittee's Technical Groups, headed by S.I. 
Gusev, had been organizing workers' combat detacl:mtents 1 distributing ams to 
31 them, and manufacturing bombs since ear~ spring. The Moscow Bolsheviks 
did not begin organizing a revolutionaey combat organization until the SlmiDler, 
but soon, with the cooperation of other revolutionary parties, about forty 
29Revoli:u)s~ Dx&;benp.te, II. p. 435-443. 
301!!JA. II. pp. 745·746. 
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combat detachments vrere organized 1 of which half were composed of Bolsheviks. 
At the head o:f this force ws a loosely organized coalition council composed 
of Bolsheviks, Menshevilt.s, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and of organizations 
of students, printers, and non-party revolutionaries.32 H""rever 1 the Central 
Camnittee soon realized that such isolated instances of success would not 
provide sufficient force for an all-Russian revolution. Representatives of 
the Central COOJmittee were sent to contact local organizations to aid them 
in organizing the workers into eanbat detachments and in building laboratories 
for the manufacture of explosives. In the meantime, the Central Committee 
soug..'lt to obtain arms from abroad. Firearms and ammunition were smuggled 
into Russia from Austria but one of the main sources of arms was the ship, 
John Grafton which smuggled arms into Russia fran Sweden. IIowever 1 it w s 
soon sent to the bottan of the Baltic Sea by the Russian rw.vy an£1 despite 
the ef'eorts of Bolshevik "fishing" operations, to salva.ge some of the "tleapons, 
33 
most of a large cargo was lost. Despite feverish efforts and great risks 
the Technical Department of the Central Camnittee could only fail in its f 
efforts to sufficiently arm the Bolshevik combat organizations all over the 
lbpire and by the end of summer 1 few centers be sides st. Petersburg and 
Moscow--perhaps Lugansk in the Don Basin and Sukhtrn in l-lestern Georgia--
bad respectably' large and -well armed canbat organizations. 
Finally, at the bottom of the party organiza.tion wre the equivalents 
ot today's cells in the Comnnm.ist Party, the factory and plant committees and 
'the propaganda reading and discussion circles. The plant and factory co-mit-
-
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tees operated among the workers of a given nanui'acturi.ne enterprise at tlwir 
place of employment and spread Social-Democratic slogans and programs by dis-
tributing literature, conversing, and encoura.ging or organizing gatherings 
to discuss the workers• grievances or to strike. Usually, the committee :wem• 
bers would hold a speech before his fellmr vrorkers showing tllenl. tf!..e necessity ,,,11 
of obtaining political freedom to better their economic conditions. Often a 
ready printed resolution signifyi.ng the agreement of all to fight for a con-
stitOCl'l.t assem.b~ tmder the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party would 
be passed arotm.d among the workers to be approved and adopted by them by ac-
cl.amation. Though the resolutions meant little since many of the workers did 
not ful.ly understand them, this method did serve to make workers more consciou: 
of the main points of the Social-Democratic program and of their OWll political 
interests. 
T:.'1e small circles run by the party were a more intensive form of propa• 
ganda and agitation. T'.aey were classified as instruments of propaganda be-
cause they were designed to impart a Marxist outlook on life to its members 
and to recrllit them either as full party members or cooperative sympathizers 
•-what 'rould be known today as fellow-travelers. The questions of the i.llllled-
tate situation and necessary courses of action 1n local affairs were, of v.:."~ 
course 1 not 'Wholly left to agitation such as factory meetings and mass demo:n-
atrations. !.?cal and immediate themes were discussed in the circles along 
Y1th the main tenets of Marxism and Social-Democracy but the main function of 
the circles vms to give the members a deeper tmderstanding of the Social-
».ocratic movement and obtain their support in one form or another. Usl.lally 
tbe Circles met in apartments rented by the party for that purpose but in 
--.. 'Which were small en.ougl1 to be under strong police surveilance, circles 
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secretly i'Utletion.ea in tl1e nearby· forests. The size of the circles also 
depended on police efficiency. The safe number of members in a circle viEls 
six to t-welve people 1:.'1 most places. There 1rere exceptions, hmrever. Some 
:[)ropagandists in St. Petersburg cra::nmed u;p to thirty .. five people into an 
apartment. Often the same landloro vrould rent otlwr apartment a to circles of 
other parties thus making the builc1i.ng a prime target for a police raid.. 
Often these apartments served not only as meeting p1aces for circles but as 
libraries c:i.rculati.."''lg r,farxist and Social-Democratic literature. 
Each circle ws run by a propagandist appointed by t 11C local party com-
mittee and sometimes another propagandist 1rould also be assigned to deliver a 
lecture concerning a. subject in -vrhicl1 he vms consi{1ered an expert. The pro-
gram of th.e circle varied ~rith the education of the propagandist and the r.;en-
eral i.l"1tell:tgence of the members. In some circles composed of semi-peasant 
wrkers in the surrounding areas of a city, the propagandist -vroald merely 
read a copy of V:pered or one of U!nL"l.' s earlier parnphleto aloud to the oth.er 
members and comment on it or discuss the local situation vrith tb.em. ITJ. other 
circles the members meeely discussed the r.tlrxist literature they had read at 
home and how this material applied to their own situation. In L'Jrger urban 
areas sucl1 as St. Petersbure, circles for the "i.."ltelligentsia" featu."':"e(1 a 
aeries of lectures, each given by a specialist i..."l. that field 1 explaining the 
history a."ld progt"8r.'l of the Social-Democratic Party, the i..."'levitability of 
80Ciali~ ti:u-oue:1 the operation of i'mllutable social and econ011ic la,ro, and 
the necessity of a proletarian party to liberate the -.;vorki.'lg class.. Some of 
these circles practically served as courses 1n schools of l·ilrxism. One circle 
ln st. Petersburg presented a series of nine lectures. The first consisted 
ot a l-ilrxist interpretation of -world history, tracL"lg the war between the 
exploiter and the exploited through the stages of ancient slavery, medieval 
feudalism, and. modern c:apitalisn and explaining the inevitability of socialism~ 
The second lecture was an analysis of the French Revolution and other western 
European revolutions in the nineteenth cent'U17'. 1'h.e third lecture recounted 
various worldn.g class movements in the West and :ln Russia. other lectures 
dealt vith the basic principles of Marxism; Marx's surplus theoey and his 
political economy; historical materislism; the Ertu:rt Program; the CCD!lunist 
!oltlnU'esto. Finally, the progrem was concluded by' two lectures on the errors 
of the nineteenth-century populist and anarchist revolutionaries and a s~~ 
of the program and constitution of the Social-Democratic: Party, ot those who 
completed this course, any that wished could :progress to a higher circles 
dealt with socio-econanic ana~s of the situation in Bussie, the revolution• 
ary movement 1n Russia, revolutionary tactics, and the tactical errors of Men· 
shevian. 34 Another circle, established toward the end of the year 1n the 
same city, had a similar program with the addition of a lecture on the class 
nature and anti-revolutionary leanings of the bourgeoisie. 35 A circle des"~" r1 
especially for uni-versity students included a lecture on the role of the 
"intelligentsia" in the revolutionary movement and its natural opposition to 
the autocracy. 36 Circles in other towns adapted their lectures to fit local 
conditions. A series of lectures in Perm, in the Urals, resembled the basic 
courses given in St. Petersburg but also added lectures on the uselessness of 
34Shaurov, 1:222 IR!• PP• 9•13. 
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individual terrorism. as practiced by the Socialist-Revolutiona ... ies, the 
hypocrisy of the liberals, the necesstty of supporting the peasant mo~ 
and the methods by which a general strike could be begu:o. and turned into._ 
37 
armed uprising. To assure that Social-Democratic propaga::lda also reacbe4 
the Tartars, some circles, such as these rtm by the teacher Gafur Kula~ 
were conducted in the Tartar language. 38 
One might ask just how effective or convincing these discussion aDd 
lectu.-e circles lmre, or what actually led a person to become a Bolshevik. 
The biographies of party leaders such as Lenin or Stalin are well known, but 
the motivation of a party worker lo-wer down the party seale may also prove 
to be of interest. V. Shaurov's aceotmt of 'Why he Joined the party provides 
us with an enlightening example. llo single event or piece of literature con· 
verted him to Bolshevism. It was a gradual process. While he was a student 
at the pol:ytec:P.nical institute of the University of st. Petersburg, his stud• 
ies in the natural sciences, philosophy, history, and economy conv1..'1Ced him 
that materialisn provided him with the only true view of the universe. To 
him Marxiem was the logical consequence of his materialism. When he joined 
a readi..""lg circles established by the Bolsheviks, h;Ss reading of Harx and 
other materialists such as Herzen, Cherniashevs!r.ii and Pisarev along wtth 
Social-Democratic literature confirmed him in his convictions and roused a 
desire in him to take nn active pa.rt in the revoltttionory r:10vement. Wli.y did 
he become a Bolshevik'? He preferred the Bolsheviks' efficient and centralized 
organization and their revolutionaey program. Above ell, he admired the 
37n;ystrikh: Bolshevistskie Orgsnizatsii Urela, p. 111. 
38 r~~mmatov, I~zanskie Organizatsia Bolshevikov, p. 62. 
Bolsheviks' detemination to achieve victory. 39 
The Bolshevil{s concentrated their main efforts in the urban areas but 
the cotmtryside was not ignored. If the Bolsheviks expected to lead a succe se -
f'ul revolt agai."'lst the government, they could not afford to disregard the 
rapidly intensifying movement 'Which might involve the bulk of the population 
of the Russt"'n Empire. In the early part of 1905, the bulk of the peasant 
population, vith some notable exceptions 1n Georgia, south-central Russia, 
and the Volga region, waited quietly for some cataclysnic event. Rumors that 
the Tsar had granted the land to the peasants or that he had quit abounded. 
With the approach of smuner, however., the :peasants took more positive action. 
The number of strikes among agricultural day-laborers increased. In Poland, 
White Russia, and the Kuban region, most of the peasantry ceased to pay rents, 
taxes or fees for pasturing animals or cutting wood on the nobles' land. In 
the Volga region there was a nmber of cases of looting of large landowners' 
barns and even murder. I:n Georgia, peasants and amy deserters intensified 
their guerrilla war. I:n the Baltic area 1 peasants organized their own com-
mittees and militia tmits and a serious threat to the government's authority 
would have developed had not the Baltic peasants ~en as ord.erl.y and self• 
restrained as they -were. The Bolsheviks sou..3h,t to organize such revolutiona~ 
peasant com."llittees and militia organizations throughout Russia 1 to incite 
.trikes among the agricultural proletariat 1 and to persuade the peasants to 
boycott all GOvernment authority, especially by ceasing to pay taxes and W'ith• 
39 Shaurov, 12,02 god. pp. 12-14. Other interesting accounts of why a 
=~aon would become a Bolshevik are conttined in Vladimir s. Woytinsky1 
...... Passa~e: A Personal HistorY Tf>..row:th T\ro Russia..'"l Revolutions to Democra· 
D' ~ Freedom;, 1905-196§. (New York, Vanguard Press., 1961} and A. Mitskie-
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l'lolding r~cruits fro:a the army. It was not all tlwt easy, ho't.rev-er. First, 
t::.~.e political co:nsciousnass of the peasantry r..ad to be raised L"l o::r·de:r to 
give the violence of' the peasant movement direction tmra:rd a definite goal .. -
t::le overthrow of the autocracy. Bola..nevik Committees iL Tve:r Poltava, Cherni-
gov, Ekaterinoslav, and Saratov, among others, sent some of their most trust-
worthy party n1embe:rs into the surrounding countryside to organize gatherings, 
propose Social-Democratic resolutions to the peasantry, and distribute leaflets 
The Ssratov Bolsheviks concentrated much of their :pDOpaganda on the village 
teachers and the peasant youth. Teachers converted to Bolshevism could be 
even more useful than regular party agitators. They were :respected and lis-
tened to attentively by the villagers. Often the teachers ~rould hold gatherines 
in the village and speak against the Tsar and the landlords, re::ninding the 
peasants of their poverty and impressing them with the need of a constituent 
assembly. Reading circles ~re also established by the teachers 1."1 sane vtl-
lages and the literature circulated among the peasants -vrllo could read included 
Marx's Communist Manifesto and The Class Struggles in France, 1848-18,20, 
Ingels' The Peasant l-Iar in Germanx, and some of Lenin's earlier pa:nplllets such 
l~o 
as The Development of Capitalism in Russia and To, the Village Poor. Itm-rever, 
the Bolshevi:-;: effort to obtain the organized support of the pea sentry must, on 
the whole, be considered a failure. Due to their sma 11 mrnbers 1 Bolshevik 
connections -vrith the co~.mtryside remai."'l.ed few and weak. Partly, however, it 
•• their own feult. Compared ~Tit!1 the attention ;;;iven. to the urbar~ workers 
bJ the Bolsheviks, the peasantry was ignored and neglected. For example, of 
170 leaflets iss:ted by the samara C~ittee in 1905, only ten -vrere addressed 
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directly and exclusively to the peasants despite the fact tlwt 1anw.ra lies in 
41 
the middle of one of Russias most important agricultural regions. Polemics 
between revolutionary parties did not help the sitt.Wtion. stalin's tour of 
Georgian villages in the stllli!ler of 1?05 to combat the influence oi' his popular 
Menshevik ri·.ml1 Ra:mishvili 1 probably only conf'u.sed the peasantry. Verbal 
attacks on the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the agricultural areas vhere they 
predominated did not serve to raise Bolshevik prestige. At any rate, the pea-
sants :..till 1rere attached to the Tsar and hoped he would better their condi-
tion. As evidence of the failure of the Bolsheviks' rural c8D'lpaign against 
the Tsar 1 the peasants outside Hose ow occasionally sent petitions to the Tsar 
asking him to grant a constituent assembly 1 local self gowl"Dlllent, equa 11ty 
42 before the la1-11 and the transfer of the land to those who tilled it. IJ."he 
peasants around i'ver asked approximately the sa• concessions and added the 
4-:> 
very unrevolutianary petition for the alleviation of taxes. J Even where the 
peasants did organize in peasant unions as the Bolsheviks had urged, these 
were most often dorainated by the Socialist Revolutionaries 'tinile the Bolsheviks 
were left ltithout much of a following in the cotm.tryside. 
It the Bolsheviks could not afford to lose the support of' the peasantry 1 
they could afford to lose the support of the army even less. As it turned out 1 
the entire course of the revolution depended on the atti'b.ude of the military 
forces tmrerd the government and the revolutto:naries. The Bolsheviks, of 
course, were not ignorant of this. The Social-Democratic Party had been print• 
41 ~· :P· 81. 
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ing leaflets calling on the troops to turn agail'lst the Tsar since 1901. In 
the first few years of the twentieth century, Social-Democratic agitation in 
the army consisted of handing out or throwing leaflets into barrack windows 
or at soldiers at railroad stations. With the caning of the Russo-Japanese 
war, the Bolsheviks, like all other revolutionaries, intensified their work 
among the troops. Leaflets were issued by the Central Committee urging the 
soldiers to go to prison or even be shot rather than face the horrors of the 
44 
war--the end would be the same anyhow. Other leaflets reminded the soldiers 
that the revolutionaries -were struggling against the autocracy 'Which was op-
pressing the workers, peasants, and soldiers alike. New methods of agitation 
were also adopted. Bolsheviks organized anti-war demonstrations around mobil-
tzation centers where the conscripts were being gathered. Campaigns ~rere 
launched in which parents of soldiers were urged to write to their sons implor-
ing them not to shoot at revolting peasants and workers. ~anwhile 1 all along 
the Trans-Siberian Railroad, workers attempted to fraternize 't>rith the soldiers 
and even invited them to attend their gatherings. However, the Bolsheviks 
quickly realized that no revolutionary movement in conjunction lri.th the army 
could be made without direct contact between the party and the military forces. 
17 the end of 1904, Social-Democratic cells of both factions of the party began 
to appear :ln the army and the navy. These 'tfere organized either by Social-
~rats who had been conscripted into the am;y or by soldiers themselves who 
bad come in contact with party workers at street gatherings or casual eon.versa-
45 ~8• Up through the summer of 1905 these organizations t~re scattered and 
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varied in their composition and complexity. Some of the :nest complex revolu-
JGionary organizations 'Within the ar.t~.ed forces in t~1e 3altic area. In .,iihe 
Higa garrison the .Bolshe-tiks and the Lettish Social-Democrats succeeded in 
creating many cells among the soldiers and ooilors with a hiera:rc21y of coor-
dinating cOllllllittees at the battalion and regimental levels. In 19J5 1 the total 
membership of this organization 'lll8Y have nurabered as high as doo men. Similar 
though analler organizations were built up at Ust DYinsk1 on tae othel~ bunlt 
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of tll.e Dvina, and Libau. At the same time, a large '1So:Wiers 1 Union" was 
organized among the garrison troops in Tit lis Georgia. 
T"n.e work of the cells conoisted mainly in secretly holding conversations 
on current events among the soldiers and distTibuting literatm-e supplied by 
the nearby Bolshevik. Ccmmittee among them. In some cases the cell members 
would even dare to organize gatherings and hold revolutionary speeches within 
the barracks. The work of the cells, however, was neithel'" safe nor easy. 
Officers restricted furloughs to prevent revolutionary conta~ts, planted agents 
IIDOng the troops, and frequently searched the barracks fOJ.• revolutionBry liter-
atu:re. Arrests of cell members were frequent, as for instance, the entire 
Bolshevik organization in the Twenty-First East Siberian Battalion, stationed 
47 1n Moscow, was arrested. 
Bolshevik and numerous other revolutionary organizations succeeded in 
IPI'eading dissatisfaction and rebellion. Disobedience of orders was frequent, 
tiptcially in cases where the army was used to restore order in the tows and 
ftllages. In Lublin, Poland, for instance, a Paiish Social-Democrat organiza-
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tion headed by F .E. DzershL"lskii, the future head of the red secret :police, 
succeeded in dissuad:L"'lg the garrison from marching agai..'tst tlle neighboring 
peasantry to restore order. However, real revolutionary actions i'iere II:Dre 
tmtil the last quarter of the year. The only serious rising that m.trlmer 
occurred in the Black Sea port of Sevastopol. .Here some of the sailors organ-
ized the Social-Democratic Sevastopol rraval Central, which maintained contact 
with the Sevastopol Social-Democrats and aimed at a genere.l rising in the fleet 
and the town. Frequent meetings "t.~re held aboard the naval vessels and on. 
sJ:>..ore and dissatisfaction spread among the crews. The Socialist-Revolutionariee 
also opn-ated within the fleet and soon most of tba crews either belonged to 
revolutionary organizations, or1 more often, were merely disgu.sted with the 
conditions of naval life. The Bolsheviks themselves were planning to leed tl 
revolt sometime in the fall when more of the crews would be sonscientious rev-
olutionaries and there -would be !40X"e chance of an aU-Russian uprising. They 
bad an es-pecially large organization on the Ekaterina II and expected to lead 
the Blacl" Sea F1eet in spreading the revolution all along the coast. However, 
the spontaneous unrest among the mass of the crew took the control of e'rents 
out of th.e hands of the Bolsheviks as was to happen so often in ·the coming 
months. In June of' 1905 1 a runor that the fleet ws to sa 11 to the ll'ar East 
alal"'lled the crevs and increased the tension. !Ievs of the 1\ussisn defeat in the 
!aushi.loo Straits and a vorker's uprising in Odessa made the sailors even more 
restless. On June 14, tbe crew of the battleship, Kniaz ?otemkin Tavricheskii, 
found their meat to be rotten. Refusing to eat it they started an uproar. 
When the officers attempted to shoot at some of the mutineers, two Bolshevik 
-bers or the crelr 1 G. Valm.lenchult and P. Mat iua'ltenko, started a scuffle which 
laded ~N"ith the death of Vakulenchu..lt and three officers. The c1-ew then raised 
•J.OO• 
the red flag and sigoalled the rest of the fleet to join them. The crevs on 
the other battleships vere not prepared to go that far, however, and the 
Potgkin sailed out of Sevastopol and toward Odessa, where the uprising organ-
ized by the Social-Democrats had been going on for several days. By the time 
the Potemkin arrived in Odessa, most of the Bolshevik inslll'gents had been 
arrested and for sane reason the MensheViks failed to contact tlle mutineers. 
The battleship shelled the city for awhile, hit nothing 1n part1eular1 and 
after Vakulench.uk was bUl'ied aehore, it sailed off to Rumania where it was 
interned and given back to Russia without the crev. 
The PQ:!(emkin mutiny could have been a far more serious affair had it 
not been so ill-prepared. However 1 there was little contact between the 
crews of the other ships. The revolutionary organizations within the fleet 
ltere as yet too small and most of the crews, though disgusted with the hers...~ 
conditions 1n the navy, were not prepared to take the final step toward mut~ 
Finally, little can.tact was made with the Soeial•Demoerats 1n Sevastopol and 
Odessa and therefore, the sailors could not Join with the workers to make up 
the revolutionary army the BolsheViks dreamt of. In short, the rising vas 
premature and spontaneous being mostly out of the control of the Social-Demo-
crats and did not at all turn out as the Bolsheviks had wanted. The mutiny 
itself received world-wide publicity and serious doubt was cast on the relia-
bility of the military forces. However, it was only a foreshadowing of things 
}£ 
to come later 1n the year. 
In spite of their risks and efforts to organize the workers, soldiers, 
and peasants into a revolutionary force under their leadership, the Bolsheviks 
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i'a iled. By the later summer of 1905, it was obvious that the Bolsheviks' 
schievet:~ents in the countryside and in the armed forces were still negligible. 
Ttleir success among the "trorkers also seems to have been unimpressive. Speak 
of' both factions of the Soc:ial·Democratic Party, the :~nshevik, Evegenii 
iviaevskii, admitted, 
The organizational ties of the Social·Democratic Party "t-rith the 
masses were always very weak. The number of organized '"'orkers in 
relation to all the masses was insignificant. However, the ideolodial 
influence of the party wqr-; great.
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How great the Social-Democratic influence on the workers really "t-ros, was yet 
to be seen. 
1l 
CliA~ IV 
TIIE OCTOBER WU~IFEST A!ID THE RISE OF THE SOVIETS 
As the Stt:~mer of 1905 wore on, pressure on the Tsar increased from all 
sides. 1'he Union of Unions~ made up of organizations of the liberal profes-
sions and vhite-coll.ar workers, had been carrying on liberal agitation since 
l·~y. In. July, radicals representing various local peasant unions founded tb.e 
All--Russian Peasants• Union and ~ediately began agitating for 1.a.n.d reform. 
Seeking to decrease the disorder in the Empire by satisfying at least some of 
the revolutio11ary elements, the Tsar announced on August 6 that he was granti."l€ 
to the people an elected state counceil vhich ws to advise him 1n matters of 
Legislation. The limitations of the state count 11 or D'l.lna wre imnediately 
realized by all the oppositional parties. The Duma was only an advisory and 
not a legislative body. It vas not to be elected by universal suffrage since 
most of the non-Russian areas were excluded and e property requu·ement limited 
the classes which could vote. The suffrage was also indirect, having several 
levels of electors. Workers in general were excluded from the voting and all 
1lho sat 1.11 the Duma had to be able to spea.k Russian. 
The Tsar• s move did serve to divide the revolutionary forces. The liber· 
ala 1n the zemstvo congresses vere 'trllling to accept the Dtl'lla 1 hoping to even-
tlaUy turn it into a re~.l legislative body. The Union of Unions; however, 
10ted to boycott the Duma. Most socialists were also rllling to boycott the 
..... 
Duma. A congress representing th.e Russ1an, Lettish, and Polish Social-Democrat , 
the Jewish Workers' Union, and the Uk:rainian Revolutionary Party voted for the 
boycott of the D'l.llla. ~ of the leading t>ienshev1ks 1 Julius I~ov, put forth 
a plan to use the Duma elections to form a provisional revolutionary govern-
m.ent. He proposed that all Social-Democrats, though not participet!Dg in the 
elections themselves, set u;p agitation conmittees which would e:xpose the short 
comings of the Duna to aU voters and urge them to elect the most democratic 
and radical candidates. These c.!3cted candidates could then gather in sane 
city in Russia and proclaim themselves a constituent assembly thus :tllega.lly 
usurping the powers of the Tsar and providing the foundations for sel:f'-govern-
ment. Lenin rejected this idea as naive. Since the workers were excluded 
from the election, ewn the most d.emocr&tic assembly of de1egates would repre-
sent the interests of the bourgeoisie and a victorious revolution in such a 
case would ~ yield the leadership of the revolution and possession of the 
governmental power to the liberals at the expense of the Social-Democrats. 
Even more important 1 the autocracy would never allaw the existence of a pro-
visional revoluticmary government. One could not ba-ve a provisional governmen: 
followed by a revolution but the provisional govermaent itsel:f' could only be 
1 
the result of an armed uprising. Lenin saw the Duma as a grant of limited 
freedom or as a step toward constitutionalism 1 but as an attempt of the Tsar 
to divide the forces of the revolution and quash the revolutionary movement. 
As for the liberals who aupported the Duma 1 L enin claimed that this only 
proved their counterrevolutionary nature and that their participation in the 
Duma was nothing but an agreement between the constitutional monarchists and 
\enm, Coll!aP. Works, n, pp. 224-226. 
the conservative liberals to divide the power of' the government among them-
s(U.ves and rule in harmony over the proletariat. It vas therefore the duty 
of the Social-Democrats to carry on a campaign condemning the Dl.lll8 for its 
shortcomings and the liberals who participated in it and urge the necessit;r 
2 
of an armed uprising amons the masses. 
The Bolsheviks diligently agitated against the Duma through leaflets, 
gatherings and even breaking into liberals meetings. One leaflet of the 
Central Camnittee listed the l:b:nitations of the suffrage and of the powers 
of the D\1118 and called u;pon all to fight for liberty--to the end.3 1'he Moe• 
cow .A:rea Committee called on the pea.sants to adopt a resoluticm. reading, 
We nov realize that if we wnt to better our lot 1 and obtain 
a better life, it is nece&O<.<r)" for us to carry on a struggle so that 
the business of' the government be run not by the Tsar and his officials, 
but our representatives, with full deciding votes, without any Tsar or 
officials, vith the full power of passing laws 1n our interests. We 
knov also that the R.S.D.L.P. struggles for the tull liberation of the 
people from the yoke of the autocrac7 and the rich. We unite with it 
end announce: l) We v:tU not elect 8J110D8 to the Tsarist Duma; 2) We 
vill obtain with weapons 1n our hands our popular dl.llfl•-e democratic 
republic given to us b7 a constituent assembly on the basis of general, 
equal, direct, and secret suttrege.4 
Throughout 1905, the Bolsheviks had been urging and hoping for the gen-
eral strike that they hoped would turn into the final armed uprising. And 
then••un.expectedly••it happened. On September 20 1 a strike broke out spon-
taneously among the Moscov printers and apread to the bakers, restaurant em• 
plo,ees, and workers 1n the turnitu:re factories and tobacco shops. As the 
strike spread through lvbscow 1 the mood of the workers became more violent. 
2Ib1d. IX1 PP• 179·188, 193·199. 
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On SeptembEr 25, the printers broke into severa 1 g-..m.sl1ops to obtain ...rea pons 
and clasl1ed vrith the police and even raised oor:ricades. After t~.ro days of 
fight i.11g tt-re lve 110rkers were dead and thirty trounded. Nevertheless 1 the 
unrest in the city increased. Towrd the end of September, the wrkers of 
several occupations, and espec ·ally those of the printing and furniture indus 
tries 1 forrned their awn individUDl soviets. As yet these vrere not organs of 
revolutionary government but mere strike committees embrscing only their own 
occupations. In early Octobel" 1 :Jeveral strike committees of tlle printers, 
mechanics, and railrood 1 furniture, and tobacco industry employees formed e 
joint strike committee which 11as joined by liberal professors, students, 
lavyers, doctors, and even bank employees and government bureaucrats. A 
few days later, the strike moverrL~:.u.t spreed tc the railroad wrkers. On Octo-
ber 7 1 the Kazan, Iaroslavl1 ~ak, and Brest bltanches of tl1e aystem rediating 
from I.Toscow struck. The other branches soon ,1oined t:b..e movement and the Grea 
October Strike spread to every industrial center in the E:npire. The strike 
not only imrolved 7001000 railroad workers and more than 3001000 workers of 
other industries, but also countless professors, lawyers, doctors, office-
workers, pharmacists, and small shop owners. Admitted.ly only about one third 
of Russin's industrial work force went on strike but this third included the 
operators of such public utilities as post and telegraph, electricity, gas, 
steam, and <."8ter plants, streetcars and cabs, ond, of course railroad worlters 
Many of the workers .entered the strike demanding civil rights and a real 
constitutional assembly but a greet number also struck to satisfy economic 
5 
clemands or because they were coerced by other lrorkers. 
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Surprisingly, neither the Bolsheviks nor the !·ienshevili:s L'lcited the 
strilte. In fact they 1-1ere unprepared for it. T!:J.e strike itself ws a s:pon-
taneous IOOvet'lent among the industrial proletariat ,,.hieh 1.ms by this time more 
politically conscious, more dissatisfied with the autocracy and management, 
t1:nd better organized in variou:..: trade unions such as the All-Russian Railway 
Union, the All-Russian Post and Telegraph Union, and the liberal Union of 
Unions. The Menshevilts were somewhat more instrumental in inciting, spread 1 
and organizing the movement Oh<.;t. it -was started but even they were caught 
unawares. It is true that the printers who set off the strike were strongly 
influencea by the Mensheviks, that the Moscow-Brest Railroad 'tTo:r·1;:ers wh.o were 
instrumental in spreading the strike among the rest of the railroad wrkers 
-.;rere under the domination of the l'4ensheviks, and that once the strike was 
started, Mensheviks played a great part in helJ?ing the v-rorkers formulate 
their demands and elect their deputies to the various soviets which sprang up 
during the strike. Jiavrever 1 it must be noted that the Mensheviks vrere not at 
all pleased by being faced with a general strike at the time since the wor1.er 
were still too :poorly emed and disorga.."lized to turn the stril"..e into a succes 
f'!..ll uprising. The strike had already become general before they ewn dared 
call for it but seeing that it was the irrepressible wish of so many of the 
worl..ers in Moscmv1 the :Mensheviks could only follow along and help the worker 
6 
organize. 
The Moscow Bols:.~-viks were even less prepared or enthusiastic about the 
general strike than the Mensheviks. Like the Hensheviks 1 they sa.w the workers 
were not yet sufficiently organized or armed f'or an uprising and a pl'Blllature 
6p.A. Gervi, VosDO!ipaU.a Sotsialdemokrata, (New York, lGI-6) pp. 339-
559. 
attel!lpt wuld certainly end L"l disaster. Furt'hermore, the Bolsheviks feared 
that the idea of a genera.l strike might eclipse the goal of an armed uprising. 
E-ven after the strike movement had spread to the railroad workers on October 
'T, the l..foscow Committee decided against appealing for a generi.l strike by a 
~vote of seven to two. Only after so man.v of the Y4oscmr worl"'..ers joined tbe 
strike that the Bols.hevif'...s feared they would be cut off from the masses did 
tr...e Bolsheviks call for a general stn-ik.e on October 10. In the meantime, they 
remained aloof fran the task c-f' ")rganizing the workers and left the organiza-
tion of elections of 'tvorkers' deputies to the soviets and the agitation for 
the creation of an all-city soviet of workers' deputies to the Mens.."leviks. 
When in early October, several strike committees of the printers, mechanics, 
and furniture, rs il:t"'8d, and tobc.lcco -vrorloers formed a joint strike committee 
;;thich was joined by libera 1 professors, studen··· s, lev~rs, doctors, engir..eers 1 
bureaucrats, and even judges, the Bolsheviks eagerly Joined the Mensheviks in 
E·ttempting to build a s::pcr.l·ute stri1re organiza.tion made up exclusively of 
proleta.rian industrial vorkers and to break up J.!oscow Strike Comnittee vThich 
contained bourgeois liberals.7 
Violence between wrkers and police broke out in Kb.arlmv a."td Odessa 
but events took a really revolutionary +:urn 'When the strike mov'-ment reached 
st. Petersburg. The Mensheviks urged all wor~rs to support the general 
stril~.in Moscow. Th.ey emphasised the need of a massive workers' organiza-
tion against the auto-M--acy. Even if this organization ws a non-party worker 
congress, it might still be converted into a form of revolutionary self-
government which could lead the masses against the autocracy. Large meetings 
7 Sch.Wrz, Thtt Russian Revolqtion of 1905. p. 138. 
lTere held "'n the rmreets and L~ the halls of the st .. Petersburg University 
calling on the worlters to join the general strilce which would eventually 
turn into an armed ~rising. By October 12, every industrial enterprise in 
the city was affected by the strilte and even the govermnent offices closed .. 
On October 13, representa-&ives of several stril"..e ccmmittees and strilting 
worlters of various enterprises met at the technological institute of st. 
Petersburg University under the presidency of G.s. Krustalev-Nosar' and pro-
claimed themselves the Soviet of Workers' deputies. The Soviet vas supposed 
to be a non-party organization uniting the broad masses of the workers in 
their struggle against the autocracy. However, its organization had been 
initiated by the l>S!nsheviks and it remained under tlteir domination throughr.iU';~ 
its short existence. Though the Soviet was presided over by a non-party 
lawyer, Krustalev-Nosar' 1 and dominated by Leon Trotskii, not strictly a 1\fun-
shevik but a "conciliator," the great majority of the deputies were Mensheviks 
or under rianshevik influence. The Bolsheviks, however, were not unrepresented 
1n the Soviet. Their agitators had sane influence on the st. Petersburg 
workers. A few of the elected deputies were Bolsheviks and t-wo of them, B.l~. 
Krumiants-Radin and D. Sverchkov, were members of the Soviet's executive 
committee. 
Though the Bolsheviks had alw;ys looked upon a general strike as the 
first step toward an armed uprising, the st. Petersburg Bolsheviks certainly 
Ud not a.pprove of' either the Great October strike or the creation of' a Menshe 
nk-dominated Soviet. Like the l4oscow Bolsheviks, they saw that the stJrike 
'bJ itself would not bring an end to the a.utocracy but would only sap the 
ltl'ellgth the 'nn•:ters needed in the final armed revolt. At the present time, 
\here ws no possibility of converting the strike into a victorious uprising 
f'ircn:rms a.n1 the great majority o!' the workers lwd on~,. lmives and crowbars 
:for weapons. BolS:1.evilt agitatJ..,_;n hod pr<Xlu.cecl its effect.. A nu:aber of worlc-
ers vras 'tvilling to take ~ ams again.st the auti1orities. Hmrevcr 1 the Bolslle-
viks' technical tmprepared.ness for the armed co:nflict no'ir :put them in an em-
barassing position. When the Bolsheviks distributed a pitifully small store 
of revol~,rers among the workers they 'Here bitterly disapptlinted and asked the 
:Bolsheviks why they had been calling for an armed ltPrising the past several 
months 'While they had only thirty :Brownings with which to arm the vrorl~rs. 
lUth so little hope of a successful armed u;prisi:ng, it is easy to see ,.my- the 
Bolsheviks did not issue a definite call to the workers to join the general 
strike until October 13 'When it was already well tmder wy. At the same tL-ne 1 
the Bols..'heviks hesitated to SUJ?port the St. Petersburg Soviet. They distrus-
ted a multi-party political organization as a rival. Seeing the Soviet mainly 
as a lerge strike committee, they- did not think of it as an organ of revolu-
tionary leadership. Therefore 1 to counterract the Mensheviks' :i.nf'luence on 
the workers and to use it as a means presenting their own revolutionary pro-
8 gram before the vorkers. 
Under Menshevik leadership the Soviet t'll'l"n.ed out to be more than the 
large strike committee the Bolsheviks accuc-ed it of being. As soon as it 
canvened, it called on the workers to arm theraselves and to form combat 
detachments. :rn defiance of the censors..'1·lip laws it printed it~ mm bulletin 
aJ1d exercised i"ts ow.n. censorship on conservative publications by ordering the 
Pl"inters to continue their strike even when other printers returned to "trork. 
-
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nicipal authorities, the control of the actool distribution of su,pplies to 
the lTOrkers, the discont tnuan.c ' of a 11 supplies to tl1e police, a ad the expul-
don of all troops from t:.w city. In the oonntime, the Soviet L11.creased its 
basis of representation. Its first meeting was attended by less than forty 
delegates, each theoretically representing five hundred m:>l .. kers, but even-
tually, the nmnber of delegates passed five hundred.9 
~lith most of the Empire paralyzed by the general strike and a workers• 
revolutionary government developing in the capital, th.e Tsar "reo faced with 
the choice of granting real constitutional government or establishing a mili-
tary dictatorship over his realm. Was he willingly to lL'llit his ow auto-
cratic pover or risk a gigantic revolution which might deprive him of hts 
throne? 
Amid the conflicting advice offered him by the members of his court 1 
Nicholss II vacillated between martial law or a constitutional government. 
Count S.I. Witte, who now enjoyed great prestige because he had managed to 
keep the Russian losses at a minimum in the treaty of Portsmouth which ended. 
the Russo-Japanese War, advised a liberal course. Grand Duke UU::olai Nikolae 
vich advised putting the Empire under martial JJ.n.r but refused to take the 
dietatorial poirers himself. Fine.lly, the Tsar decided with vlitte. On Octobe 
17, he issued the famous manifest ending the centuries-old autocrs.cy in Russia. 
'lhe October r·Janifest 1 drafted by rlitte 1 granted full civil liberties to all, 
that is, freedom of opinion, speech press, and association. The state Duma 
9 . I 1'rotskii1 !2Q.2_1 (Moscow, Gosizdateistvo, 1922) pp. 190-208. E. Maev-::t · 1905 god. Och.e[ki Revoliutsionorp Dvizhenia. (st. Petersburg-!-1oscow 1 
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1ras to be elected by all classes and nationalitiea previousJ...y excluded thou.g.~ 
the classes remained unequally represe11ted. 'fhe most important provision, 
:r..m-~ever, established that no law could be promulg-ated without the consent of 
the Dma and that the Tsar's officials were accountable to the Dur.ta. Though 
the suffrage was 't.reighted to favor the privileged and wealthier classes and 
the executive pmrer remained wholly in the hands of the Tsar, at last the 
Tsar's povrer had been limited. The autocracy vre s at an end! 
The Manifest met with various reactions. The conservatives were dis-
mayed. The Constitutional-Democrats, a moderate liberal party formed early 
that autWllll, were dissatisfied with the r.tanifest but \dlling to enter the 
Duma :tTJ. order to pressure the Tsar into granting a truly constitutional gover11 
ment. Among the Social-Democrats the Manifest senred to open another tactical 
debate between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. The Menshevik Position 'l.TaS 
probably best expressed by A.L. Helph.and, (Pa.rvus). The Duma ws a wonderful 
opportunity to agitate and organize the masses without oppost.tion from the 
gover.n;"lent. The Social-Democrats might just as well tal"..e advantage of the 
opporttt'lity offered by the Duma to prepare the masses for a revolution by 
freely expressing the Social-Democratic program and lim.iting the power of the 
Tsar by such means as refusing to provide the money and the armies he needed 
to stay in power. The Duna was a political fact and a Social-Democratic boy-
cott would not destroy it bu.t only leave the Social-Democratic Party and re-
duce the power and will of the Duns to oppose the Tsar. He lphand agreed with 
the Bolsheviks that the liberals were essentially enemies of the proletariat 1 
but why could not the Social-Democrats support the:n in the Duma against the 
!aar? Why not use the energies of one's enemies to combat hi a other enemies? 
It vas stranc.~ that Lenin should tal~ such an obstinate stand on participating 
in the Dura and cooperating 'trith the liberals. Ire was tu.."lling these tactical 
~1uestions i..."'l.to moral isSt.Jes though there is no :political morality--only class 
no:rality. IIelphand denied tha:; by entering the Duma the Social-Democrats 
";TOuld be la.psing into reformsi:'!l or r'"'nouncing revolution; rat'l:.ter 1 they would 
merely be using another weapon for revolution. The Social-Democrats "t-Tould 
11ave to be ~rrilling to use every 'l:reapon in the ;tong process tovrerd revolution 
10 
a.nd not rely exclusively on an armed uprising. 
The Bolsheviks, meanwhile, maintained the same position tm.mrd the Octo• 
ber ~1anifest as toward the August Manifest. Lenin condemned the October Mani• 
fest as an agreement between the Tsar and nobles wh.o needed bourgeois support 
and the bourgeoisie who did not want a complete revolution but only to seize 
the govermnent machinery. To Lenin, the armed uprising was the only way 
11 
toward the complete liberation of the toiling masses. Vorovskii joined 
Lenin in condemning the Mensheviks for not urging the boycott of the Duma and 
not concentrating their energies toward preparing an armed uprising. He de• 
nounced the Duma as a trick by the Tsar and tl~ liberals to split the forces 
l2 
of the revolution and condermed the Mensheviks for falling for it. Along 
with Lenin's and Vorovskii • s articles :t.n Proletm=:ri 1 the Bolsheviks issued 
leaflets throughout the Empire, denounci.."lg the October 1\{anifest as a lie. A 
leaflet of the Central COll.lllittee cautioned the people not to be deceived by 
the Manifest and urged them to obtain real rather than paper rights by force 
of ams, 
10
.Psrvus Rossiia 1 Remliutsiia, (st. Petersburg, s. Glagol.ev 1 1907) ~. 144-176, 1Ba~l90. 
1~nin1 Collected Wgrks, IX, pp. 396-404. 
(u. l2v. V. Vorovsldi 1 Izabrannie Proizvedenia o Pervoi RusskQ.i ReYO_liutaii. 
... ,.. ~ ~~-l'l 
Only by force of arms, only by a popular armed uprising will 'li.'e 
sweep the enemy from the fece of the earth and win liberty for 
ourselves •• .Forward into battle! ••• To arms comrades! Dow. vith 
the false constitution! Long live the popular armed upris1ngt13 
Obviously, the October Manifest had not deterred the Bolsheviks from their 
revolutionary purpose. 
The Bolsheviks and many Mensheviks found it their task to convince the 
people that the Manifest had gained them nothing and that the real revolution 
was still to come. In the first few days after the issuing of the Manifest, 
the streets of st. Petersburg were filled with rejoicing crowds celebrating the 
victory of the revolution. Trotskii reminded the crowds that the Manifest 
had changed nothing. The Tsar still actually held autocratic power. His 
troops and his police were still present. Even the promised release of poli-
tical prisoners had not yet been carried out. The Bolsheviks echoed his warn-
ing throughout st. Petersburg urging all, even the students to continue the 
14 general strike and prepare for an armed uprising. 
Along with the Manifest, the Bolsheviks denotmced the Duma as a shan 
parliament controlled by bourgeois liberals. In Ekaterinburg in the Urals, 
I.t4. Sverdlov held several speeches at workers' meetings repeating Lenin's 
position that the liberals had betrayed the revolution and concluded a deal 
' 15 
with the Tsar to maintain their hegemony over the working class. In Moscow 
a leaflet printed by the Federated Cotmcil of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks ex-
pressed the typical Bolshevik attitude toward the Duma. Arter condemning the 
1~ 
.)Piaskovskii, RevoliHjtsiia ,l2?5-l2g:I v Rossii, p. 139. 
14 ' 
Shaurov, 1905 sod, p. 49. 
15I.M. Sverdlov, Iza}lrannie P.roizvedenaia, (Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe 
Izdateistvo Pol1ticheskoi L1teratur1, 1957) I. pp. 15-27. 
liberals as traitors because of their support of the DU!lla it closed l.rith, 
Dow with the exploiters! Down with peaceful friends! Dotm. with 
the liberels! Down ~ritl~ t:1c Tsarb:t goverm .. rent and its collaborators! 
Long live the armed uprisi:1g! Long live the popular constituent assembly 
Long live the democratic republic--pir sole dependable -vray to sociali~.r.~i6 
Obviously, the October .Manifest had not deterred the Bolsheviks from their 
revolutionary purpose. 
The Bolsh.eviks were justified :L."l. fearing that the October I·'&snifest would 
split the forces of' a popular ~v~lution. Disorder increased throughout the 
1!1np1re after October 17 but not all of it was directed against the gove:rrar:1ent. 
After the announcement of the October Manifest 1 a wave of violence, motivated 
by a mixture of patriotism, reaction, and racial hatred, swept Russia, swept 
the Empire and especially its non-Russian regions. Demonstrators clashed in 
st. Petersburg. In Moscow, r-r .E. Baum.."ln, one of the lead 1ng Bolshevik agitators 
vas released fran prison by virtue of the Tsar's amnesty and killed wh.en the 
triumphant crowd surrounding him was fired on by counter-revolutionary demon-
stretors. Even worse crimes were committed by such Black Hundred organizations 
as the Union of the Russian People, the Society of Russian Patriots, and the 
uatian i··fonarchist Party, sometimes with the local authorities' passive appro-
1 and even assistance and sometimes in defiance 0~ all authority. t-rurderous 
grans were carried out against the Jews in Odessa, Kiev, Gomel, I..odz, and 
I.'l'l Saratov police, troops, and volunteers carried out a general 
om against local revolutionaries who had freed a large group of arrested 
In Cheliabinek ninety members of t'he local Bolshevik combat 





the Black Htmdreds. In Ufa there was an armed conflict between the Bolsheviks 
and the Black Hundreds fran wi:.ich Sverdlov barely escaped. The worst disaster 
occurred in the Siberian town of Tomsk when a la.rge crowd of the Black IIundrede 
surrounded a building where a workers' meeting was being held and set it on fir 
burning about 4oo people to death despite the resistance offered by- a smell 
group of' Bolsheviks. Even in Moscow the students were surrounded in the 
university by a menacing crowd until they were saved by the police •17 
Even 1f the mass of the population did not engage in such counterrevolu-
tionary activities, most of the people had lost interest in the revolutionary 
1novement. In st. Petersburg and Moscow the defiant spirit of' the workers be• 
gan to wane. Realizing this, the St. Petersburg Soviet called otf the general 
strike on October 19 while the Moscow Strike Committee, which represented the 
greater part of the city's labor force 1 and the All-Russian Railroad Union had 
recommended the cessation of the general strike even earlier. Seeing that 
the strike would only fade away rather than turn into an armed uprising, the 
Bolshevik Moscow Caamittee urged the workers in the Moscow area to return to 
work temporarily and prepare and organize themselves for the next general strikl 
which was to turn into the final decisive struggle of the proletariat for the 
18 fulf'illment of its political and economic demands. 
The Great October strike was over. It had been something the Bolsheviks 
hsd desired and agitated for but certainly tr..ey were neither its sole nor main 
instigators. other parties had been agitating for a general strike also, bu:t 
more inlportant factors were the general condition of the working class, the 
17Pankratove, Perva1! RW!sk@ie RevoliutsU.a, p. 134. 
l8 ro~d. p. 135. 
widespread unrest of 1905, the disgraceful behavior of the gove~~nent on 
''Bloody Sunday, 11 and defeat in the Fer East. As far as revolutionaries of' a 11 
parties were concerned, the Great October Strike had been a partial success. 
It resulted in the limitation of the autocracy. It had made the proletariat 
more politically minded. It had established a revolutionary pmrer in the capi'"'~"1-t8l--the Soviet--and many lesser revolutionary bodies, such as the !-1oscow 
Strike Committee, which were to provide bases for the construction of future 
soviets. Finally, it in itself was a revolutionary weapon r..rhich other European 
socialist parties later used either actually or as a threat. However, as far 
as the Bolsheviks were concerned, the strike vas also largely e failure. The 
tsarist government was still standing. At least the Bolsheviks could take a 
little comfort in that their tactical principle had been proven correct: the 
goverament could not be overthrown by a general strike alone; the government 
could only be destroyed by means of a general armed uprising. 
'l"ne failure to convert the general strike into s revolution proved that 
the Bolsheviks were not anywhere near being prepared to lead an armed uprising 
The stril~ was over and a great opportunity had passed by but perhaps there 
wes still time to achieve something. Lenin believed that the point of balance 
had now been reached. Many of the military units were considered unreliable. 
The autocracy had betrayed its lack of confidence in its own pm1er by retreatirl~ 
before the anger of the people and granting a constitution. A great victory 
had been won but it was only the first step. Russia did not yet 'have a demo-
crat:t.c republic or even a responsible ministry. The PDOletariat had to press 
further, to organize a workers' militia, to gain the support of the soldiers, 
to overthrow the autocracy and thus spark a general European socialist revolu-
tion Which ,,ould establish socialism throughout all Europe, L'"lcluding 
...... 
19 Russia. Throughout 1905 Lenin had spent much of his spare ti.'!le i...'l'l the Gene-
va library studying the works of C1useret, the leader of the French "Cornnnm-
ards" in 18711 on street fighting. tfuile net.rs of disorders and uprisings in 
Russia reached Switzerland, Lenin longed to be at the scene of events. If he 
could not be present, he would at least send advice to :his embattled comrades. 
Apparently he became well-versed in revolutionary tactics. The advice he sent 
to t!1e Bolsheviks in Russia was sound. He urged them to arm themselves with 
anything they could get hold of including rope, Keroseve, and even nails to sl 
dovm the charging cavalry. Leaders were to be elected and the necessary pre-
parations for an effective struggle made: the organization of headquarters, 
the prearrangement of secret signals for communication, the reco:n.naisance of 
primary targets such as banks and police stations as well as secret escape 
routeso He urged each Bolshevik committee to organize small canbat detachments 
of three, five 1 or even thirty men each. It was not necessary that these men 
should be social-Democrats as long as they were sincere revolutionaries. Of 
course, these untts could not be successful without the preparation of' the men 
themselves for their tasks. Training was to be carried out on the theoretical 
level by reading historical literature on revolts in other European cities as 
well as by lectures presented by ex-soldiers. !·1ore important, the men were to 
obtain practical e:x:perience by attacking individual policement, raiding banks 
20 
and police stations, and clashing with the Black Hundreds. No definite 
deadline was set for the armed uprising, but Lenin did warn against a pre-
uture revolt and expressed his opinion that it would be best to de lay the 
19 LenL~, Collec~ed Works, IX, pp. 427-434. 
20~. n, PP· 244-246, 420-424. 
uprisi:ng until the coming spring when the most dissatisfied segment of the 
21 
army would return from Manchuria. 
Though there was no date set for the armed uprising, the Bolsheviks in-
tensif'ied their preparations for it lest the masses rise in a spontaneous and 
uncoordinated effort before the Bolsheviks were ready. In st. Petersburg the 
Central Committee and the st. Petersburg Committee worked together. More 
party members and sympathizers were organized into combat units in every dis-
trict. Each unit had about ten men end was headed by a "desiatnik" who was 
under the command of' one of' the party's district organizers. It is impossible 
to tell how many Bolsheviks 'tvere organized in such detachments but there were 
enough to provide a deterrent against attack on the workers • meetings by the 
Black :Iundreds. Rifles and revolvers were distributed among the men and they 
practiced using them by hunting outside of town or firing a few quick shots in 
the parks at night. There was always a shortage of firearms, however, end 
many '"orkers resorted to improvising daggers, pikes, and other homemade weapons 
within the plants themselves. The technical department of the Central Committe~ 
meanwhile, managed the aspects of an uprising which could not be hand led on the 
district level. i..f. Litvinov was in charge of smuggling weapons from Germany 
and Austria into Russia. Ammunition was often obtained from the revolutionary 
cells within the army in exchange for party literature. A member of the Cen-
tral Committee, Leonid Krasin, took on the task of manufacturing, testing and 
ltortng bombs. The university students in St. Petersburg also built up a com-
bat force composed of all classes of revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks among 
them saw no point in not participating in this organization with the Mensheviks 
-
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V.Io Lenin, Polnoe Sobrannie Sochinenii, XLVII, pp. 100-101. 
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and Socialist-Revolutionaries. They all agreed on the necessity of an armed 
uprising and a revolutioury provisional government. I~ot only was the student 
organization an ally of the Bolsnevik fighting units, but it also gave them 
access to the university's laboratories to make bombs. 
T:.t1e money for this general arming came from various sources. Bolshevik 
orators collected contributions from the workers at factory and street gather-
ings. Political clubs which were looser forms of' workers' discussion circles 
yielded additional funds. Maxim Gorkii used his popularity and influence amone 
the rich to obtain contributions. Apparently he was very successful for even 
wealthy industrialists such as the two Moscow factory owners. Schmidt and Moro 
22 
zov, contributed large sums of money to the Bolsheviks. Yet, the Bolsheviks 
were always short of ftmds. Weapons were costly but they were not the party's 
only expense. The party presses needed printing equipment, paper, and. ink. 
Apartments had to be rented to hold meetings and store arms and literature. 
Furthermore, few of the Bolsheviks could support themselves by even part-time 
work. It is difficult for fugitives and revolutionaries to find work in s 
police state. 
Tr.e ~k>scow Bolsheviks worked even harder to prepare for the armed up-
rising. Around the time of the October !43nifest, the Bolshevik canbat organ1-
zation numbered only 250 men, armed for the most part, by bad revolvers and 
low quality bombs. After Bauman's murder on October 18, the :,foscow Bolsheviks 
realized the v..-eakness of their combat organization and accelerated their effor1 s 
to build e real revolutionary army. The organization of the con1bat force was 
22Akhun, Boevaia i Voennaia Deiate~os~, pp. 25-35. if.!I. Iakovlev, J-~he~11e Vosstania Delrebria 1905 13• (Moscow 11 Gosudarstven."'loe Isdatelstvo ~:iticheskoi Li'eeratury, 1957) pp. 57-70. Liadov, Iz Zhizni Parti~, pp. 79-
cir!lilar to t::1at of the St. Petersburg organization witil its ''desiatniki" and 
district organ1.zers. It seems that volunteers ·i.rere screened more strictly, 
:10':rever, for it \t."8S required that every member be vrell knowu &nd :reco:rrnnended 
by a party organization as a determined revolutionary. 'l'hese most disciplined 
and adept at handline weapons were ad.'llitted into the active companies while 
the rest were members of the reserve. Strict discipli.'1.e was mainMined in the 
obedience of orders, disposal of arms, and expenditure of ar:1munition. The 
members uere constantly impressed with the f'act that it was their im:nediate 
duty to protect the party from attacks by the police and Black :iundreds and 
that their ultimate duty was to lead the proletariat in its final struggle 
23 
a ga i.TJ.st the autocracy. 
Much ti111c was devoted to the training of the men for their duties. Ex-
soldiers organized nightly target practice in basements and schools wr;ere the 
sound of the shots could be muffled. Instructors held lectures on street-
fighting tactics used by ·~restern European -workers in the revolutions of 1848 
and the defence of Paris in 1871. stations and escape routes for revolutionary 
staffs and snipers were picked out end plans for lines of barricades were 
draw up. Bomb laboratories 'Here set up. Political meetings 'Were held more 
frequently to obtain more contributions from the workers. A gift of' 20,000 
rubles by Scl1."llidt, the great furniture manufacturer, toward the end of 1905 
vas also very welcome • 
In cddition to all this training and preparation, tb.e Bolsheviks gained 
first hand experience in small, isolated exploits against the Dlack Htmdreds. 
Baaetimes t!:ley broke up meetings of the Black Hundreds by shouts end gunfire, 
1-
23 Vvsshii Pod 11em Revoliutsii, It pp. 600-601. 
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but tl1ere were no serious clashes. Hore serious were the attacks on individua 
policement to rob them of their gwts and passport books and attacks and burg-
21~> 
lnrier;: of small gunshops to obtnil1 firearms. 
Similar organizations were also built up in the suburbs of Z.fosc;ow) and 
-vlith the development of Socialist-Revolutionary) Menshevil~) and anarchist, 
and non-party combat organizations, the rJfoscov area rivalled st. Petersburg 
as the revolutionary center of the Empire. Yet mistakes in the training and 
organization of these 'lmits left serious waknesses in the structure and effi-
ciency of these cOJ.abat groups which would only become apparent in the heat of 
battle. v. Kostitsyn, one of the Mosco"VT Committee's organizers, compl21ned 
that while combat un.:i.ts were organized on the basis of the area in which they 
operated) they also accepted volunteers from other sections of the city. When 
the shootinG started, these men would be more anxious to defend their own 
neighborhoods th.an the ones they were assigned ·t;o. Even more serious a defect 
was that the leaders themselves were ineJq>erienced. The party's organizers 
were essentially political agitators vrho had themselves never had any experi-
ence in actually leading an armed uprising. The instructors, 'vho vere usually 
ex-soldiers, had been trained for fighting in the countryside, in the field 
or on rugged terrain, but not for street fighting i.."l. a large urban area. \ihen 
the actual clash came, these shortcomings vould cost the Bolsb.eviks dearly. 25 
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v. Nevskii1 (ed.) Dekebr' 12,05 na K.rasnoi Presno, (Mosccnr1 Agitprop· 
Oi.:.del1 Krasno--Preaenskogo Baikoma 1 RKPB 1 1926} v. Kostitsyn, "Deknbrslmc 
Vosstanie 1905 goda" pp. 21-30. M. Sidorov "vosponimania Druzhinika F--ki 
Schmidta," 117-121. u. Korolev (Batyshchev) "Ila B:restskoi Zheleznoi Doroge 
v 1905 godu)" pp. 150·157. Iakovlev, Vooruzhenie Vosstania, 110-113. 
25v. Kostitsyin, ''Dek8barskoe Vossta11ie 1905 gods" Ne"7sldi, Dekabr' 1925 
J.'la Krasnoi Presne, pp. 120-121. 
Similar eanbat organizations were being built up in most af the indus-
trial centers of the Empire by all revolutionary parties including the Bolshe-
viks. The strength of the Bolshevik organizations varied with the size of the 
local population and the influence the Bolsheviks exerted on it. Nizhni Ifov-
gorod wi.th its 300 armed Bolsheviks had an even larger organization than e-ven 
the Moscow Committee. In a town like Voronezh where taey had less influence 1 
the Bolsheviks could only arm seventy or eighty men. Even more important 
than numbers, the fighting efficiency of the various centers varied with the 
initiative of the local Bolshevik leadership and the Yvail.ability of money and 
arms. These differences, however, would only becane really apparent once the 
fighting had started. 
Despite the:tr extensive preparations for the final armed uprising, the 
Bolsheviks managed to arm and organize a very small portion of the urbtlll work-
ing class. What the Bolsheviks always aimed for, however, vas a mass rising 
led by themselves--not a coup executed by a conspiratorial minority. Row 
oould the support of the masses be obtained1 The obvious answer would seem 
to have been the soviets which could be the basis of a workers' revolutionary 
organization. Yet 1 many Bolsheviks mistrusted the soviet as an organ of rev-
olutionary government. Though. soviets had their uses on such occasions as 
political st:rikes, the Bolsheviks did not think them capable of assuming 
political leaders..l).ip because they were non-party institutions which would not 
26 
necessarily adhere to the Social-Democratic program. Therefore 1 the Bol-
shevik attitude toward the Soviets in general vas not only one of mistrust, 
but dovmrigh.t hostility. B.M. Knuniants-Radin1 one of' the two Bolsheviks 1n 
~ Bystrikh, Bolghevi§tki! Ormmizatsii Urela, p. 176. 
the st. Petersburg executive committee, feared that if the Soviet \ISS not used 
to propagate the party's ideas, the Soviet might turn out to be the germ of 
an "independent labor party'' as opposed to socialism. Many of the Bolsheviks 
in St. Petersburg looked upon the Soviet as little more than a Gtrike commit-
tee which, once the general strike was over, had outlived its purpose and be-
come more of a nuisance than an asset. They were ma 1nly concerned with the 
question of whether they shoulil boycott the Soviet or join it ad "explode" it 
from Vithin. Whatever the tactics to be used, most Bolsheviks agreed that the 
St. Petersburg Soviet had become "u.n.necessaryn and th<; it should leave the 
political leadership of the proletariat to the Social-Democratic Party and 
accept its lead and party program or dissolve. Z7 
The attitude of the Central Committee toward the Soviet is probably best 
expressed in the Central Committees "Letter to all Party Organizations" of 
October 27. The Central Committee instrt..tcted Social-Democratic participants 
in all soviets or similar organizations to invite the soviets to adopt the 
program of the Social-Democratic Party and accept its leadership 1 and ultim-
ately to dissolve into it. If' the soviet refused to accept the Pz-ogram of 
the party, the Bolsheviks were to leave and expose the antiproletaria.n nature 
of such an organization. If the soviet refused to accept the entire party pro 
gram but reserved its right to decide on even individual political issue as 
it came up1 the .Bolshevik deputies could stay in the soviet but had to expose 
28 
the "absurdity" or such political leadership. 
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sci1wrz, The Russian Revolution of 19QS. pp. 179-185. Schvarz•s 
chapter "The Soviets of Workers• Deputies" pp. 167-;93, is a detailed survey 
of the Bolshevilt and rilenshevik attitudes toward the soviets. 
2P, .. r. Vasil 'ev-Iuzhin1 "I>'Ioskovskii Sovet Rabochikh Deputatov v 1905 
goclu.'' Proletarskaia Revol1,'W;siia 1 April, 19251 p. 90. 
Following these instructions, the Bolsheviks in the st. Petersburg 
Soviet proposed that the Soviet accept the Social-Democratic program or dis-
band, arguing that such a vague, political amalgam as the Soviet could not be 
the political leader of the vorking class. The Socialist Revolutionaries in 
the Soviet illlllediately objected that the Soviet was supposed to represent 
the entire proletariat and could not be attached to any one party since the 
Social-Democratic party was not the sole representative of all vorking people. 
Had this proposal by the Bolshevik minority been put to a vote, it might have 
destroyed the Soviet, but fortunately for that organization, the question was 
29 
shelved. 
Lenin himself had a somewhat different attitude toward the soviets. 
Previously, he had always feared that such non-party organizations as trade 
unions might lead the proletariat astray from its revolutionary path and be-
lieved that the party must either infiltrate and control such organizat tons 
or destroy them. However, he saw the soviets in a different light. To carry 
out a successful revolution both the party and the soviets were necessary. 
The soviet could serve as the instrument of the proletariat and all people 
opposed to the autocracy. It should proclaim itself and take over the duties 
of e revolutionary government and serve as the central organization of the 
revolutionary soldiers and sailors, the peasant committees, the armed prole-
tariat, the revolutionary democrats, and intelligentsia. As long as the 
party maintained its independence of action, there was no reason wlzy the non-
IOC1alist revolutionaries should be alianated. Nor would the leadership of 
the soviet be a weak coalition. The soviets hsd functioned well so tar, 
29G. Khrustalev-Ifosar• 1 "Istoriia Soveta Rabochikh Deputatov (do 26 f~~bria 1905 gada) Istoriia Soveta Rabochikh DeEutatov g. S-PeterburS@, 
ersburg, 1906) pp. 156-!51. 
despite their multi-party cherecter. Besides, all revolutionary ~laments 
would be united in the struggle for full civil liberty, the eizht-hou:r day, 
and the transference of all the land to the peasants, without much disag:ree-
30 
ment. 
Most Bolsheviks, however, vrere not ss liberal in their views of the 
soviets as Lenin and believed the sole justification of their existence was 
that they could be used as instruments of the party. Lenin's letter expres-
sing his views on the soviets, which was addressed to the editorial board 
of the new Bolshevik newspaper in Russia, I~ovaia Zhizn, was not printed until 
two decades later. In towns like Kolanna and Kostroma, in the north-central 
industrial region, and Motovilik..1J. and Ufa 1 in the Urals, where Bolshevik 
influence \ms so predominant that they could easily control the soviet workers 
to accept the leadership of the party, the Bolsheviks readily agitated and 
helped the workers to organize soviets. 
In Moscow, where other parties also had a sizable influence, the over-
bearing attitude of the Bolsheviks toward the soviets became more apparent. 
Since the Moscow Bolsheviks and I.fensheviks shared the same views regarding 
the armed uprising against the Tsar and the falsity of the Duma 1 the Belshe-
vik Moscow Committee and the Menshevik Moscow Group united in a Federative 
Soviet which was actually a local party council and not to be confused with a 
workers' soviet. This Federative Soviet issued joint leaflets and organized 
gatherings at which Bolshevik and Menshevik orators condemned the October 
Manifest, condemned the liberals for betraying the revolution, and called on 
the workers to organize end arm themselves for the coming uprising. Both 
30 Lenin, Collected Wo;r.:ks, X, pp. 19-29. 
factions in the Federative Soviet condemned the Moscow strike Committee be-
cause it included professionals, store keepers, and even government employees 
along with the factory workers. In place of the strike Committee, the Federa-
tive Soviet urged the workers to form a soviet composed exclusively of the 
proletarian workers of the Moscow area. During November, several district 
soviets 1-fere organized in Moscow. The strike Committee was eventually dis-
solved by the combined efforts of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks and on Novem-
ber 22, the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies, modelled on the st. Peters-
burg Soviet and having one delegate for every 400 workers represented was 
organized, was founded. The Moscow Soviet began its activity by declaring 
its support of all the present strikes in the city with funds and a sympathy 
boycott of all enterprises involved 1n the strikes. Eventually, however, the 
Moscow Soviet called on all workers to refrain from initiating scattered and 
31 isolated strikes and to prepare for e new general strike. 
It seems, however, that the Bolsheviks were not very enthusiastic about 
the organization of the district or city soviets and tried to make them mere 
party tools wherever possible. M.I. Vasil'ev-Iuzhhin, one of the Bolshevik 
representatives 1n the executive canm.ittee of the Moscow Soviet, vas not very 
interested in the Soviet because he thought the political leadership of the 
proletariat belonged to the Social-Democratic party rather than non-partisan 
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organizations. The Bolshevik aversion to independent action by the soviets 
became even more apparent in their behavior toward the district soviets. In 
31yysshii Pod"em Russkoi Revoliutsii, I, pp. 365-390. Iekovlev, 
Vooruzhenie Vosstania, pp. 110-114. 
3~4.I. Vosil'ev Iuzhin, "Moskovskii Sovet Rabochikh Deputatov v 1905 
godu." Proletariska ia Revoliutsiia, April, 1925, P. 89. 
the Presnia District Soviet, for instance, the Bolsheviks argued that the 
proletariat was a single class which should have a sil'lgle party in its strug-
gle against Tssrism. Unless the soviets did not openly recognize and accept 
the program and leadership of the Social-Democratic Party, they would become 
a "non-party party" and therefore a dangerous rival to the Social-Democratic 
33 Party. The Mensheviks protested that the Social-Democratic propaganda but 
that such a blunt demand of the formsl recognition of Social-Democrst:tc lead-
ership would only alienate a sizable portion of the workers, especially those 
under the influence of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks, however 
were unmoved by such arguments. The Conference of most of the Bolshevtk 
northern committees, held on November 21-23, adopted the following resolution 
regarding the soviets. 
Soviets of workers' deputies need only be created where the 
organization cannot direct the proletariat's mass action 1n any other 
way or where it is necessary bo detach masses that have fallen under 
the influence of bourgeois parties. The Soviet of \iorkrrs' deputies 
must be the party's technicel apparatus for carrying the RSDRP's poli-
tical leadership to the masses. Therefore, it is necessary to seize 
control of it end to persuade it to recognize the program and the 
political leadership of the RSDRP •34 
In Nizlmi Novgorod (today Gorkii) the Bols~1eviks managed to organize 
the rudiments of a popul~Jr revolutionary government which would always be 
under their control, and therefore, succeeded in bypassing the organization 
of a soviet. In keeping with lenin's exortations to make the Social-Democra-
tic Party a rnass organization by allowing more worlters into the party, the 
local Bolsheviks held mass meetings in which workers '\-tere encouraged to dis-
33 Garvi, Vos;eonimaniie Sotsial-Demokrata, p. 603. 
34vyssh1i Pod"em Revoliutsii, I, p. 23. 
cuss and vote on party affairs. At many of tnese meetings a "Peoples' Court" 
tros held to settle <lifference s among the citizens by a vote rather than by 
resorting to the regular courts of the government. A popular militia, made 
up of all classes, was also organized to protect the city against pogroms. 
Though this was not a strictly proletarian fighting organization, it was a 
force which included the proletariat and had severs 1 Bolshevik organizers 
within its command.35 In Kazan, tlle Bolsheviks participated in a rudimentary 
provisional government. On October 20, a large crovd of citizens of all 
classes and parties marched on the town duma disarming police111en along the 
way. Once there, they organized a peoples' militia and town camnune 1n which 
all revolutionary parties participated. There was much rivalry between 
Damperov 1 the Bolshevik leader of the militia 1 and the libert:lls for the con-
trol of t~1e combat detachments. The armed workers 1 meanwhile aggravated the 
situation by seizing the town's printshops and publishing workers' papers. 
It would have been interesting to see the outcome of ti:1e Bolsl:1evik-liberal 
rivalry in t:lis rudi..'llentary provisional government, but it was very short-
lived. On October 26 1 a force including Cossacks, police 1 and Black Hundreds 
surrounded the duma hall where the commune was meeting, arrested the leading 
revolutionaries, including most of the Bolsheviks, and subjected the town to 
a three -day orgs of looting and killing. 36 In both Nizhni Novgorod and Kazan 
would have preferred to have had the ovle leadership revolutionsry movement, 
but they realized how pitifully small their forces were and that they could 
have no hope of overthrowing the government without the alliance with non-
35~. II, pp. 90-114, Iak?v1ev, Vooruzhenie Vosstaniia, pp. 220-235. 
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proletarian elements. Therefore, they entered soviets and multi-party 
provisional govern.l!lents to direct the energy of' all the people f.lgainst the 
government. 
xio\>• much state authority a soviet could usurp depended on the daring 
of the revolutionary leaders and the unrest of the local population as ;.rell 
e s on the strength of the local authorities. The Bolshevik-dor:~L.'"l.ated 2-:ioto-
vilikh Soviet in the Urals expelled the police from its place of meeting, 
carried on collective bargaining for all the workers in the town, took over 
the administration of the local hospital, and collected money for weapons. 37 
However, the largest and most powerful soviets sprang up 1n the U'Kraine aml 
the Ceuca sus where the Mensheviks predominated. The ~nsheviks did not share 
the Bolsheviks' mistrust of the soviets and W~tre therefore more ready to aid 
the workers in building up such organizations. Nor was the Menshevik leader-
ship in the soviets squeamish about seizing local government or leading an 
armed uprising as Bolshevik historians have claimed. The Odessa ~·1ensheviks 
had already been engaged in several battles against troops and police even 
before the October Manifest was issued. In Kharkov, a genera 1 strike was 
enforced by a workers' militia which forcibly closed shops. Peoples' Courts 
were founded and a soviet of doctors and hospital employees took over the 
administration of the local :'1ospita1.38 In the Caucasus, meanwllile, the 
Mensheviks unhesitatingly resorted to violence to seize goverrunental powers. 
In western Georgia, the peasant guerillas, known as the Red Hundreds were 
very much tmddr the influence of the !>iensheviks. They attacked the police 
37 Bystrik.~, Bolshevistkie Organizat sii Ura la, pp. 220-235. 
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and even Cossacks. Government officials and prominent citizens were assassin-
ated in a wave of terror much more systematic than the isolated assassinations 
perpetrated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Where the Red llundres were vic-
torious, they seized the r'.:dlroad stations, took over the town administration, 
formed peoples• courts and passed sentences, and emptied the government build-
ings of arms and money. Towns like Poti, when they were taken over by the 
Red Hundreds or affiliated organizations, temporarily came tm.der a red dic-
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tatorship. T'ne Bolsheviks were certainly not the only party willing to 
resort to violence to overthrow the government. 
No matter how well organized the soviets ~vcre, there could be little 
hope of victory without the support of the army. II oping to combine the 
strength of the local garrisons with those of the soviets 1 the Bolsheviks 
and other revolutionary parties intensified their agitation in military units. 
The Bolsheviks concentrated especially on sailors, artillery-men, sappers, 
and railroad troops whose personnel was large~ drawn from the industrial 
proletariat. In the course of 1905 1 the Bolsheviks found that political 
agitation appevled only to the minority of the men in the armed forces. To 
gain the support of the mass of the Empire's military personnel, they sought 
to take advantage of the soldiers• and sailors' prevailing disgust with the 
harsh discipline, bad living conditions, delay in demobilization, and the 
use of garrison troops to restore order. Organizers within the military \mit s 
encouraged meetings at which agitators formulated complaints to the officers, 
denounced the Tsar, and called for a constituent assembly. Most frequently 
the soldiers demanded e two-;,yeor term of service, on immediate demobilization 
39 !2.!i• III, pp. 8o0-811. 
of t:1.e reservists, batter food and clothing, better treatment by their offi-
cers, more frequent f'urlougt1s; the rigb.t to assemble and discuss their needs 
within their barracks, the right to read what they wished, amnesty for all 
soldiers undergoing punishment for previous disciplinary offences, and that 
they no longer be used to res-tore order against their mm people. SO!llet:lmes, 
at the instigation o"f' revolutionary agitators they would include the demand 
for a constituent assemb:cy. By uniting the demands of the political:cy con-
scious mi.."lority wit~l that of the merely dissatisfied minority, the Bolsheviks 
i1oped to build up a massive following withi.YJ. the army. 
'l'he Bolshevik activity in the Hoscow garr_Jon and its results were 
fairly typic :l of Bolsl1evik efforts in other Russian garrisons. After the 
October Manifest, revolutionary cells within the army organized an increasing 
number of company and battalion meetings. T:.'l.e main themes of the agitation 
dealt ;.rl.tll the incompetence and corruption of the bureaucracy which had lost 
the war, the hardships of Russian military service 1 and the injustice of 
forcing soldiers to shoot at their own people to uphold the tsarist government 
Outside the ba·:-racks, workers and agitators fraternized with the soldiers, 
conversing with them or inviting them to workers• meetings. '.l'O'trerd the end of 
I:Tovember, some of the sappers in the I4oscow garrison decided to present their 
officers "t>rith demands to better the condition of the rank and file. If these 
demands were not satisfied, they planned to arrest their officers, seize the 
reg±nental store of arms, and the telegraph, and call the other tmits of the 
garrison to join them. On November 26 and 27 the sappers and 300 men of the 
!~esvizhski and Perenovski regiments held armed demonstrations outside the 
barracl\.s. Had they been quickly joined by the city proletariat, there might 
l1ave been an armed uprising. However 1 before the worlters could join the 
soldiers in an armed disturbance, the officers quicklJ satisfied same of the 
soldiers' demands. Most ot the men were not interested in staging a revolu-
tion and when their demands were partially satisfied, they first hesitated 
40 
and then retumed to duty. 
A similar demonstration took place in Kiev on N0vember 17, but again, 
the workers were not prepared. A great crowd of workers did join the sappars' 
demonstration in the Jewish }iarket and for awhile there was much shooting and 
disorder. The workers, however, were unarmed and loyal troops soon scattered 
41 
the demonstration by opening fire on it. 
One of the grossest examples of lack of cooperation between the prole-
tariat and the a~ occurred in Voronezh on November 18. A disciplinary 
battalion rioted against their officers protesting the rotten food they were 
receiving. When the looal Bolsheviks learned of the disorder they were totally 
unprepared to take any action. Apparently they had neglected to form any eon-
neotion within the garrison and did not have the slightest inkling that trouble 
was brewing. By the time they sent a few men over to investigate and gathered 
a force of armed workers, the disturbance within the barracks bad aen crushed 
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a.nd there was nothing for the workers to do but retum to town. 
'J.be Bolshevik effort to win the army over to the revolutionary cause was 
not a total failure, however. Along the Trans-Siberian railroad they succeeded 
1n forming large soldiers' organizations which closely cooperated with the 
railroad workers. In Krasnoiarsk, the soldiers frequently joined workers' dem-
•strations carrying weapons and red flags and shouting Social-Democratic slo-
ll.lls. In Irkutsk, many of the soldiers went on strike and elected a committee 
-
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partial~ c~~posed of officers. The 3olsheviks opposed tha inclusion of 
officers in this com:r(d. ttee because they considered them to be bourgeois and 
rightly feared that they would exert a moderating influence on the men. The 
Socialist-Revolutionaries and non-party soldiers, however, did not object to 
the presence of officers, many of whom they still respected, and disregarded 
the Bolsheviks in this matter. In chita, the junction of the railroads lead-
ing to Vladivostok and Harbin, the Bolsheviks had their greatest success. On 
November 22, a Soviet of Soldiers and Cossacks was formed not so much through 
the influence of the revolutionar.y cells within the army but of participation 
in workers' meetings and the oratory of local Bolshevik agitators such as 
V.V. Kurnatovskii. The Soviet readily declared its acceptance of the Social-
Democratic leadership and the solidarity of the soldiers with the proletariat. 
On :!I0vember 26, this organization did combine wi tb the workers in the town 
and for.mad the Combined Committee. To have startad a general strike along 
the railroad would have harmed the welfare of the army in Manchuria and alien-
ated it from the revolution. Therefore, the soldiers and workers decided to 
seize control of the railroad themselves and arrange for the speedy transpor-
tation of the Far Zastern army back to European Russia. In the meantime, the 
soldiers seized soma of the railroad cars on the sidings and distributGd 800 
4J 
rifles among the workers, thus leaving the regular aity government powerless. 
Strangely enough, where the Bolsheviks hoped to have the most suaeess--
Within the defeated army in Manchuria--there was no rising or soldiers' soviet. 
In Harbin, Flanahuria, a Menshevik Harbin Conmdttee and a Bolshevik Harbin GrofP 
-
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both carried out oral agitation and distributed leaflets urging the soldiers 
to return home to protect their families against the Tsar and telling them it 
would be necessary to seize the railroad to get out of Manchuria from wh~re 
the Tsar feared to bring them baok. The only disturbances caused by the 
soldiers were temporary strikes and enough reliable troops were left to crush 
44 the revolationary movement in Siberia in the n~xt two months. It seems 
that an army on the field is much more loyal and conservative than units on 
garrison duty. 
The Bolsheviks were not more successful in the navy. At Kronstadt, the 
island fortress guarding St. Petersburg, the cells among the sailors and. the 
garrison's artillery-men intensified their activity after the October Manifest 
and agitated for a demooratic republic. However, the membership of the Sooial. 
De.moora. tic circles remained small, totaling about ninety men and 1 ts influence 
was diluted. in a sea of Socialist-Revolutionary and non-party ::Jantiment. In 
spite of this, the Bolsheviks hoped that their organization would. grow and laa.c 
a well-planned. revolution in connection with the St. Petersburg proletariat. 
However, before the Bolshevik organization could be enlarged, outside factors 
increased the ferment in Kronsta.dt. Many of the sailors had been kept on d~aty 
beyond their term of duty. During the entire war they had been occupied with 
garrison duty while news of defeats in the Far East and the mutiny in Sevasto-
pol caused seething unrest. On October 26, the dissatisfaction became open 
when maey sailors and artillery-men held an armed demonstration through the 
streets of Kronstadt demanding a constit~aent assembly, the rttduction or the 
tel'lll of' duty for seamen from seven to four years, civil rights for all, and 
the right to be educated in one's native language. 1'llh.en on the next day they 
~-
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were joined by civilian workers, living in Krons~~dt, and agitators, the 
demonstration got out of hand. Sailors and hooligans raided several shops 
o:1.nd tho public library, killing a few people in the prooess. This was no 
organized uprising but an outburst of vandalism which the small Bolshevik 
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organization could neither control nor make use of. 
A better organized uprising took place again in Sevastopol. Sailors, 
g~rrison troops, and Savastopol workers held frequent meetings together and 
separately im their own ships, barracks, and warehouses. Soviets were organ-
ized ~J many of the crews and there was muoh talk of the neoessity of the 
improvement of oonditions in the navy to gain the support of the mass of 
non~· ?Oli tical members of the crews and garrisons. Again, the Social-Democrats 
last (lontrol of the situation before an organized uprising could be organised. 
Lieutenant F . .,. Schmidt. com."llander of the Oohakov was hir1self a revolutionary 
liberal and urged the Bolsheviks to call off the disorders in the fleet and 
wait for the liberal Union of Unions to start the all-Russian revolution in 
Mosao-vr. ltlhen most of the sailors' deputies refused to listen, Schmidt agreed 
to help them by staging a night raid and kidn11pping all the fleat officers. 
However, he was only able to take over the Ooha.kov and three :mine layers. 
Furthermore, he failed t~ eaptura ma~ of the officers. The crew of the 
Panteleimon (whioh wtl.s aotually the Petamkin renamed to erase its shame) 
attempted to take over the ship as it had bean taken in June. Though they 
raised tho red flag, the officers and the loyal portion of the orew managed to 
restore order. Similarly, on the other ships, the orews hesitated before the 
prospect of m1.1tiey" and ware still too disorganized to stage a ooup against 
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thair officers. The S~vasbpol garrison vlb.ioh had promised the sailors not 
to fir'9 at ths fl,'i!&t if" it w.ut1..nied, finally submitted to their officers and 
opened fire on the Ochako~T setting it on .f'ire and ending the mutiny on Novem-
46 ber 17, after six days of great unrest and disorder in the port. It seemed 
tha. t the great enemy, spontaneity, stalked all .3olshevik efforts to organize 
the revolution. 
The 3olsh.evil-:>> 1 can1paigntto organize a.nd unite the mass of the· Russian 
population, the peasantry, to the proletarian movement similarly failed. At 
first the outlook seemed favorable. There was plan~ of revolutiona~y feeling 
among the poasantr;r. lvhen the October Manif'est was issued the first react:i.on 
of the peasants was, "1'lli.at? nothing about the land?" Seeing that the October. 
11an:ifest only brought on an inorease in the disorder in the countryside, the 
Tsar isslled a special decree for the peasants on November J, retduoing and 
gradually abolishing all payments collected by the state to compensate the 
l.ando'il!le:::-s for the loss of their serfs' lands in 1861 and establishing land 
banb -vrhich provided cheap loans to peasants who wanted to acquire more land. 
The Jolshevib quickly launched a campaign against this dfecree lest the pea-
sant.;; should be partially satisfied by it and become more conciliatory- totiard 
the landlords and the government. They urged all the peasants to stop all 
paylllGnts i111111edia tely instead of complying with the gradual reduction of pay-
ments since, in the past forty years, the peasants had paid more than the 
L 1:is were worth. The land ba.r,k was denounced as a means of mkking the rich 
paa.;;:;antry ·aven ri~her while driving the poorer peasants further into debt. 
Finally, the l~usants were renrlWnded that the Tsar sought only to protect the 
-
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large landovmers by quieting p<iasant unrest l'd th promises while the November 
47 3 decree did not give a bit of land to the peasants. 
The 3olsheviks had 11 ttle trouble in keeping up the rsvolutionar-.r a!'dor 
of the peasantry sinoe, after all, they had plency of help from the Sooialist-
Ravolutionaries in that respect. But trds was not enough. For a suocessful 
revolution, organization was needed. Special groups of Bolshevik organizers 
were sent out from towns to organize revolutionar,y peasant committees in the 
villages. In soma oases they succeeded. Even a few days before the announce-
mant of the October Manifest, the peas.:1.nt::>. of tlikolaavsld in the Sara tov pro-
vince organized a "Revolutionary Peasants' Committee1' to replace the regular 
gov3:,,nment officials with elected officials, destroy the government records, 
abolihh governn1ent taxes and replace them with a. progressive income Ul.x, 
organize an a:lUad militi~ .• requisition stores of bread fron the nearby estates 
and confiscate all esta:~e lands tdthout co:11pensation. Soon after the proi.lam.,. 
a.tion of the October 1-fu.ni.fest, the villagers of Nikolaevsld, joined by tho 
villagors of ~fa.reyka, began to carey this program out. On October 20, an 
armed band moved into town and seized all the government offices including 
the post and telegraph offices and the wine shop. After confiscating all the 
money and arms they could find 1.n these offices, the villagers installed 
their own committe~ there and began the confiscation of nearby private stores 
of breed. 48 In the nearb'; Samara province, the villagers of Staro-Buia:nsk 
~ um went so far as to draft their own oansti tution. The regular govarnmant 
w~s ~er1acAd by a peoples' congress and a popular]J· elected executive board. 
Under direct popular control, the executive board was responsible for the 
47vysshi1 Pod'em Ravoliutsi~, I, pp. 82)-825. 
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protection of the village against the regular government, the collection and 
dispensation of revenues, and education in the village. The land was declared 
to be at the disposal of the community and available to those who could use 
it productively, though it could be taken away from them if they used it 
irresponsib~. The final settlement of the land question, however, was left 
to the future constituent assembly. Finally, peoples• courts were established 
and all officials, including teachers and militia officers were electdd.49 
These and other such popular governments were quickl.y destroyed when the al'llliY 
returned to restore order but they did represent the Bolshevik ideal of a 
revolutionary peasant committee. 
Unfortunately for the Bolsheviks, these instances of peasant revolu-
tiona.ry were rare exceptions rather than the rule in the Russian countryside. 
Instead of a well-organized revolution by self-governing communities, November 
of 1905 saw a wave of violence sweep across most of the rural areas of Russia. 
The more moderate instances of lawbreaking were the cutting of wood and graz-
ing of animals on estate lands w1 thout the payment of a fee, the stealing of 
grain and hay, the threatening of agricultural laborers who remained at work, 
and the evasion of taxes. However, most regions were beset by more violent 
manifestations of peasant discontent. Assaults at agricultural day-laborers 
that remained at work, the wrecking of farm machinery, the theft of livestock, 
grain, hay, and food stores, the looting of manor ho11ses, the destruction of 
entire estates, the beating and expulsion of village elders and police chiefs, 
the clashes with police and Cossacks, which defended the estates, and evan 
aurder became widespread in the Baltic region, central Russia, the northern 
-
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Ukraine, the Volga region, the Urals, and, of course, Georgia. Even in the 
Baltic region, where numerou.s villages had established self-government peace ... 
fully, theee was a wave of violence 1n November. In that one month, 2)0 
estates were destrpyad. in Lithuania, 229 in Courland, and 197 in Estonia.50 
Two centers of the greatest violence were the Sara.tov province on the middle 
Volga and the Chernigov province in the northern Ukraine. In the Sara.tov 
province alone, about )00 estates were levelled during November.51 Chernigov 
remained quiet during Noveniber, but in December there was a rash of clashes 
between peasants and Cossacks. In wevtern Georgia, peasant guerrilla warfare 
reached a new peak. Late in October, the Rad Hundreds ambushed a Cossack 
prison det1.il 1n£11ct1ng seventy oa.su .. '.ties on the Cossacks.52 Bolshevik 
agitators oalling for the organization of revolutionar.y peasant committees 
weee lost in a sea or non-party agitators including doctors, agronomists, and 
even priests, calling for attacks on the government and the landlords,but 
gave no definite revolutionary directives. Socialist-Revolutionaries set an 
example of widesprN.d terrorism against government officials. but, aaoording 
to tha 3olsheviks, they did not preach the actual overthrow of the tsarist 
government or the establishment of a democratic republio. Peasant unions 
accepted resolutions approving the seizure of land by the peasantr,y but said 
nothing definite about the overthrow or the Tsar. Some Sooialist-Ravolution-
arias stirred up disorga.n1zed violence among the peasants by travelling around 
the countryside in generals' uniforms and telling the peasants that the Tsar 
-
50Iakovlev, Vooruzhenie Vosstaniia, pp. 410-411. 
Slvysshii Pod' em Revollqtsi;1. II, pp. 771-77). 
52 Akhun, BO!va.ia. Deia:telnost, P• ,;o. 
--~-
had giv•;)n ther~l the lrtnd but naeded the help of hi:. loyal su':ljects to seize 
it fro~tl the landlords. Such methods did stir the peasants to violence but 
not to revolution against the tsarist government. In fact, most or the 
peasant violence was motivated not by a desire to overthrow the government 
but by the prospect of personal gain or revenge--in short, crime. Instances 
of cooperation with the proletariat, such as the bringing of food to strikar.s 
in urban al~eas "Wal"e rare. Indiscrimi.nate murders weremore oor·mon, as, .for 
it'lstanoe, si.""C agi t.<t tors of revolutionary parties wr.a killad by the peasants 
themselves in the Saratov province during Novamber of 1905.53 Durine that 
same month. VJ.adL'llir Voitinskii, a Bolshevik agitator operating in the village 
of Chorino, near St. Petersburg, folln(l the peasants to be in a violent mood 
but 11nwilling to reject God or the Tsar. They were very unresponsive to his 
:mc:>sage and he was only rescued by tsarist troops while the peasants wers 
atte .. upting to blind him with a splinter • .54 
The agrarian revolts of 1905, therefore, oonstitutad more of a orime 
wave than a revolution and were of 11 ttla help to the urban revolutionary 
movement. Order was tamporarily restored 1.."1 December. but in 1906, the .Empire 
was sv;ppt by e•Mn more serio11s peasant revolts. However, these also came to 
nothing. The lack of organized cooperation between the peasants and the urban 
proletariat was one of the main causes or the failure of the revolution ot 
1905. 
vfuile the Bolsheviks u&re ooo~pied in 1nriltratine, soviet3, encoura~in5 
the organization or peasant comm.ittass, agitating the soldiers. and, in 
general. preparing for the armed uprising, the Menshevik-do:mina ted St. Peters-
n. P• 773. 
burg Soviet was pushing the workers and the government toward a ooll1s1ort 
between themselves. Early in November the workers began implementing the 
eight hour day by revolutionary means, which meant that they just dropped their 
work a:f'ter eight hours. Hany of the Soviet• s deputies, and especially the Bol-
sbaviks hesitated to begin a struggle against the capitalists before they had 
gotten rid of the tsar1st government. The spontaneous pressure of the workers 
for a struggle to better their eoonomio oondition, however, was so strong. 
tha.t no elected body oould oppose it and retain the support of the workers. 
Consequently, against the better judgement of most of the deputies, the Smet 
decreed the eight-hour day in St. Petersburg. S.S Moreover, prestige and 
sympa. thy forced the Soviet into add1 tiol"al economic struggles against the 
St. Petersburg industrialists. On November 2, a political strike was called 
to protest the government's treatment of tb.a mutineers in Kronstadt a:nd the 
establishment of martial law in Warsaw. The str1ke involved some 11,5,000 
workers but it soon died out and had to be called off on November 7. On 
November 16, the St. Petersburg Soviet again became involved in a strike moTe-
ment when it declared its support of the All-Russian Post and Telegraph strike 
though the strike had been initiated without prel.im1nary consultation With th.e 
Soviet and c:ame too soon after the poli t1oal strike in St. Petersburg which 
had eneded on November 7. Many in the Soviet, especially Trotskii realized 
that too frequent use of the general strike cheapened it as a political weapon 
and weakened the proletariat tor its final struggle against the government.S6 
In addition to the :fOlitioal strike, the Soviet had othermeans of 
S.SB. Patrc.w-Radin, "Borba za Vosemoba.sov.nyi Raboohi Den," Istoriia Sove'b 
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resisting government authori~. It exercised an effective resistance to the 
lim1 ted government censorship which remained after October 17. Printers were 
ordered to strike against all papers conforming to the government's censorship 
laws and the workers were all called on to boycott such papers. In the mean-
time, the workers printed the Soviet• s "Bulletin" without government inter-
ferenoe. 
Nor was the Soviet uninterested in revolution and absorbed tin an eeonomic 
struggle against the St. Petersburg industrialists as most Communist historian 
have maintained. As a whole, the Soviet recognized the eventual need and in-
evitabili ty of an armed uprising. Throughout its existence it aimed to organ-
ize and arm the workers by collecting arms and money and calling on all the 
workers to make their own weapons of cold steel. Some success was achieved. 
Several hundred revolvers were distributed among the Soviet's deputies for 
their own protection while about 6,000 workers did manage to arm themselves 
with homemade pikes and bludgeons. However, the St. Petersburg t~rkers '~r• 
certainly not so well armed that they could hope to successfully overthrow the 
government. Ac' t:1.a strike movement -4ragged on, contributions fo.r weapons were 
reduced to a trick~t+:: and it became evident tha. t the workers could hope to 
revolt successfully only with the support of rebellious army units.57 If 
Trotskii and many other deputies opposed an armed uprising at the time, it 
was not that they were anti-revolutionary but that they ltere realistic. 
Heanwhile, the Bolsheviks ware not idle. More factory and street gather-
ings were held. New political olubs were opened. Ta.ld.n~ advantage of.' the new 
liberties, granted with the October Manifest, the Bolsheviks began publishing 
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their first legal newspaper, Hovaia Zhizn (New Life), under the editorship 
of ~~xim Gorkii, Leonid Krasin. and Maxim Litvinov. The general format of 
Novaie. Zhizn was similar to that of Vpered. and Proletaryii: lea.dine art1.eles 
on current events and condemnations of the government or other parties; de-
ciaions of the Central Committee; telegrams of disturbances in other towns 
in Russ~:./'.; correspondence of party members and workers relating their axper-
iences L~ their work or the social conditions of the working peasants, and 
soldiers in their localities; and even some articles on the arts.58 Tffben 
Lenin arrived from S ritzerland to St. Petersburg by way of Sweden, Novaia 
!h,.izn practically became the Bolsheviks' central organ. It was a great tri-
urnph for Lenin to be able to edit his paper in the capital of Russia and he 
soon set himself to the task of urging the enlargement of the Bolshevik organ-
iza tion by including more workers in the party a.nd reaching some sort of 
arrangement with the Mensheviks. Lenin's first article in the new paper ap-
peared on Novem~r 10, and called for the inclusion of more workers in the 
party to give it some needed bulk. 
By this ti~q he had lost his fAar that the swellinr, of the party's ranks 
by any but the most 'ievoted and ideologically pure members might dilute the 
strength of the party. He hoped that 1 t would be the other way 11round--tha t 
the older par~ members might be able to eduoate the workers to a higher leveJ 
of political consciousness if they were all in the same organization. Lenin' s 
support of a mass membership and elected leadership did not mean the abandon-
aent of a conspirator,y apparatus of the party. bgt that the Bolsheviks could 




K£BS, Jol:ib.evistl:aia Pecha t' (:.'i.OSoow, 1960) II, PP• 1!~9-208. 
prevented the implementation of Lenin's ideas in most branches of the party 
59 
and it remained a substantially centralized and conspiratorial organization. 
While both the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in St. Petersburg grew more 
militant, neither the government nor the factory owners remained passive. The 
factory owners combatted the Soviet's campaign for an eight-hour d&y with a 
general lock out which did much to weaken the ardor and strength of the mass 
of St. Petersburg's industrial force. The government, meanwhile took more 
direct action against the Soviet. Annoyed by the Soviet• s support of the 
.r·os t and Telegraph opera tor's strike, whioh had begun on November 16, Count 
~Iitte, and the minister of the Interior, General TrepoY, had the president 
of the Soviet, Khrusta.lev-Nosar', arrested. This step did not disorganize 
the Soviet for a II Presidium'' composed or Trotskii, Zlidiev' a Henshevik, and 
the Bolshevik, SverchkOY was soon elected. The arrest of Khrusta.lev-Nosar' 
far from eased the situation but incited a. furor within the Soviet against 
the government. 
There was a brief argument in the Soviet. The Bolshevik delegates and 
many Mensheviks called for an immediate general strike. Trotsldi, however, 
sided with the Socialist--Revolutionary deputies who opposed an imm.edia. te UP-
rising at the time and feared that a general strike certainzy would bring 
about a premature revolt. The workers were poorly armed and there was no 
sign of a military revolt. Trotskii therefore wisely proposed that such dras-
tic action as a. general strike or an armed uprising be postponed until a more 
favorable moment and hoped that the government might release Khrusta.lev-Nosar' 
anyway thus giving the Soviet a great morll victory without an immediate con-
-·••-c._._ ___________________________ _ 
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flict. 60 No definite decision was yet taken on the question of an armed UP-
rising, but on December 2, the Soviet retaliated against the government by 
issuing the 11Finanoial Hanifest'' based on the idea of the :i•lenshevik, Helphand 
(Parvus), that the government might be destroyed or very seriously weakened 
by bankruptcy. To prevent the governJUent from paying the large war debt 
it had incurred against Japan and to paralyze it by depriving it of the reve-
nue necessary to carr,/ out its regular funoti,ons, the 1111a.nifest" called en all 
the people to withold taxes and all payments due to the government, demand 
that all wages be paid in gold, or ooin for amounts of less than five rubl&s, 
and that everyone withdraw their deposi tes from government banks. The 
"Hanifest" was signed by the Soviet and the central oommittees of the all-
Russian Peasants' Union, the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Soaialist-Ravolutionaries 
e: 
and of the Polish Socialist Party. 
The "Uanifest" must certainly have touched the government in a sensitive 
spot, for on the next day, Deoember J, Trotskii, the rest of the Soviet's 
Presidium, and almost 2.50 deputies within the Soviet were arrested. \oJ'hat was 
left of the Soviet met a few days la tar and called for a general strike to 
start on December 8 as the beginning of a struggle for a constituent assembly, 
civil liberties, freedom of expression, the ending of martial law throughout 
the Empire, amnes~ for all political prisoners, the transference or all the 
land to the people, and the eight-hour day. By December 9, llO,OOO workers 
were on strike in St.· Petersburg. There. were nwnerous parades, demonstrations 
revolutionar,y speeches, and isolated clashes with the police and Cossacks, but 
-
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nothing decisive could be done by the workers without the news of an important 
revolutionary victory elsewhere in Russia. The news of a victorious uprising 
in another important canter never oame, however. TirEid try numerous demonstra-
tions and strikes in }lovamber and lacking firearr.1s, most of the workers grad-
ually lost interest in the strike and by Decatlber 20, practically all of the 
62 
workers of St. Petersburg ware back at work. ~ 
Lenin and most of the other Bolsheviks of the Central and St. Petersburg 
Committees, meanwhile, fled to Finland, where a Bolshevik conference was held 
at, Tammenfors, December 12-17. The most im.por:tant decisions reached were 
rather inconsequential as far as the revolutionary movement of 1905 ~das con-
cerned. The decision to fuse the3olshevik Central Cor.nuittee and the DHanshe-
vik Organizational Committee in order to arrange a fourth party oongress to 
reunite the two factions had importance for the next year, while the command 
to all local committees to prepare for an immediate armed uprising and to 
notify the Central Committee when they were ready came rather late to have 
any meaning. 63 Other cities in the Empire were already rising agiinst the 
government though St. Petersburg was to remain quiet for the rest of 1905. 
62 
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CHAPTER V 
TH!!: AruiED UPRISINGS 
There would be no armed uprising in St. Petersburg in 1905, but many· 
other Russian cities, especially .M.oscow, were to be the scene of clashes 
betw"aen the government and revolutionary forces. Rebellion among the garrison 
troops signall&d the beginning of the conflict in Moscow. The scene of this 
beginning was the barracks of the Rostov regiment which made up part of the 
garrison in 11oscow. This military unit was already riddled with dissatis ... 
faction. It had bean used to :restore order in Sevastopol in November and this 
experience had disgusted many of the men with the government. 1Jithin the reg-
ime.nt were a Bolshevik, a Henshevik, and a Socialist-Revolutionary circle, 
each wf which held frequent meetings, distributed revolutionary literature, 
and provoked the officers in taking ~requent discliplinary measures. On 
December 2, at the instigation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, part of the 
regiment arrested three of its officers, forbade other officers to approach 
the barracks, and elected a twenty-man commission representing each company to 
aot as the regimental executive commission. After taking possession of the 
regimental arsenal and food stores, the soldiers announced they would no 
longer carry out police duties against their own people, and demanded better 
tre•tment, abolition of the death penaltzy', amnesty for aU political prisoners, 
treedo.'!l of discussion of soldiers' needs. and the sh 
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3srvice. The next day, an a~~ soviet representing the Rostov regiment, tha 
Go:>sacks and artillery-men, and units from six other regiments was organize1. 
Civilian 3olshevik agitators also atte.ndad the meeting of the army soviet 
and urged cooperation and solidarity between the lllTv and the proletariat. 
For their ~~rt, most of the soldiers promised they would not take any action 
.:t.gainst the workers if they revolted while some even promised to join and a"'Td 
the workers if the Hoscow Soviet called for a general strike and uprising. · 
That same day, December 3, the news of the arrest of the St. Petersburg 
Soviet arrived in Moscow and, of course, cau.sed an outburst of indignation 
in the Moscow Soviet. 1r1ith the garrison in 1•evolt and the people in a revolu-
tionary mood, the fifteen-member Bolshevik }foscow Committee thought it time 
to hold a conference and make a momentous decision on the question of a final 
armed uprising. On December 4, the Moscow Committee, representatives from the 
Central Committee, and heads of the arirzy" agitation in department and the com-
bat staff met secretly in a rented apartment. The question on everyone's mind 
was, 11 Is this the right moment to begin the uprising?" One representative 
of the Central Committee, I.A. Sammer, who had just come from St. Petersburg 
with instructions. did not make it any easier to arrive at a. decision. He 
announced that the Central Committee suggested that the Moscow COllllllittee take 
the initiative in beginning the armed uprising which was to sweep all Russia 
since the Central Comid ttee had more confid.enca in the Moscow Conuni ttee than 
in any other. However, this was only a suggestion and the final decision still 
rested with the Hoscow Committee. And it was a difficult decision to make. 
There was considerable division and debate among the Bolsheviks, and a lead~ 
-
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mu,,i'u~:n· of the 3olshevik comba. t staff, !1oi. Vasil.Lev-Iuzhin, one of the Bol-
->hcvik representatives on the executive board of the Eoscow Soviet, urged 
that the Hosco11f COF..t:Ltittee immediately call all the soldiers and workers to 
join in an armad uprising. V .L. Shantser, also a me:nber of the Soviet's 
executive c~~ttee and the Bolshevik combat staff, doubted that the rest 
of the anr~ would support the uprising and urged that the Moscow Bolsheviks 
~'lold the soldiers and wo1•kers in readiness. but wait for instructions froiu 
the Central Committee. R.S. Zemliachka opposed an uprising at the time for 
she thought the supply of firearn1~ to be insufficient and suggested that the 
Jolsheviks save their strength for another occasion. Though this probably 
would have been the correct decision, other factors made it difficult to 
arrive at. That vary day, the Soviet had called upon all the people of 
Hoscow to prepare for a general strike and an uprising. The working class 
of 1'1oscow was in a mill tant mood. It the Bolsheviks did not taka the lead 
1n the matter of an armed uprising, the workers might stage a rising without 
their leadership and bring disaster on the revolutionary movement and disgrace 
to the party. If the Bolsheviks did take the lead and initiated an uprising, 
what wera the chances of a revolutionary victory? Kudriavtsev, one of the 
Bolshevik combat experts, provided some figures for encouragement. He calcu-
lated the revolutionary forces to consist of 300 armed Bolsheviks, 300 Social ... 
1st-Revolutionaries, 100 Mensheviks, 150 students, and 150 or 200 armed men 
of other or no groups at all. However, Kudriavtsev hoped that as the fight 
went on, others would join. }'lost of those at the conference had their doubts 
&bout the success of the revolution. Zemliaohka oast grave doubt on the 
6 "'h-o:.t·1~ of the uprising by the soldiers and by the rest of Russia. Many 
shared h&r doubts and the conference voted, twenty to seven to delay the call 
...... 
for a general strike and an armed uprising and wait for further instructions 
from the Central Committee or to see what course the mood of the workers would 
2 taka. Throughout the rest of December 4, the Bolsheviks even attempted to 
delay the Moscow Soviet's decision on a general strike so that they could 
discuss the matter further among the workers in the factories and wait for 
an answer from the Central Committee. They found the workers to be in an 
angry mood over the arrest of the St. Petersburg Soviet and expecting the aid 
of the army. ~vi th the workers and the soldiers in such a revolutionary mood, 
the Bolsheviks could not pass such an opportunity up. H.I. Vasil'ev-Iuzbin 
brought up the question of the situation in the army. He estimated that of 
the almost 15, 000 troops in the Moscow area, the government oould rely on only 
4,000. Most of the rest would certainly refuse to shoot at the workers, but 
they would not join the revolutionary movement unless they were sure of a 
strong and determined effort on the part of the workers. If the Bolsheviks 
passed up this opportunity, would the army ever be in such a mood again? It 
was a difficult situation. The soldiers would not rise unless they wre sure 
the workers bad really risen. Yet how oould the workers rise if they were 
not sure of the soldier's support? Consequently, on Deoember 5th an all-
oi ty conferenoe of Bolsheviks deoided to reoOimllend to the Soviet that 1 t begin 
the general strike on December 7 and to call for an armed uprising in the name 
of the Moscow COimllittee.3 It was their most fateful deoision of the year. 
The Bolshevik decision to take up arms was also supported by the Mensha-
-
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viks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. All of them pressed for a resolution 
which wa.s adopted unanimously in the Hoscow Soviet on December 6. 
In Petersburg the Soviet of ~iorkers Deputies bas been arrested, 
gatherings are being dissolved; we are prepared to answer this provoca-
tion by the government with a general strike, hoping that it can and 
should turn into an armed uprising. The Moscow Soviet of l·lorkers• 
Deputies, the Committee and Group of the Russian Sooial-Dtmocra tic Part;y • 
and the Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party declare: To 
announce in Moscow on December 7 at 1.2 o'clock a general political s triln~ 
and to strive to convert it into an armed uprlsing.4 
A leanet issued on the same day by the Moscow Soviet and the revolutionary 
parties called the soldiers to join the movement. 
Comrades Soldiers! You are our blood brothers and chUdren, 
together w1 th us of the same mother, long-suffering Russia. You already 
know of this and are confirming it by your participa. tion in the general 
struggle • Today when the proletariat announces the deciding war to 
the hateful enel!\Y of the people--the tsarist government--act with de-
termination and courage. Refuse to submit to your bloodthirs~ comman-
ders, chase them away and arrest them; elect from your own midst re-
liable leaders, and with arms in bands unite with the rising people! 
Together with the working class obtain the dissolution of the standing 
arm;y and obtain the arming of the people and the abo11tion of mi11tary 
courts and martial law.5 
But even as the Bolsheviks and other revolutionary groups were commi ttin 
themselves to a conflict with the government and calling on all the people to 
join them, the favorable situation began to deteriorate. While the Bolsheviks 
4 ~· P• 151. 
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sants would join in the struggle. Therefore, ,he urged an immediate uprising. 
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and other revolutionaries were deciding whether they should begin the armed 
uprising or not, the revolutionary spirit in the army declined. In many of 
the regiments the officers promised to improve living oonditions, raised 
monthly pay, and distributed liquor to partially satisfy the troops and get 
them to betray the agitators among them. Some battalions in even the most 
rebellious regiments refused to join the movement and now the rest of the 
units returned to duty. Though they were still not considered reliable, there 
6 
was no longer a danger of a rising among the troops. 
On the day that the general strike began another disaster struok the 
revolutionary cause. Two of the leading members of the Bolshevik combat 
staff, Vasilievich-Iuzhin and Shantser, had previously worked out a plan to 
seize the Governor-General's home, the Kremlin, and all the telegraph offices, 
banks , and. railroad stations in order to take power in Moscow. However, just 
as these two Bolsheviks were conferring with Henshevik and Socialist-Revolu-
tionary combat leaders, all of them were arrested by the police. The two 
Bolsheviks were jailed while the others were later released, thus depriving 
the Bolsheviks of a coherent tactical plan and some of its best central 
leadership. 7 
~1/ithout the support of the army the situation did not look too favorable 
for the Bolsheviks or abe other revolutionaries. Against the 4,000 or 5,000 
reliable soldiers and 2,000 policemen the revolutionaries could muster about 
250 Bolsheviks, 200 1-1ensheviks, 150 Sooialist-Revolutionaries, and 250 others 
including a student organization, the Caucasian brotherhood, and some non-pa.rtJ 
/ 
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volunteers and anarchist groups. A l:Lenshevik source, Gimer, whose work was 
published in 1906 and has since been lost, and Trotsld.i agree with these 
figures for the most part though they add one or two hundred Socialis~Revol-
8 
utionaries and non-party volunteers. At any rate there wre not more tb.a.n 
1,000 armed and organized revolutionaries in 11oscow at the time. Perhaps 
),000 or even 6,000 others followed the combatants, hoping to pick up weapons 
from fallen comrades or soldiers. Litvin-Sedoi, the Bolshevik chief of s&aff 
in the Presnia District on the west side of Nosoow, estimates that the arms 
available to the rebels consisted of perhaps 200 rifles, soma of them Winches-
tars, and 500..600 revolvers, most of them Brow.n.ings, and about 30 low grade 
bombs.9 This is a conservative estimate, but it was evident that the revolu-
tionary forces were badly armed. This revolutionary a~ was under the loose 
control of a war council made up of combat leaders from the revolutionary 
parties and headed by Litvin-Sedoi. Attached to this starr were a medical 
department, a financial department, arxi a mechanical department for the re-
pair of weapons. 
On December 7 the General strike started. The Moscow Soviet ordered 
all stores ~ enterprises to be closed b~ the workers, except such essential 
enterprises as the gas works and food stores. Those enterprises which were 
allowad to remain open ware warned not to charge the more than the usual pri-
ces and to grant the strikers cr!).:ii t. To make the strike felt even more 
10 
widely the Soviet called on all tenants to stop paying rent. 
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The fighting started on the day after the beginning of the general 
strike. It started off in a desultory fashion--nothing like the surprise 
coup against all strategic points as Ve.sillevieh-Iuzhnin had planned. Rather 
than a concentrated effort against strategic points, the rebels carried out 
a scattered and uncoordinated campaign of attacks on small groups of police-
men and army officers and burglarized gun shops in the dark. For the first 
two days, they still sought to win the soldiers over to their side and tried 
t.o tAlk to them and give them leaflets rather than attack them. However, 
Admiral Dubasov kept the :most unreliable elements of the garrison within the 
barracks. The soldiers who did patrol the streets did not usuallY fire at 
the workers' gatherings or at the revolutionaries except in self defence, 
but they refused to give the rebels their arms, accept their leaflets, or 
even talk to them. 
On December 9, the first barricades began to appear in ::-fosoow. !-1ost of 
these were built in the i'tl.iusk Park, Tver Boulevard and Square, the Triumphal 
Gate and Strastnaia Square in a rough pattern which seemed to indicate that 
the revolutionaries W$re trying to aut off the center of the city from the 
11 
outer districts. However, there was no coordination between the rebel 
units. The war council lost contact with the separate districts and no coo-
rdinated offensive could be taken against any strategic point. The railroad 
workers did take all the railroad s'vations except the Nikolaevsk Station which 
11 Garvi, the leader of the Presnia }1ansheviks says there was a definite 
Plan and order in the construction of the barricades. Vospanima~ Sgtsial-
Q._emokrata., p. 629. V. Zenzinov, the leader of the Sooialist.-Revolutionary 
detachments, says the barriaa.des were constructed haphazardly and spontaneous-
ly, more for moral effect than for actual use in defense, Parezhitoe, p. 225. 
Perhap3 there was a vague plan in building the barricades, but the lack of 
ooordination betwe~n the various districts did not allow the oonstruction of 
a tidv net.wn"rk nf h,q,.....-l ... at"t.:o., 
was the terminal for the railroad connection with St. Petersburg. Haphazard 
attempt were made b,y the Bolsheviks and Socialist-Havolutionaries to seize 
this station and several ilanks, but all these '!'Jere made in such a piecemeal 
and disconnected manner, that they were easily repelled. On DitoeL'l.ht~r 9 and 
10, some military units took the offensive, and, placing artillery on the 
tver and Strastnaia squares, fired down the length of the boulevards clearing 
barricades w1 th shells and caseshot. or course, the military and polioe for-
cas were too small to occupy the entire city and often barricades sprang up 
in the same places where they had been cleared. However, the army also had 
its successes. The "Aquarium" Theater was cleared of demonstrating crowds 
and armed anarchists. On December 9, the Fidler school, where hundreds of 
revolutionaries had gathered for a general descent upon the police, was 
surrounded by the army and shelled. When the defenders surrendered after 
some ineffective shooting and bomb-throwing. it was a grave defeat for the 
revolutiona~J forces for anywhere from 120 to ;oo prisoners, most of them 
Socialist-Revolutio..l'laries, were taken. 
In such a situation, the revolutionaries adopted partisan tactics hoping 
to wear down the army and eventually take over the stra tegio points in the 
city. On December 11, the Moscow Committee issued a leaflet advising the 
revolutionaries to operate in small units: 
1. The first rule--do not aot in crowds, work in small details 
of three or four men, not mora. Let there be as many of these details 
as possible and let them learn to attack quicklY and disappear quickly. 
The police strives to shoot crowds of thousands of people with a hun-
dred Cossacks. To fall on a hundred is easier than on one, especially 
if that one shoots and escapes unnoticed. The pollee and army will be 
helpless if all Moscow is covered with these small and elusive dete.ils. 
2. In addition comrades, do not take up fortified positions. 
The army always attempts to take them or si:rn.ply' destroy them with 
artillery. Let our £ortresses be passable yards and all places from 
which we oan shoot and escape easily. It they take such a place, they 
will not find anyone there 1 and will lose many ot their own. It is 
impossible to take them all, for to do that it wuld be necessary to 
settle every heme with a Cossack. 
3· Therefore, canrades, it aeyone should call you to go in a 
great crowd or to take a fortified place 1 can.sider him a fool or a 
provoeator. It he is a fool, don't listen to him. If a provocator 
--kill ••• 
The leaflet went on to suggest that the revolutibries attack soldiers only 
in self-defence, but that they unhesitatingly kill officers, Cossacks, and 
high-ranking policemen or those known to have been cruel to the workers •32 
For the most part, the revolutionaries followed this advice 1 sniping, running, 
and attacking individual officers and policemen. Barricades were not serious 
ly defended 1 but only used to slow UP cb.Srging troops so that they would pro• 
vide better targets. The revolutionaries did have Bale manents of success. 
In one instance they captured an artillery piece but then found they did not 
know how to operate it. At the same time, costly mistakes were also made by 
the rebels. They paid a high IU"ice learning that soldiers were accurate 
shots at a far greater distance than poUcemen. To add to the rebels' mis• 
fortunes, the town duma an December 13 armed 2800 volunteers to combat the 
revolutionary forces and another 1000 to guard the strategic points in the 
city. By December 32 1 camnunicaticms between the rebel combat units in the 
various districts bad practically dissolved and what was lett of the revolu• 
tionary forces spontaneously drifted to Premia, one of the main warkers' 
districts on the west side of town.13 Here 1 z. Litvin•Sedoi, who had lost 
contact vith the Central Committee and most other revolutionary tmits in 
Moseov, took charge of about 400 armed and 800 t.m8l'med men ot all parties, 
including the units led by E. Desser1 a Bolshevij., P. Oervi, a Menshevik, 
l2 
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and I. Dubrovinsk1i 1 a Soc1alist-Revolut101'.1.8.rY 1 the Menshevik Pchelka group, 
and the Socialist-Revolutionary Medvedev group. Litv1n•Sedoi set up his 
headquarters in Presn1a1 complete with a military court vhich did have the 
opportunity to pass a death sentence. Other "executions" were less formal. 
Lt.tvin•Sedoi himself led a band which d.isamed a Cossack colonel and shot 
him. Sakhar, a policeman regarded with great hatred among the workers 1 was 
shot without a trial by the Bolsheviks Who feared that the Mensheviks would be 
too "soft" to carry out the execution. other policemen, officers, and Cossack 
who were foolish enough to surrender met similar ends. 
While the fighting was concentrating arOWld Presnia, M. Liadov was sent 
by the Moscow Canmittee to st.. Petersburg to inform the Central Camnittee ot 
events 1n Moscow. On the way he saw that the St. Petersburg Moscow railroad • 
was working at full capacity shipping troops to Moscow. When Lenin heard this 
he exploded at Krasin, the head of' the Central Committees technical group 
which had the duty of mining the tracks to Moscow. Krasin came up with sane 
lame excuse about his men losing their way 1n the dark end Vhat actualcy 
happened was never cleared up. The result was that Lenin and the Central Com• 
mittee ordered that the action in Moscow be broken off' 1n an orderly manner 
in order to save the Bolsheviks' strength for a future ris1ng.14 
On the night of December 15 the Semenovsld and ladoga Regiments 1 both 
completely reliable units, arrived in Moscow fran St. Petersburg. The next 
day Presnia was cut off tran the rest of the city and shelled severely. Many 
ot the men were demoralized not anly because they were surrounded and shelled 
but also, the workers of many factories, newspapers, and electric plants were 
l4 








back at work since December 15 and it looked as if the defe11ders of Presnia 
had been betrayed. Dosser, one of Litvin•Sedoi's Bolshevik lieutenants, 
urged him to order the men to hide the 1r arms and scatter so that they vould 
be available for a future rising. Litvin•Sedoi wanted to hold out a little 
longer 1 hoping that the newly-arrived troops were tmreliable and fearing that 
ending the struggle in Moscow might betray the other uprisings going on in 
the empire at the t 1me. But when late on December 16 he saw that most of 
the Moscow proletariat was back at vork he saw the wisdom of the Mensheviks' 
viewpoint and ordered bhe men to stash their arms w'.aere they could find them 
again and to filter out of the district, througb. the troops, as best they 
could. The next day, amid heavy shelling, the rebels hid their arms in variou 
places, and one by one, they stole away. On December lB the soldiers charged 
into the district as the revolutionaries had expected and found hardly anyone. 
The uprising in Moscow was over. On that day the Soviet issued the leaflet 
telling the workers they had not been supported by the rest of Russia nor by 
15 
the e.rrrr:1 and that they should return to work and prepareufor the next rising. 
I£ the uprising was through the Bolsheviks were not. A laat'let issued 
by the MoscOW' Committee late 1n January of l9o6 struck a defiant note. The 
events of the past month had shown everyone that liberty could only be won by 
an armed uprising. In conclusion the leaflet read, 
The December rising 1n Moscow has shown that the victory of the 
working class iss possible and near. 
It is necessary to prepe.re t:ar another struggle. 
One more great, cooperative, ganeral effort of the Russian prole• 
tariat and victory is ours. 
Canrades, let us all tmite together, and step under the red 
15 
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barmer of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party for the \mt'emit-
ting struggle with the arbitrariness, force, and lawlessness of the 
Tsa:!ist government. 
Long live the ~d uprising~ 
Long live the popular constituent assembly and the democratic republic 1 
Long live the Russian Soctal-Democratic Labor Party! 
16 
Of' course 1 the Moscow uprising could not avoid having its repercussions 
in the rest of the lhptr.. Like ripples :frau a disturbance in the water 1 an 
ever-widening circle of rebellion SPf."ead :from the heart of Russia, to the 
rest of the .Qnp1re. In N1zhni Novgorod a general strike vas called on Decem-
ber 7 in cooperation with the Moscow strike. On December l2 workers clashed 
with Cossacks and patriotic demonstrators. For the next tw days combat units 
of Bolsheviks and other revolutionaries follom:rd the same tactics as the Mos• 
cow revolutionaries-•sn1p:l.ng1 attacking in mall groups, and running from 
house to house. Sane fortUied a three•story school building and repulsed 
Cossack attacks inf'licting sane ninety casull.ties on them. When tha army 
trained artillery on the school on December 14, the rebels quickly evacuated 
the school and the disorder quickl.;r died down. As :tn Moscow, the revolution• 
aries, led by the BolShevik· $ema.Shko1 failed to seize the strategic points in 
the city such as the teJAgrapb. office, arsenal, ar a bank.17 
In the Urals, the Bolshevik stronghold, events followed the same general 
pattenn. In Ufa 1 the Bolshevik-dominated soviet called a general strike on 
December 7 in support of the Moscow striloa. When sane of the Bolsheviks kid• 
napped a hsndtul of Cossacks the troops outside of tovm. opened fire an the 
shops and the rebels scattered into the hills. At the munitions plant in 
Motovilikh, the Bolsheviks began hostilities by attacking and disarming police • 
16Ib:t.d. I. P• 757. 
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men. Hmrever, out of e. wor?~ force of 10,000 they could only arm 300 men • 
.As in Moscow the Bolsheviks built a few barricades and did a lot of sniping. 
After they tried and failed to seize sane of the strategic poiuts in the area, 
most of them were surrounded and captured. In general, tr...e rising workers 
in the Ural towns received no support from the army or the peasantry. The 
Bolsheviks were totally unprepared to lead an armed Ullt"ising in the Urals, 
especially since they lacked firearms, yet they ~elt they should show some 
support of the Moscow uprising lest the workers be demoralized 
1 
even it the 
18 ) 
rising was hopeless. 
In the Ukraine and the Don Basin, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks cooperated 
in staging numerous and bloody uprisings. In Kharkov the Bolsheviks and Men-
sheviks in the Federated Jtoviet could not agree when to start the general 
strike and many Bolsheviks were arrested during the delay. On December 12 a 
crowd of workers preparing to seize the strategic points 1n the city were 
surrounded in the Gelferikh-Ba.de Factory. All attempts by large crowds to 
save the workers were repelled by gunfire. '!his group of Bolsheviks seemed 
to have everything going against them. The Menshevik-contJJOlled railroad 
workers refused to strike and let the soldiers in an the railroad. The 
troops which were thought to be lml"el1able fired at the workers despite report 
aboat their loyalty. The peasants who were stagings revolt in nearby Kup-
11ansk and Lebedin did not come to help. Finally, of course, there was the 
shortage of' arms. So 1 the combat groUPs in the factory surrendered. In 
Roatov on the Don a combat group of 400 men, mostly Social-Democrats but also 
including sane Socialist-Revolutionaries and students seized sane of' the 
18Bystrikh, Bolgvistskie Or1iiza.tsi1 Urals 1 pp. 226·235. 
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railroe.d statio:.1s end proe:eede'~ to d.isa:r"1 the :poliee ~nd Cossacks 1n the 
vicinity. The army restored order on December 15 by using artillery though 
Bolshevik grou:pn held the Temernik District and the suburb of Nakhichevani 
on the other side of the Don mt 11 December 21.19 
Even blood:i.Jrr co11flicts took. pla.ce on several stations on the rd.ilroad 
from Kllarkov to Rostov. One of t!1e bloodiest conf'licts of the revolution 
tool"' place at Gorlovka. Revolutionery combat units fran Debaltaevo, Enakievo, 
Ianisovotaia, Avdecvka, and. Gr:tshino,il <reased' greatly by a canbat group 
froiu Luga."l.sk1 led by Klement! VoroshiloT 1 the future World War II hero and 
red marshal, swelled the number of the rebels to 4,000 of which about a 100 
ha.J. rifles, 500 had revolvers and shotguns, and the rest were armed Yith 
hon1emade pikes, leadpipes, daggers, and tools. When this ho.rde charged the 
railroad station and the barracks the garrison fled. The soldiers returned 
the next day 1 December 181 w:i.th reenforcements consisting of Cossacks and 
dragoons and routed the rebels, killing about 200. Similar seizures of rail• 
rood atations by lare1! ccwoot groups took place all along the line vith s:bnila r-
results. It to noteworthy, ho'W'Ever, that this area was one of the few regions 
:i..n which :pcosunts coo~atea with the workers thus swelling the numbers of the 
rebels to several thousand. By seizing the rtilroad stations, the rebels 
planned to regulate traffic and especially to control the food supplies of 
the cities, obstru.ct troop movements, and shift thetr <nm reentarcements where 
they wre needed. The region of the eastern Ukraine and the Don Basin, there• 
tore presents a rare example of an nntire area, rather than one city, rebel• 






too poorly armed to win. 
In the central Ukraine the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in Aleksandrovska 
(today Zaporozhe) seized the railroad station and hospital. After heavy fir• 
ing and plenty of banb throwing, the station was retaken on December 14 with 
the death of' 300 workers making it one of' the bloodiest classes of the revol-
ul&ion. 
On the eastern coast of' the Black Sea the Bolsheviks participated in the 
creation of' the "Novorossisk Republic." When news of' the Moscow general 
strike arrived by telegraph on December 7 a soviet was organized. The next 
day it took over the town government, held new town duma elections in which 
all classes were to be represented, and organized a "people's court." During 
the next few days the Soviet taxed the rich to support the tmemployed 1 forci-
bly closed government liquor stores and other larger business enterprises 
while it regulated the prices of those it lett open. With a force of 300 to 
500 men of which a few had revolvers while the rest were armed with cold 
steel, the Soviet felt itself strong enough to begin requisitioning arms, 
threatening Liberi.l and conservative newspipers, a:nd demanding the gold de• 
posited in the local bank. However 1 either because its forces were too weak 
or because most of' the members of the Soviet wanted to establish a purely 
popular government, no attempt ws made to seize the bank, opposing newspepers, 
or to disarm guard units made up of the middle classes. When a troop train 
arrived and a battleship trained its guns onNo\a'oS.sk ~December 25 1 however 
the Soviet was its forces to be ridiculously weak and dissolved without resis-
20 
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tance. 
The situation was not so quiet in the Transcaucasian area. Peasant Red 
Hundreds and Bolshevik bands led by s. Ordzhonokidze attacked small military 
units, took over entire villages, raided government offices for arms and 
money, and stopped trains throughout western and central Georgia, and espec-
ialy around Soch11 Sukhum, Poti1 Kutaisi, and Gal:'i. In 'l'Ulis a Central 
strike Committee made up of eighteen Mensheviks and twi.lve Bolsheviks took ove !" 
the city's railroads permitting only provision necessary to the workers to 
enter the area. The entire Nadzal.adevi district was taken over by the Bolshe• 
vik, s. Ter•Petrosian (Kamo) who was later to become famous as the party's 
leading "expropriator" as a result ot his engineering the Great Tiflis Bank 
Robbery. 'l'b.e police we s chased out of the district and the administration 
taken over. However 1 troops returned to Tit lis on December 15. 'rhough there 
was no organized resistance there was plenty of sniping and ban"&-throwing 
by all the revolutionaries 1n TU'lis and order vas not canpletely restored 
there until December 29. Meanwhile, an a1'1117 led by Alikha.nov-Avarski carried 
22 
out a ruthlsss suppression of the peasant revolt 1n Georgia. 
In creating a revolutionary army and a provisional government the Bolshe • 
viks achieved their greatest success in Siberia along the 'lrans•Siberian 
Railroad. In Kras:noiarak a Soviet of Soldiers and Workers vas formed in 
early December. Seeing that there was no power in the vicinity to oppose it, 
the Soviet began to convert itself into a provisional government. All news• 
papers were camaanded to defy the censorship laws. The eight-hour day was 
2\rtsshi P~'em Revoliutsii, II, pp. 574-580. Iekovlev, VOQiFBHh!nnie 
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declared. All liquor shops were closed. The workers and soldiers themselves 
regulated railroad traffic. As time went on the Soviet took on even more 
governmental powers. The police was disarmed. Print shops were seized by 
the Soviet to print workers • papers. Democratic elections to the town duma 
were arranged. Finalq, the Soviet organized a workers' militia and levied 
taxes to provide it with arms. However, though the K'rasnoiarsk Soviet appro• 
ached the Bolshevik ideal of' a revolutionary provisional government, it fell 
short of the ideal in many respects. The soldiers, under the influence of 
Ku.zmin, one of' the Socialist-Revolutionary agitators within the army, held 
aloof' from the workers and refused to give them their arms, thus making it 
impossible to form a truly powerful workers• militia. On the other hand, 
the SOviet itself' hesitated before certain steps. The police was disarmed 
but not imprisoned. Instead of' spending more of its time and energy organiz• 
ing and training the workers and seizing the bank, arsenal, and p.rison, the 
Soviet spent most of its time arranging and campaigning in the town dtm'18 elec-
tion 'Which it wanted to make a model democratic government. 
The weakness of' the United Soviet of' Soldiers and Workers became appar-
ent when the Krasnoiarsk Regiment returned tran duty in Western Siberia and 
restored the town's print shops to its owners. The rebellious soldiers rep• 
resented in the Soviet either lost their nerve or did not wish to tire on 
their fellow soldiers and most of' them surrendered their arms to the Krasnoi• 
arsk Regiments. The workers also lost their nerve and limited their action 
to throwing leaflets at the newly-arrived troops. Even the Bolshevik Melnikov 
advised against violence because or the insufficiency of arms among the 
workers. The situation became even more impossible for the Soviet When the 
defeat of the Moscow insurrection released more government troops against the 
revolutionaries :1n Siberia. On January 1, 1906, a strong expedit6onary column 
under General Meller-Zakanelski arrived in Krasnoiarsk. The Soviet diesolved 
quickly enough but about 250 soldiers and 120 or the most revolutionary worker fl 
took refuge in the railroad machine shop building. T'u.ere they were pinned 
down by rifle fire and cut off frau. water and heat while the temperature 
dropped to --46° Centigrade. When they surrendered on January 31 the vorkers 
were released but the soldiers were held for severe punishment.23 
In Chita sa similar associaticm of soldil:rs and workers took over the 
regulation of traffic on the Trans-liberian Railroad. In taking control of 
the line, the Bolsheviks and their military allies hoped to spread dissatis• 
faction among the troops returning fran Manchuria, let the most dissatisfied 
and revolutionary elements pass into European Russia to aid the revolutionary 
cause , and obstruct the pa asage of loyal troops to the west • In contrast to 
the situation at Krasnoiarsk, the vrorkers in Chita did not suffer fran any 
shortage of arms. On December 5 a railroad shipnent of 800 rifles had been 
given by the soldiers to the railroad workers. In January thirteen wagons 
of arms and five of ammunitions were given to the railroad workers. With 
such an armed force the soldiers and workers defied not only the civil author• 
ities but also the military authorities by freeing several imprisoned sd.ilors4 
At the same time, the workers' militia policed the town and telegraph com• 
mtUlications vith imperial authorities were cut off. 
Despite the formidable power of the vrorkers and soldiers together, they 




6, 19061 General Rennelmmpf 1 who was to suffer the disaster at Masurian Lakes. 
in 1914-1 quickly arrested almost all the revolutionaries of all factions in 
Harbin and immediately set ou.t far Chi.ta vith six tra:f.nloo.ds of troops picked 
for their reliability, made up mostly of the 5th East Siberian Rifle division 
and 11th Siberian corps which had been convinced by the officers that they 
were not defending reaction but the tsarist goverment limited by the prin-
ciples of October 17. When the Chita rebels heard of the coming expedition, 
they mined the railroad near Chits and hoped this might stop the approaching 
force. However, mines not covered by fire are almost useless and Rennenkampf'' 
sappers had little trouble detecting them and clearing the railroad. The 
rebellious troops had no desire to combat Rennenkampf' s large force. The 
vorkers, led by the Bolsheviks V.K. Kurnatovski, I.V. Be.bushldn, and A.A. 
Kostiuzhko-Valiuzanich, sav themselves deserted by the troops and facing a 
large and well-armed force. The Bolshevik leaders, taking the size of the 
government forces and the workers' lack of experience in fighting, advised 
them to hide their weapons end scatter. This they did but Rennenlmmpf' s 
troops captured the Bolshevik leaders of the Chita Camnittee and shot most of 
them with and v:tthout court martials. The last Bol.sbevik uprising of the 
24 
revolution was thus snuffed out. 
Besides the armed uprisings in which the Bolsheviks participtted1 there 
were outbreaks of violence in IB.tv:ta., Finland, and a troops revolt in central 
Asia rlth which they had little or nothing to do. In addition to the armed 
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As the year 1905 drew to a close 1 the Tsarist government was still 
standing. To be sure 1 it vas nat an absolute autocracy as it had been at the 
beginning of the year but it was far from being the democratic republic the 
Bolsheviks had aimed for. The Bolsheviks had failed and when one looks over 
their activity over the course of 1905 it is easy to see why. 
One of the most evident weaknesses of the Bolsheviks and their revolu• 
tions.ry allies was their lack of arms. An entire empire cannot be armed by 
a series of smuggling operations, gun shop burglaries, or assaults on 1ndivid• 
ual policemen. 'l'he defeat of the revolutionaries 1n almost every one of the 
amed uprisings of 1905 can be attributed to the lack and poor quality of fire 
arms. 'l'here was, however, very little either the Bolsheviks or any other 
revolutionaries could do about it. 
Another technical difficulty which cost all the revolutionary parties 
dearly vas the inexperience of the members 1n actually fighting battles 
against the government. Most of the men who made up the canbat units were pro 
fessional agitators or workers. They soon found that engaging the army was a 
far cry from merely dodging the police. The same lack of coordination be• 
t;reen revolutionary units and the same failure to execute a well•pla:nned attac 
against strategic points were evident not only 1n Moscow but repeated over 
and over again 1n cOtmtless towns and villages. The lack of mUitary ability 
among the revolutianaries1 in general, was exhibited on the strategic as well 
a 
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non-existent. The eastern Ukraine offered a rare example ot cooperation be• 
tween tCMls 1n a region, pooling resources and shirting farces to threatened 
points in the area--too rare as tar as the Bolsheviks and the other revolu• 
tiona.ry parties were concerned. Throughout the year the government reta:tned 
effective control of commtmications and la!pt the initiative by attacking the 
revolutionary forces when and where it pleased. The grossest e:xsmple of this 
is the passage of troops f'r<D st. Petersburg to Moscow in the most critical 
times of the December rising while the railroad emplo,ees went about their 
of operating the railroad. The only real exception vas in Siberia W.L1.ere the 
revolutionaries seized control of the line but this was quic~ re:paired by 
Rennenkampf and Meller•Zakanelski. 
The wry size of the revolutionary farces made victory almost impossib 
The snell number of' men who were actually able and willing to take up arms 1n 
Moscow is representative of other centers 1n Russia. As yet 1 only a traction 
of the proletariat ws actually revolutiOD.Bry. In the second halt ot 1905 
most workers' demands did tnelude political liberty and a representative 
government. However 1 it is doubtful that aey great nl.ll1ber of the workers 
were willing to fight and die tor these ideals or even tul.ly understood -what 
they meant. Only a snall part of the proletariat participated in the mikes. 
Only 31.4;, of' Russia's factory workers participeted in the great October 
strike, while in the December strike 1 which ws supposed to respresent the 
peak of the revolutionary movement this figure dropped to 26.~.1 
It the Bolsheviks and other revolutionary parties had little support 
among the proletariat, they had even less among the peasantry, the largest 
class in Russia. The Socialist-Revolutionaries were the only revolutionary 
party Which had an:y real influence among the pea santa and though they did 
rouse many to revolt, the peasant risings were scattered, unorganized, and 
disconnected from the proletarian revolutionary movement. The Bolsheviks, 
understandably 1 concentrated most ot their et:fort on the proletariat and it 
is difficult to see how such a snall party could influence and organize such 
a large and dispersed class as the Russian peasantry. Yet, to get the 
suppotrt of the peasantry 1 as Lenin had so of'ten emphasized, was essential for 
a proletarian victory and the BolsheViks' failure to coordinate the peasant 
movement with the proletarian movement was a major cause of their defeat. 
Perhaps even more important was the failure to obtain the support of 
the army. Again, this is partly due to the Bolsheviks' and other proletarian 
parties' concentration of effort on the working classes. The bulk of the men 
in the military forces seem to have belonged to no party at all or adhered 
to the Socialist-Revolutionary Party 'Which appealed to the peasant majority in 
the army. However, the failure to turn the army against the government was 
due more to the difficulty of evading the army's security and disciplinary 
measures against agitators and revolutionary- organizations than to anything 
else. Furthermore, it was found that troops at the front are less susceptible 
to revolutionary agitation. The revolutionary parties failed to turn the Far 
Eastern forces against the government. General Rennenkampt was able to muster 
a sufficient force to clear the 'l'rsns-Siberian Railroad of revolutionaries. 
Most manifestations go to the front. Even in those risings which resulted in 
bloodshed, most of' the rebelling soldiers directed their anger sgd.inst their 
officers and the army's disciplinary system while retaining a basic loyalty to 
-179-
God and their Tsar. With the :&npire's large and well-armed military force 
still basically loyal to the goverm.ent 1 the revolution had no chance of 
success. 
While the revolutionary parties Wluenced such a small part of all the 
classes of the population, they were further weakened b1 division among 
themselves. There was no one leader who could marshal all the revolutionary 
forces for one blow against the government. Lenin -was a forceful leader but 
cetmnanded the loyalty of only a small party. The largest :party, the Socialist· 
Revolutionary had many leaders and was not as well-organized as the Bolshevik 
faction. Meanwhile, there was little cooperation between the many parties. 
Fa.ther Ge.pon's congress in early 1905 collapsed and resulted in no substantial 
tm.ity between revolutionary :parties. Bolshevik committees did often reach 
local agreements with the Mensheviks and even the Socialist-Revolutionaries 
as at Baku, Moscow., end Kharkov, but usually the parties could not agree on 
when to start or end a general strike or an armed uprising or what tactics to 
use. Even during the Moscow uprising thel!f! was frequent bickering between 
the canbat units of various parties. 
Finally, one of the most important reasons for the Bolshevik failure in 
1905 was that they let events control them and initiated the armed uprising 
prematurely. The proletariat was as ~t mostly disorganized and poorly armed. 
The peasant masses 1 though in the midst of a violent upheaval, were still 
disorganized and largely disconnected fran the proletaria.n movement. Most 
important of all, the army was still generally loyal to the government, thus 
ma1~in.g a revolutionEtl'Y victory in 1905 virtually impossible. Faced with such 
a iituation the Bolsheviks should. have postpoDed the uprising at least until 
spring as Lenin suggested, or even far several more ~ars. In a.Uowing them• 
selves to be provoked by the arrest of the st. Petersburg Soviet and drawn in· 
to action by a doubtful revolt in the Moscow garrison and by the fear that 
the masses would be demoralized 1f they did not act immediately, the BolshevU s 
relinquished their independence of action and failed 1n their role of "van-
guard of the proletariat." 
But no revolution is a total loss. The agitation of the Bolsheviks 
and other political parties, the October General strike, and the armed up .. 
rising did serve to make the masses more conscious politically. The soviet 
was introduced into Russian politics and sprang up again 1n 1917 as soon as 
the Tsar's authority was overthrown. Judging by the way the Bolsheviks seized 
power in 1917 they had learned scme valuable lessons fran their defeat 1n 
1905. I..?J. 1917 Lenin put little faith in the proletarian Red Gward and waited 
for the army to support him against the Provisional Government. Nor did the 
Bolsheviks allow the spontaneity of the masses to draw them into a conflict 
with the Provisional Govermnent prematurely. They withdrew their support froo 
the July uprisings in 1917 and waited for additional casualties at the front 
and the fear of a royalist reaction inspired by the Kornilov revolt to do the :I r 
work before they dared to selze power in October. 
One thing the Bolsheviks did not realize in 1905 was that they had been 
defeated. In the first week of January of 1906 Lenin wrote 1 
Let the tasks of the workers' party stand clearly before it. 
Dov.'ll with constitutional illusions. It is necessary to gather the new 
forces joining the proletariat. It is necessary to "gather the experi• 
ences" of' the two great months of revolution {November and December). 
It is necessary age in to ad9Pt to the restored autocracy. It is 
necessary to be able to crawl back into the underground wherever necess• 
ary. It is necessary to establish practically and more definitely the 
colossal tasks of' a new, active drive by preparing tor it more firmly, 
more systematically, more persistently, gathering, wherever possible, 
the strength of the proletariat, exhausted by the struggle of the strike~ 
Wave follows wave. After the capital the ].lE'OVinces. After the 
border erea s the very heart of Russia. After the proletariat the tow 
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petty bourgeoisie. After the town the countryside. The overthrow of 
the reactionary government is inescapable in the execution of their 
all-em.brac:irJ.g tasks. Mucl1 of the outcane of the first phase of the 




RESOWTION OF III PARTY COHGRESS 
OI'J THE ARNED UP.R ISirlG 
1. Whereas the proletariat being, by virtue of its position, the foremost 
and only consistently revolutionary class, is therefore called upon to play 
the leading role in the general democratic revolutionary movement in Russia; 
2. Whereas this movement at the present ti.'De has already led to the necessity 
of an armed uprising; 
3. Whereas the proletariat will inevitably taka the most energetic part in 
this uprising, which participation will decide the destiny of the revolution 
in Russia; 
4. Whereas the proletariat can play the leading role in this revolution only 
if it is united in a single and independent polltical force tmder the banner 
of the Social-Democratic Labour Party, which directs its struggle both ideo-
logically and practically; and 
5:. Whereas only the performance of this role will ensure to the proletariat 
the most advantageous conditions for the struggle for socialism against the 
propertied classes of bourgeois-democratic Russia;-
Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.s.D.L.P. holds that the task of or-
ganising the proletariat for direct struggle against the autocracy by means of 
the armed uprising is one of the major and most urgent tasks of the Party at 
the present revolutionar.r moment. 
Accordingly, the Congress instructs all Party organisations: 
a) to explain to the proletariat by means of propaganda and agitation, not 
only the political significance 1 but the practical organisational aspect of 
the impending armed uprising, 
b) to explain 1n that propaganda and agitation the role of mass political 
strikes, which may be of great importance at the beginning and during tr:~e 
pro~ss of the uprising, and 
c) to take the most energetic steps towards arming the proletariat, as well 
as drawing up a plan of the armed uprising and of direct leadership thereof 1 
for which purpose special groups of Party workers should be formed as and 
when necessary. 
Trettii snezd, p. 4-50-451. 
Appendix II 
DEX: ISIOI~ OF III PARTY COifGRESS mr THE 
PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIOI~Y GOV.TiRNl·1Erfl' 
1. Whereas both the direct interests of the Russian proletariat and those of 
its struggle for the ultimate aims of socialism require the fullest possible 
measure of political freedom, and, consequently, the replacement of the auto-
cratic form of government by the democratic republic; 
2. Whereas the actualization of a democratic Republic in Russia 1s possible 
only as a result of a victorious popular amed uprising of ~1ich a provisional 
revolutionary government will be the organ,. which alone is capable of securing 
complete freeda~ of agitation and of convening a Constituent Assembly that 
will really express the will of the people, an Assembly elected on the basis 
of universal, direct 1 and equal suffrage by secret ballot; and 
3· Whereas this democratic revolution in Russia by its Socio-economic system, 
rrill not weaken, but, on the contrary, will strengthen the domination of the 
bourgeoisie 1 which, at a certain juncture 1 will inevitably go to all lengths 
to take away from the Russian proletariat as many of the gains oi' the revolu-
tionary period as possible;--
Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. resolves: 
a) that w should spread among the working class the conviction that a 
provisional revolutionar,y government is absolutely necessaey, and discuss at 
workers' meetings the conditions required for the full and prompt realisation 
of all the :Immediate political and economic demands of our progranrne; 
b) that in the event of the victorious uprising of the people and the com• 
plete overthrow of the autocracy, representatives of our Party may participate 
in the provisional revolutionary government for the purpose of waging a re-
lentless struggle against all counter-revolutionary attempts and of defending 
the independent interests of the working class; 
c) that essential conditions for such participation are strict control 
of its representatives by the Party, and the constant safeguarding of the 
independence of the Social-Democratic Party, which strives for the complete 
socialist revolution, and, consequently, is irreconcilably opposed to all the 
bourgeois parties; 
d) that, irrespective of whether participation of Social-Democrats 1n the 
provisional revolutionary government is possible or not, we must propagate 
among the broadest sections of the prol.etatiat the idea that the armed prole-
tariat, led by the Social-Democratic Party, must bring to bear constant pres-
sure on the provisional government for the purpose of defending, consolidating 
and extending the gains of the revolution. 
Trettii S"ezd, p. 451-452. 
- -- ----------
Appendix III 
DECISim: OF III PARTY COHGRESS 0:~ TH.E 
1. V."h.ereas the growing peasant movement, though spontaMous and politically 
unconscious, if.~ nonetheless inevitably directed against the existL'"lg order 
and all remnants of serfdom in general, 
2. l\l};.ereos it is one of the tasks of Social-Democracy to support every 
revolutionary mov:?ment against the existing social and political order; 
3. h'hereas, L'l vie"t-r of the aforesaid,. the Social-Democrats must strive to 
purify the revolutionary-democratic features of the peasant movement of all 
reactionary premises to develop the revolU'tiionary consciousness of the 
peasontry and fulfill their democratic demands to their logical conclusion; 
4. Whereas t:"l.e Social-Democratic Party, as the party of the proletariat, must 
in all cases and under all circumstances work steadfastly for the independent 
organisation of the rural proletariat and to clarUy for this class the irre-
concils.ble antagonism between its interests and those of the peasant 
bourgeoisie;--
Therefore 1 the Third Party Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. instructs all 
Party organisations: 
a) To car:ey on propaganda among the wide masses of the people that Social-
democracy considers it its task to support all revolutionary measures of the 
peasantry 1 which are capable of bettering of its condition, even to the con-
fiscation of patrimonial state church, monestary and private estates. 
b) To put fo~-~Srd as a practical slogan for agitation among the peasantry· 
a.'>l.d as a means of instilling the utmost political consciousness into the 
peasant movement, the necessity of the immediate organisation of revolutionary 
peasant committees that shall heve as their aim the carrying out of all revol-
utionary-democratic reforms in the interests of the peasantry ZL.'>l.d the libera-
tion of the peasantry from the tyranny of the police, the officials, and the 
landlords; 
c)To the peasantry and rural proletariat, to non-performance of military 
service 1 general refusal to pey taxes, and ref'ussl to recognise the authori-
ties, in order to disorganise the autocratic regime and support the revolution 
ary onset directed against it; 
d) to work for the independent organisation of the rural proletariat 
and for its fUsion with the urban proletariat under the banner of the Social-
Democratic Party and the inclusion of its representatives in the peasant 
Committees. 
Trettii S"ezd, p. 454. 
What do the police 
and officials want1 
Appendix IV 
LENIN'S POSITI<li Vl!BSO'S LI.BPEAL 
C<MPROMISE WITH AUTOCRACY 
'.rllREE CottsriTUTIONS 00 'l'.HRD sYSTliMS 
<F GOVIiRN'MKNT 
lihat <!o the most 
liberal of the bour-
geois (the people 
of the Osvobozhde• 
niye 1 or the Con-
'lhe absolute monarchy. 
stitutional-Demo• 
cratic Parjty wanti 
The constitutional 
monarchy. 








OJ!' WHAT DO TIIESE SYSI'EMS OF GOVERNMENT C<JiSISl'f 
Const; itutional Democratic 
Republic 
1. The tsar--an 
absolute monarch. 
2. A Council of 
State (officials ap-
pointed by the tsar) • 
3 • A state Duma, or 
consultative body- of 
:popular representatives 
(indirect 1 unequal, and 
non-universal elections). 
monarchy 
1. The tsar--a con• 
stituliionAl monarch. 
2. An Upper IIouse 
of popular represen-
tatives (indirect 1 not 
quite equal and not quite 
universal elections). 
3. A Lower House 
(universal, direct, and 
equal elections by 
secret ballot) • 
1. No tsar. 
2. No Upper House. 
3· A single repub-
lican house ( 'lm.iver• 
sal, direct 1 and 
equal elections by 
secret ballot) • 
Absolute 
Monarchy 
1 and 2. Cor.1plete 
power of the police 
~~d the officials 
over the people 
3· Consultative 
voice of the big 
bourgeoisie and the 
rich landlords. 
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WHAT IS TJE SI~TlFICA.I.""lCE OF THESE 
SYSTm:lS OF GOVmNMm:TTY 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
1. One-third of 
the power in the 
hands of the police 
and the officials, 
headed by the tsar. 
2. One-third of 
the power in the 
hands of the big 
bourgeoisie and the 
rich landlords. 
rio power for tlle people. 3. One-third of 
the power in the 




That the courtiers, 
the police 1 and 
the officials may 
live on the rat of 
the land; 
that the rich may 
rob the workers 
and peasants at 
their own free will; 
that the people 
may remain forever 
without rights and 
live in darkness 
and ignorance. 
WHAT PURPOSE SIALL THESE 
SYS'lEMS fR GO~ SERVE! 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
That the police 
and the officials 
may be dependent 
on the capitalists 
and landlords; 
that the capital-
ists, landlords, and 
rich peasants may 
freely and easily 
rob the workers of 
town and country 1 
by right and not 
by arbitrary rule. 
Lenin, Collected Works, v. 8. 
Democratic 
Republic 
1. Uo independ ... 
ent power for either 
the police or the 
officials; their com~ 
plete subordination 
to the people • 
2. lie privileges 
for either the capi-





i."l. the l:umds of the 
whole people • 
Democratic 
Republic 
That the free and 
enlightened people 
may learn to run 
things themselves, 
and 1 principally 1 
that the working 
class may be free to 
struggle for social-
ism, for a system 
under which there 
<t.rill neither be rich 
nor poor and all the 
land 1 all the facto-
ries and "WOrks 1 will 
belong to all the 
working people. 
Appendix V 
LEAFLET ISSUllD BY T.UE FEDERATIVE SOVIE'.r 00, MOOOOW 
:EXll:.t:PLJFYn{G 'niE BOISHJWDCS' AriD I•tl!:tfS'IEVIICS' 
CONDJ!l&TIO!r OF THE 
OCTOBmt t~JA<.'llFEftt 
Comrades! Our terrible stril.a has delivered an awful blow to the hate-
ful (;0\"Crn::.'lent of the Tsar. In confusion, the autocracy grabs on to its last 
remain.L."lg recourse: it struggles within the loving embrace of the bourgeoisie 
and its servants, the moderate liberals. The co-wardly manifest of the Tsar 
is a solei:m offering of hand and heart to our sworn enemies, OU't" eternal oppre s t-
sors1 the bourgeois class. TOf:tha proletariat it insures nothing but cloudy 
promises of all liberties and nev threats and coercions.--olr strike has de-
livered an s:wful blow to the Tsarist gowrnment, but it has also shrnm us 
that it is impossible to kill it and. wipe it fran the face of the earth by-
means of a strike alone.--"weaponst" .,Give us wsponsH" tbat is the demand 
that resounded frcrn all sides. The strike r.tas united and organized us, it 
has shown the enitre world our strength, it has opened the eyes of our blind 
canrsdes1 it has sparked the thirst for liberty in all the proletariat. The 
present strike has plaj"Sd its great role 1 it has given all it can give. We 
can get nothing more from it • We propose that it be temporarily suspended. 
Temporarily, cCil11'8des1 Because we will soon take the field again, we 'Will talm 
the field 1n the decisive stl"UI;!le and for that decisive taking of the field 
l~ should prepare as follows-- To arms!"·· That is our ir:'~diate call. Arm 
yourselves, canrades1 with whatever you can1 obtain -weapons wherever you can. 
--we know that l.11Sny 'Who have aided us in thestrike t~re leaving us. Many of 
these will become our enemies and vill kiss the hand 'Which only ~sterday r 
whipped them. But the terrible proletariat does not need false allies and is 
not afraid of its enemies as many as there may be. Organize, canrades, close 
your ranks tightly, and gather under our pure proletarian decisive struggle. 
We swear by the blood of our fallen c0ll11"8des that we vill not lay down our 
ams until we destroy the government and obtain the realization of our demands. 
--we vill prove that contemporary society is supported only by the strength 
of' proletarian a.ltoulders. And let the entire bourgeois world lmow that "le rtll 
bring all our strength to bear against it if it thinks to stand 1n our way. 
Suspending the general political strike for nov, we propose that those of our 
comrades ~rh.o r...ave put forth economic demands, use all means to realize them. 
Along 'With that, we call upon all canrades to champion the liberty of speech 
and assembly w:tth all their strength, eveey"VThere 'Where we have obtained it. 
And after that, we will quickly prepare ourselves, eanrades, for the armed 
upris:tng. v!ith a.rmed hands we will overth.rov the tsarist government and then 
the provisional revolutionary government will call together a popular consti-
tuent assembly, 'Which will legalize our immediate demands. Let our terrible 
calls carry over aU of proletarian Russia like a storm. To amst Long live 
the uprisingt Long live the popular constituent assemblyl Long live the 
democratic republic t I..ong live the struggle for socialimllt L:mg live the 
Russian Social-Democratic Partrl-
APPENDIX VI 
ISTTZR OF OCTOB!i:R 27 TO ALL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS 
SHOtiDiJG THE BOLSH3VIK ATTITUDB: 
TOl~RD SOVIETS 
The Russian Social-Democratic par~ must at the present time openly 
step forward as the party of the Proletarian masses. In the way of such a 
manifestation it meets politically vague and socialistically immature workers' 
organizations created by the spontaneously revolutionary proletariat. Each 
one of these organizations, presenting a certain stage in the political devel-
opment of the proletariat in so much as this development stays within the 
ranks of social-democracy. But objectively such an organization faces of 
holding back the proletariat on a primitive political level and so subordinate 
it to bourgeois parties. 
One such organization is the Petersburg Soviet of '1lorkers' Deputies. 
The tasks of Social-Democracy in its relation to the Soviet is to induce it 
to adopt the Sooial-Damooratic program and tactical leadership. With these 
aims it is necessary to immediately nobilize all the Social-Democratic forces 
in the Soviet in order to put the Social-Democratic platform into practice 
within the Soviet. 
In its relations with such independent organizations, in as much as they 
attempt to take upon themselves the role of the political leaders of the 
proletarian masses, the tactics of the Sooial-Democra ts should. be such: 
1) To persuade such organizations to adopt the program of the Sooial-
Democra tic Par~ as the party in accord w1 th the true interests of the prole-
tarian masses. In adopting this program, they should actually define their 
relation to the Social-Democratic Party, recognize its leadership, and fin-
ally, dissolve itself into it. It these organizations should not strive for 
political leadership but merely remain pure trade organizations, they fulfill 
their definite purely technical role. 
2) In the case of the refusal by such organizations to adopt our party 
program or their adoption of some other program, Sooial-Demoorats should quit 
them and expose their anti-proletarian oharacter. 
J) Finally, when the organizations refuse to adopt this or that certain 
program, but reserve for themselves the right to define their polioy in 
each separate instance, Social-Democrats should remain within them and prov-
ing within these organizations as well as among the wide masses the absurdity 
of such political leadership and amplifying their own program and tactics. 
l1.I. VasU• ev-Iuzhin, "!1oskovskii Sovet Rabochikh Deputatov v 1905" 
.f.roletarskaia B.tvoliutsiia, April 1925, PP• 89-90. 
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A?PENDIX VII 
RUSSIAN SOCIAL-JEl'10CRATIC LABOR PARTY 
PROLETARIANS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE t 
Regula t:i.Olls of the 
"'Jorkers' Comba. t Company 
of the Moscow Committee of the RSDLP 
#1. The i'IC RSDLP imposes the following tasks on its comba. t company 
First, it must protect all gatherings of organized workers from encroach 
ments by the Black Hundreds, police, a:rxi Cossacks. 
Second, it must take upon itself the protection or all citizens against 
the pograoms and lawlessness organized by the police. 
Finally, third, it must help the conscious proletariat organize itself 
for the armed uprising and at the very moment of the uprising must take its 
place in the front ranks of the proletariat in order to repel the last forces 
of the autocracy. 
One joining the company :>hould calculate his abilities strictly. 
He should remember that in all conflicts he will be in the forefront and 
that he will always be threatened by death. A member of the company must 
be selfless and brave. 
#2 Only those persons ms.y be members of the combat company who are 
well-known by soma parcy organizations and are recommended by it as uncondi-
tionally conspiratorial, determined, a:rxi devoted to the party. 
#J. The company is divided into the active and the reserve components. 
#4. The members of the active company are those who have learned to 
use weapons wlll, are acquainted with the necessary methods of combat opera-
tions , and are possessed of a spirit of strict discipline. 
ffS. In the reserve are included those persons w1 th preliminary training 
who wish to join the company but do not meet the requirements of #4. 
Note. All local party workers possessing weapons may be included in 
the reserve. 
16. The active part of the company, constituting the main combat strang h 
of the organization, is divided by districts into details headed by organizers 
designated by the Committee and approved by the detail. Each detail is com-
posed of several tens made up, if possible, of those working on one plant or 
living alose to eaah other, and including an elected 11 Desiatsk1i" approved 
b,y the organizer, a courier, and a scout. 
Note. Each new ten of a detachment is recruited from. the district 
reserve under the strict control of the foreman and the organizer. 
#7. The responsiblli1;y to concern oneself with the prudent growth of 
the detachment, correct distribution or weapons withint the detachment, 
the correct procedure of m1litary exeraises, and so on, falls on the organizer 
At times when the detachnent is acting or is performing soma service, 
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submit themselves. 
Note. For the combat training of each detachment a special instructor 
may be designated; At the time when the entire company takes the field, 
the instructor may receive command of the detachment. This fact is to be 
announced to the detachment by the organizer who from that moment places him-
self under his command in the role of his closest assistant. 
Note. 2. The gathering of organizers, under the presidency of a repre~ 
senta.tive of the Committee constitutes the council of the company, managing 
its internal affairs. 
#8. The district organizer can be removed b,y the demand of a two-thirds 
majority of a general assembly of the detachment, called together by the 
representative of the Committee based on the demand of one fourth of the 
detachment. 
t9. It is the responsibility of the ffdesiatskii" to supervise the dis-
tribution of weapons. The responsibili~ of the distribution of weapons with-
in the ten, the strict account of bullets and their distribution, the super-
vision of the conditions of the weapons of eadh member, the calling together 
of the entire ten on the demand of the organizer, and so on, falls on the 
"desiatskii." During a period when the ten has taken the field, for example 
in protecting plant meetings, the 11 Desia tsldi, 11 in the basence of the organ-
izer commands the ten, and eonsequently, the entire ten is to submit to his 
orders. 
#10. Weapons, given by the organization belong to the organization 
and not to the individual members. Therefore, 
1) No member has the right to arbitrarily dispose of the weapon 
given to him, to transfer it to other hands, or exchange it with other com-
rades or give it away for repairs without permission, and so on. 
2) Leaving the organization, even temporarily, each is oblighed, 
~thout fail, to transfer the weapon to the organization, through the 11 desiatski • 
#11. The right to carry weapons constantly is given only to the active 
company. Members of the reserve may only have them during target practice 
and during the fulfillment of some task, if necessary. 
#12. In the handling of the weapons, each member is obliged to strictly 
follow particular instructions and all the directives of the leaders: other-
wise, the weapon may be taken away from him by the 11 desiatskii" or organizer. 
#13. To preserve comradely relations members must conform to strict 
discipline, by the force of which each member is obliged to: 
1) To show up in the designated place and time at the first call. 
2) During periods of combat activity and service, the company is to 
submit unconditionally to all the dispositions of the leaders, even if they 
should seem to be incorrect. 
3) Departing from the city for a time, it is obligatory to obtain 
leave from the "desiatskii" or the organizer, and leave the weapons with him. 
#14. Each member must hold the internal affairs of the company in 
trictest secrecy, not speaking about them needlessly to even the closest 
comrades. 
#15. For a more or less serious breech of the regulations a member may 
be excluded from the company and this exclusion is possible only b,y a decree 
App. m (Contd.') 
of the comradely court. 
Note. Each Desia tskii or organizer may temporarily remove a member 
from the detachment. 
Printing Department of the Moscow Committee. 
Vysshii Pod'em Revoliuts11. I, pp. 600-601. 
APPZNDIX VIII 
LEAFLET OF TIE HOS CO~i COH~'.liTT3Z ISSUED ON DZCZi11£R 4, 
CALLING FOR THE PREP~1ATION FOR A FINAL DZCISIVE 
STRUGGLE AGAINST THE AUTOCRACY. 
Comrades! Every day it gets harder for the Tsarist government. Its 
last support--the a~--is also wavering and is beginning to rise directly 
against it. After Savastopol, Kronstadt, Piatigorsk, Riga and SamaJa,, the 
army has also rebelled here in Hoscow. In the Rostov Regiment all the offi-
cers have been expelled, all tha authorities' guards have bean seized, and 
the barracks and weapons are in the hands of the rebelling regiment. 
The rest of the arm;y is also restless. 
Not today, but tomorrow, perhaps , the deoisi ve day will come, when the 
army will not be in a condition to restrain itself and will come out on the 
street. Perhaps, the day of the decisive struggle is near. Prepare your .. 
selves, comrades, that you ma.y provide help to your comrades, the soldiers. 
Prepare yourselves, tba t we may, through the general strike and other means, 
help our friends and comrades overthrow the common ene:uzy- by force. Organize, 
prepare for the decisive struggle. 
December 4. 
Moscow Committe• of the Russian Sooial-
Democratic Labor Party. 
APPENDIX IX 
CALL OF THE IJJ.OSCOW SOVIET AND THE MAJOR REVOLUTIONARY 
PARTIES IN MOSCOW TO PREPARE FOR THE ARMED UP-
RISING, ISSUED DlOC'EMBJm 6. 
TO AU. WORKERS, SOLDIERS, AND CITIZENS 
Since October 17 when the working class forcefully tore the promise of 
various liberties and the "actual" inviolability of the person from the tsar-
1st government, violence on the part of the government did not only not cease 
but even increased, and h\.UI1an blood is flowing as usual. 
Free gatherings where free words can be heard are scattered with weapons 
Trade and political 1.mions are cruelly persecuted. Free newspapers are closed 
by tens. Prison is threatened for striking. 
Such mockeries and violations are made of the actual "inviolability" of 
the Russian citizen, that the blood freezes in one's veins. 
Again the prisons are being crammed full of fighters for liberty. 
Entire counties and provinces are being put under martial law. 
litmgry peasants are being beaten and shot without mercy. 
Sailors and soldiers not wanting to be fratricides and joining their 
people fester 1n prisons and ere drowned and killed. 
If a 11 the blood and tears spilled throug.l-J. the guilt of the government 
only in October were gathered, the government would drown in them, comrades! 
But with special hatefulness the tsarist government comes down on the 
working class: concluding an agreement with the capitalists, it throws hun-
dreds o:f thousands of workers out on the street, dooming them to pauperism 
and a hungry death. 
It places deputies and workers' leaders in prison by tens and hundreds. 
It threa•ens to take "exceptional" measures against the representatives 
of the Social-Democratic Labor Party and the party of Socialist-Revolutionaries 
It has again organized the Black Hundreds and threatens new mass murders 
and pogroms. 
The revolutionary proletariat can no longer tolerate the mockeries and 
crimes of the tsarist government and declares a decisive and 1.mrelenting war 
against it. 
Comrades workers! We, your elected deputies, the Moscow Committee, 
the Moscow Group, the !·1oscow District Organization o:f the Russian Social-
Democratic Labor Party, and the Moscow Committee of the Party of Socialist-
Revolutionaries declare a general political strike and call you to drop and 
stop your work at all factories and p lants and 1n all business and government 
enterprises on Wednesday, December 7, at 12 o'clock. 
Long live the unrelenting struggle with the criminal tsarist govern..rnent. 
Comrades soldiers, you are our blood broth.ers, children, together with 
us of the same mother, long-suffering Russia. You have already acknowledged 
and confirmed this through your participation 1n the general struggle. Today 
when the proletariat declares a decisive war on the hateful enemy of the 
people--the tsarist government--you also act with determination and solidarity. 
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Refuse to submit to your blood thirsty leadership, expell them and arrest 
them. Elect reliable leaders froo among yourselves and with weapons in your 
hands, unite with the rising people. Together with the working class, obtain 
the abolition of the army and t~:1e general ::rming of the people. Obtain the 
abolition of military courts and martial law. 
Long live the union of the revolutionary proletariat with the revolu-
tionary army! 
Long live the struggle for general freedom! 
And you citizens, wf.1o truly thirst for widespread freedom, help the 
rising wurkers and soldiers as much as you can--by personal participation and 
general means. The proletariat and tlle army struggle for the liberty and 
happiness of all Russia and all the people. The entire future of Russia is 
placed on a card; life or death, liberty or slavery! 
With our tmited strength we will finally overthrow the criminal tsarist 
government, convoke a constituent assembly based on general, equal, direct, 
and secret suffrage, and asset a democratic republic which alone can guarantee 
broad freedom and actual inviolability of the person. 
Together into the struggle, comrades workers, soldiers, and citizens. 
Down with the criminal tsarist government: 
Long live the general strike and armed uprisingt 
Long live the popular constituent assembly! 
Long live the democratic republic! 
The fvbscow Soviet of Workers Deputies 
The Moscow Committee 
The Moscow Group RSDLP 
The Moscow district Organization 
The Moscow Connnittee of the Party of 
Socialist-Revolutionaries 
APPENDlX X 
Instructions on Guerilla WBrt'are Issued by 
tee Bolshevik Moscow Committee, 
December 11, 19;5. 
ADVICE TO THE R ISDiG WORK.l§iS 
Comrades~ A street battle of rising workers against the army and 
police has begun. If' your do not adhare to certain rules 1 many of your bro-
thei't'Hmhy pc;l.~ish.:in.'thi'; battle. The canbat organization of the Moscow Com-
mittee of the Social-Democratic Labor Party makes haste to point these rules 
out and to urge you to follow them strictly. 
1. The first Rule--do not act in crowds. Work in l:Dall details of 
three or four men, not more. Let there be as many of these details as pos-
sible and let them learn to attack quickly and disappear quickly. The police 
strives to shoot crowds of thousands of people with a hundred coasacks. You 
must put one or two snipers against a hundred cossacks. To fall on a hlm• 
dred is easier than on one, especially if that one shoots and escapes 1m• 
noticed. The police and army will be helpless if all Moscow is covered with 
this small and elusive details. 
2. In addition, comrades, do not take up fortified places. The army 
always attmmpts to take them or simply destroy tham with artillery. Let 
our fortresses be passable yards and all places from which we can shoot and 
escape easily. If they take such a place, they will not find anyone there, 
and will lose many of their own. It is impossible to take them all, for to 
do that it would be necesS817 to settle every home with a cossack. 
3· Th.efefore, comrades, if anyone should call you to go in a great 
crowd or to taks a fortified place, consider him a fool or a provocator. If' 
he is a fool, don't listen to him, if a provocator••kill ••• 
4. Also, avoid going to large meetings. We see them often in tree 
states, but for now, it is necessary to struggle and only struggle. The 
government understands this perfectly and makes use of our meetings to beat 
and disarm us. 
5. Rather, gather in small clusters for combat conferences 1 each in 
his own district, and at the first appearance of the army, scatter throughout 
the yards. From these yards, shoot and throw rocks at the Cossacks and after 
thai, climb into the neighboring yard and leave. 
6. strictly differentiate between your conscious enemies and your 
unconscious and accidental enemies. Destroy the former and have mercy on the 
latter. It 1 possible do not bother the infantry. Soldiers are the children 
of the people and do not go against the people by their awn will. The otfi• 
cera and the higher leadership set them on the people. Direct ;your energie a 
against these officers and authorities. Every officer leading soldiers to 
beat workers proelafms h:lmself an enemy of' the people and puts himself out-
side the law. Kill him unconditionally. 
7. Do not spare the Cossacks. Much of the people's blood is upon 
... rm. ...... .... ... J:lt ..... ~" • 
-., .. .. ..... 
-196-
APPEi.'l'D IX X ( Cont • d • ) 
awn lands, wh.ere they have their lands and families, or let them sit shut up 
in their barracks. Do not bother them there. But as soon as they cane out 
on the street--on foot or on horse 1 armed or tmarmed--consider them the most 
evil enemies and destroy them t-'ithout pity. 
8. Att&ck and destroy the dragoons and patrols. 
9. !n conflict with the police, proceed in this way. Kill all higher 
ranks whenever conditioi!s are favorable. Disarm and arrest the others. Also 
ldll those 'Who are known for their cruelty and meanness. As tor the town 
militia only take their weapons and canpel them to serve not the police but 
us. 
10. Forbid homeowners to lock their doors. This is very important. 
Go after them and if they do not obey 1 beat them for the first offense 1 and 
tor the second--kill them. Ccnpel the haneowners to serve us and not the 
police. 'l'hen 1 each yard will be our refuge and place of ambush. 
These then, are the most important rules, comrades. In forthcaning 
leaflets the canbat organization will give you additional advice on how to 
protect yourselves, attack, and construct barricades. Now we will say a 
few words about sanething quite different. 
Remember Ccmrades that we want not only to destroy the old order but 
to build a new one 1 in 'Which each citizen will be tree fran all compulsion. 
Therefore, immediately take upon yourselves the protection Of all citizens. 
Protect them. Make unnecessary that police 1 which under the disguise of pro-
tector of the social peace and security exercises farce over the poor, puts 
us in prison, and forms Black Hundred Pogroms: 
Our immediate task, canrades is to transfer the city into the hands of' 
the people. We will begin with the outskirts and seize one part after another 
In the seized pert we will immediately establish our elected administration, 
install our ow order, the eight-hour day, progressive taxes, and so on. We 
will prove that under our administration social life will go on more justly, 
and the life, liberty, and rights of each will be better protected than now. 
Therefore, struggling and destroySng, rem.ember your future roles and 
learn to be rulers. 
Combat Organization of the Moscow Committee of the 
Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party. 
SPREAD 'miS LEAFLET EVERYWHERE, PASTE IT ON '.IHE 9m.E:R'J.S1 .HA.l-,.IJ .d' wl! •.rv 
PA SSER6-BY. 
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